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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Field of General Value Theo~y• 
i. Axiology a Nineteenth Century Development. 
It is the purpose of this dissertation to consider the 
cont~ibutions of Karl Marx to discussions of those prob-
lems which lie in the field of general theory of value, or 
axiology. But since value theory is itself a newcomer to 
the philosophical sciences, some preliminary remarks may 
profitably. be made concerning it. 
(l) Lotze. 
General value theory is really a nineteenth century 
development. Schiller calls the discovery of value theory 
8 the greatest philosophic achievement of the nineteenth 
century.al Previously a great deal of thought had been 
directed toward this or that question relating to value, 
. especially the question of ethical values. But it was not 
until the present century that value theory came into the 
philosophical consciousness as a distinct and independent 
field of inquiry. 
Several lines of thought converged to make this devel-
opment possible. First, there was the insight that value 
theory is fundamental not only for ethics, but for other 
fields of thought as well, notably metaphysics. This insight 
1. Art. (1922), 5g4. For an explanation of the system of 
abbreviations used in this dissertation see the bibliog-
raphy. 
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was given expression by Lotze (lgl7-lggl) who saw in ethics 
the starting point of metaphysios.l Lotze recognized that 
considerations of value do as a matter of fact influence 
and bear on o'tir theories about the nature of the world as 
it is, as well as on our ethical views. A recent example 
of the influence of value considerations in the philosophy 
of religion is Professor Brightmanfs proof of the immor-
tality of the soul, a proof which rests largely on the 
goodnes~ of God. 2 
It is evident that if value considerations are related 
to metaphysics and philosophy of religion~ not to mention 
other fields which came to have normative significance, 
such as logiot it becomes the task of critical philosophy 
to turn its attention systematically to the problem of 
values. Kant's insistence on the need for criticism of the 
presuppositions of knowledge was thus to be repeated in the 
nineteenth century in the field of values. This type of 
critical philosophy was given impetus by Lotze's insight. 
· (2) The Austrian Group. 
Another line of thought which converged on the prob-
~em of values came from a somewhat psychological point of 
view. This movement.was led by a group of Austrians, namely, 
Brentano (1e3e-1917), Meinong (lg53-l92l), and Von Ehrenfele 
(lg59-l932). Their chief aim was to ground ethics in value 
1. See ~aird, IOV, xviii. 
2. POR, 400-404. 
j 
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principles~ and their investigations of value theory were 
empirical and, to a large degree,. psychologioal.l Brentano2 
stressed the role of a nfacultyn of value judgment corres-
ponding to the faculty of theoretical judgment. That is .. 
we can malte both value judgments and knowledge judgments. 
Each has its own rootage in the human mind, and each has 
its own validity. 
Meinong.,3 hedonistically inclined, stressed personal 
· emotions and the personal reference of values. Von Ehren-
fels4 emphasized the role of desire in value judgments. 
The approach of these men was systematic and oritioal, and 
so they deserve, Urban believes, to be called pioneers in 
the science of value.5 
(3) The Classical Economists. 
Another phase in the thought of the period which con-
verged on the problem of values had its origins in the 
eighteenth century, but carried over into the nineteenth. 
The classical economists, notably Adam Smith (1723-1790) 6 
and David Ricardo (l772-ll!!23), 7 turned their attention to 
the problem of values. partly for ethical reasons (assum-
ing that those who are the creators of value should also 
receive the rewards), and partly for economic reasons 
(hoping to improve the capitalistic system, then budding). 
l. Sidgwiok, OHE, 306-30l!!. 
2. See PeS and KRW. 
; •• See Ga.W., 
4- See SdW. 
5. Art.(l902), l!!a;. 
6. See WON. 
7. See PPE. 
The analyses of these men were oriented toward economic 
science, but they were under the influence of philosophy, 
especially ethics, a.nd they in turn influenced the course 
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of social and ethi.cal philosophy., chiefly through Marx. 
Smith and Ricardo tried systematically to discover the 
essential nature of value and the principles and presupposi-
tions of thought about value. With their scientific orien-
tation and their interest in political economy they made a 
strong impact on Karl Marx's thinking. 
(!J.) Nietzsche. 
Significant not so much for his constructive theory as 
for his attack on traditional values, Friedrich Nietzsche 
(lg44-l900) challenged the complacency of all thinkers whose 
views of value were not well founded. Nietzsche's attack 
was neither systematic, nor scientific, but was literary, 
forceful, and simple. Against many of the traditional, 
Christian conceptions of value, conceptions commonly accepted 
as a matter of fact, he posed a plain denial (as, for instance, 
the Usuffering servant" conception). 
~ietzsche 1 s influence was more negative than positive. 
His impa.ot on nineteenth century thought was calculated to 
create doubts and inspire new examinations of valu~s. No 
framework of values could henceforth be taken for granted. 
New thought about value was demanded. 
(5) The Olassioal Sociologists. 
Finally, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the 
origins of modern scientific sociology were also to strike 
xi 
at the vitals of traditional Weltanschauungen·. These begin-
nings were spearheaded by the French thinker, Durkheim (1g5g_ 
1917), and the Germans, Weber (lg64-l920) and Troeltsch 
(lg65-l923). These men reversed the traditional method of 
studying social facts as expressions of ideas. They studied 
historical and eoonomio determinants. Society was examined 
from the standpoint of causal, developmental, functional 
factors, rather than ideal factors. Moral and religious 
ideas and institutions were viewed from this standpoint. 
These investigations tended to indicate a historical 
relativism. By implication the warrant of predominating 
values and institutions, of moral and religious conceptions, 
was their social function rather than their inherent theoret-
ical plausibility. This movement was bound to add to the 
demand for new criticism and new investigations of value 
theory. 
There was, then, a flowering of thought on the problem 
of value in the nineteenth century. The chief well springs 
of this development were pure philosophy (Lotze), the Aus-
trian psychologists (Brentano, Meinong, Von Ehrenfels), the 
classical economists (Smith, Ricardo), Nietzsche, and the 
classical sociologists (Durkheim, Weber, Troeltsch). It is 
xii 
1argely because these men focused attention on the signifi-
cance of value theory tll.a.t general theory of value is being 
investigated in so many different directions today, as for 
example in this dissertation. 
ii. Historiea1 Sketch of Value Theory. 
An exhaustive history of value theory is not within the 
scope of this dissertation. But for purposes of illustra-
tion, and in the interest of framing the universe of our 
problem, some mention of the history is desirable. More-
over, while value theory as a systematic soienoe or branch 
of metaphysics is only of recent development, the impres-
sion should not be given that the history is devoid of 
thought about value. There were, as a matter of :fact, many 
interesting early contributions to this subject. 
(1) Ancient Views. 
Three pre-Socratic thinkers inferred value principles 
from their theories about the physical universe. Anaximander 
(sixth century B.C.) noticed the eternal rising and passing 
away of things. This, he be1ieved., occurs "as destiny 
orders.~l Beings ware punished and give satisfaction to 
one another for their injustice in the ordering of time.•2 
This is an early attempt to 1ink the order of nature with 
the order of justice. Ethical goods are made inherent in 
1. Bakewell, SAP, 3. 
2, Bakewell, SAP, 3. 
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Another attempt to ground the order of values in the 
order of nature is to be found in Heraclitus (536-470). 
His famous doctrine of process contained within it the con-
ception of order,l a conception in which the physical and 
the ethical are joined. Empedocles (490-430) likewise, 
in his doctrine of Love and Strife~2 a doctrine of the causes 
of the tmion and separation of things, gave an explanation 
of good and evil. 
But it was not until Plato (427-347) that a philoso-
pher was sufficiently systematic to give anything resembling 
a general treatment of value problems. Plato, of course, 
did not deal directly and explicitly with theory of value. 
But scattered throughout his writings (Orito, Gorgias, 
Phaedo, Philebus, Protagoras, Republic, Symposium, Timaeus) 
are many passages which bear on the problems of value. 
One of his general principles is to be found worked out 
in detail in the Republic. "Doing one's own businessn is 
established as the primary rule of justice. Value is 
achieved through that harmony of various elements in an 
individual or group which is consequent upon eaoh element's 
functioning as its role demands. A good society is one in 
which each person, be he warrior, artisan, or ruler, per-
forms his peculiar duties. A good man, in like manner, 
I 
l. Windelband, HOP, 36~37• 
2. Ba.kewell, SAP, 4~45. 
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harmonizes the various -forces within him which are pulling 
in different directions. According to another strain in 
Plato ethical value and knowledge are very closely related, 
eo that virtue or good conduct is acting according to ra-
tional truth.l The good person is the one who is guided 
by reason. Good and truth are identified.2 Other Platonic 
doctrines of value include the superiority of the ttgoods 
of the eoul,n3 the principle of harmony,4 the doctrine of 
tttrue pleasures,n5 the value of the contemplation of the 
good,6 and the doctrine that good is rewarded in heaven.7 
A more detailed review would necessarily have to distinguish 
the Socratic elements from the maturer Platonic views in 
these doctrines, but such detail is not now relevant. 
Aristotle (3g4-322) likewise had a good deal to say 
about the problems of value, chiefly in the Nicomachean 
Ethics and the Poetics. His key oonoept was fulfilment of 
function. Man has a given nature which realizes value when 
it functions as it was intended by nature. 
Many other ancient views that deserve attention in 
fuller treatments need not be mentioned here. The Stoics 
and the Epicureans, especially, held interesting views. 
l. Gorgias, 467-47g• This page number and others in foot-
notes on Plato refer to the standard Greek pagination 
of the dialogues. 
2. Crito, 47;. PhilebusJ 21. 
3. Phaedo, 6~67. 
4. PhilebusJ 31, 65-66; 
Republic, 443; Timaeus, g7. 
5 .. Philebus, 51. 
6. Symposium, 211. 
7 .. Timaeus, 42. 
It is characteristic of all the ancient views that they 
did not include systematic treatments of the fundamental 
problems of the science of values. They did~ however~ 
contribute to the movement of the science. and might prop-
erly be regarded as in the pre-scientific era of value 
theory. 
(2) Moder.n Views. 
XV 
Most modern philosophers have had something to say 
which bears on the problems of value. A very few signifi-
cant examples may be cited. Among continental philosop~ers, 
Spinoza (1632~1677) offers one of the most interesting 
theories. For him, values are not grounded in nature; they 
have no metaphysical status at all.1 For Spinoza, as with 
Aquinas, the valuable is simply what is. nBy reality and 
perfection I understand the same thing,"~ said Spinoza.2 
The consequence of this doctrine is that value is achieved 
by being at one with nature. On Spinozata view, as well 
as the earlier Neo-Platonists, the highest good is a mysti-
cal contemplation of or union with God.3 
Contemporary with Spinoza was the English philosopher, 
Hobbes (15gg-1679), who set the stage for the English 
tendency to relate valuing to psychological processes. 
For his part, Hobbes reduced good and evil to purely relative 
terms with no objective significance beyond their rela-· 
tion to the physical system of the human body. He saidt 
Whatsoever is the object of any man1s Appetite 
or Desire; that is it~ which he for his part 
calleth Good., •• For these words of Good, Evil, 
and Contemptible are ever used with relation 
to the person that useth them: There being 
nothing simply or absolutely so.l 
By way of sharp contrast to Hobbes one may return to 
xvi 
the flontinent to find~ in the eighteenth century~ a very 
different view~ fathered by Kant (l724-lg04). Whereas 
Spinoza and Hobbes denied any basis for values in the objec-
tive order of the world~ Kant asserted such a basis. Whereas 
Hobbes had reduced good to a relative term varying in mean-
ing and validity with the physical appetition of the indi-
vidual8 Kant asserted universal principles of right and 
wrong.2 Kant's statement of his view was so forcefUl that 
it remains classic. As will be seen~ the view of Kant the 
idealist made its influence felt even upon Marx the mate-
rial.ist.3 
In Kant$s century there were a number of English 
phil.osophers who turned their attention to the analysis 
of approval.. V~lue was equated with what is socially 
approved. Bhaftesbury (1671~1713) stressed taste and gentle~ 
manliness in his exposition of approval ethios.4 Hume 
l. LEV~ 24. 
2. See FPME. 
3 •• See Chapter IV. 
4 See Laird, IOV, l.g3ff. 
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(1711-1776) based his value theory on nexpressions of 
sentiments of approval and disapproval,w according to 
Demos's interpretation.l In the same century a very differ-
ent viewpoint was taken by Reid (1710-1796) and Price 
(l723-l79l)_whc turned away from the relativistic lfa,pprova.lw 
ethics of Shaftesbury and Rume to ta.ke up an intuitionist 
or "moral sensen view. 
In addition to these strains of development, there 
was a new affirmation of hedonism by Bentham (l74e-lg32) 
and J.S. Mill (lgo6-lg73). They equated value and pleasure--
Bentham distinguishing only quantities of pleasure, but 
Mill taking account of qualitative distinctions. 
(3) Recent Developments. 
The chief events of the nineteenth century have already 
been discussed, and there now remains the task of citing 
twentieth century developne nts. Until the last century 
there had been theories related to vaJ.ue problems, but 
there was no systematic treatment of value theory, and 
almost all attention was given to ethical value, to the 
exclusion of other types of value. In the nineteenth 
century the groundwork was laid for systematic theories. 
It has only been in the twentieth century that explicit ani 
scientific systems have actually been worked out. 
l. Art.(l944), 329. 
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Several thinkers have made notable contributions in 
this direction. In 1909 appeared W.M. urbants Valuation. 
Other significant contributions have been Perry's General 
Theory of Value (1926), Laird1s Idea of Value (1929), 
Lepley's Verifiability of Value (194~), and O.I. Lewis's 
An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946). Other books 
and many articles are too numerous to be catalogued here. 
These works have brought the science of value to that state 
of maturity wherein the nature and scope of the problems 
of the science are understood as they never were before. 
iii. The Chief Problems of Value Theory. 
It has been said above that only recently has theory of 
value been systematized. By that is meant that the prob-
lems of value have been isolated and related, Those prob-
lems fall into approximately four groups: the nature of 
value, the criteria of value, the types of value, and the 
ultimate good. 
(1) The Nature of Value. 
A great deal of initial confusion is created for value 
theory by the a.mbiguous reference of the term value. Val.ue 
may refer to the valued object (piano). Or, the term may 
refer to the conscious experience or enjoyment of values 
(listening to piano music). Then again, value may refer to 
a norm (beautiful piano music in the abstract). Or, value 
may refer to a cultural or other accepted standard, as when 
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we say, ~One of our values is individual freedom.n The 
chief ambiguity rises out of the question as to whether 
value is a substantive or a quality, a subject or a predi-
cate. Is value something that belongs to objects and/or 
experiences, or is it an independent something existing by 
itself? Because of these difficulties philosophers must 
first give ~ generic definition of value, before they give 
their special theories of value. 
Full agreement on these questions has not been attained. 
But the general tendency at the present time seems to be 
to regard values as facts of consciousness. Human beings 
value in the same sense that they know. A value is an act 
~r attitude of consciousness in relation to objects 
either within or outside of the valuing consciousness. Urban 
gi vee this explanation: 
Worth defines an attribute neither of subject 
nor of object, but rather a functional relation 
between the two. All values are therefore des-
criptive of such actual or possible relations.l 
Dewey makes this statement: WThe field in which value facts 
belong is behavioral.n2 Professor Brightman sayst •Value ••• is 
the actual experience of enjoying a desired object or activ-
ity.-n3 
While there are great differences among th~ viewpoints 
of these men, especially as suggested by the words behavioral 
l. Art.(l902) 11 823 .. 
2. Art. (1949) a 64. 3. POR, gg• 
and experience, the three statements above have this in 
oommon, that they all regard human experience as oentral 
XX 
to the value fact. Marbles do not have value, nor are they 
values in the technioal sense •. Only the enjoyment of having 
and playing with marbles is a value. Professor Brightman's 
definition of value as •whatever is desired, liked, esteemed, 
or approvedw1 is remarkably simple and free of complications. 
It is a good starting point for this or any study of value. 
For the purposes of this dissertation the question 
will simply be asked, to what states of affairs does Karl 
Marx attach the predicate good. That will be the point of 
departure. The question of the metaphysical existence of 
goodness will be left open for the present. 
Theory of value, first, then, must consider the con-
aept of value in general. This, says Perry, "is the task 
of value theory.n2 But the problem of the nature of value 
goes beyond giving a generic definition of value. It also 
includes questions of the general metaphysical status of 
value, the conditions and constituents of value, the genetics 
of value, and so on. 
(2) Criteria of Value. 
The above section calls attention to value as a meta-
physioal question. There is the further question of how 
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values are to be known. Schiller states the problem welll 
It is quite possible~ and indeed necessary~ to 
inquire whether the values claimed are really 
possessed, and to question the validity of the 
values actually recognized. This inaeed is one 
of the chief occupations of critical philosophy.l 
The problem of defining value includes, to an extent~ the 
problem of criteria. But, the peculiar nature of value is 
such that the ways of knowing and judging values must receive 
special attention. This involves the question of method. 
Values mu.st be judged and related., as well as merely iso-
lated and defined. 
(3) Types of Value. 
Once definition and criteria. have been formulated~ 
theory of value can turn to naming the specific types or 
groups of values. Once it is known what values in general 
a.re, specific values may be investigated. Such types as 
ethical, aesthetic, intellectual, physical,. religious, a.nd 
social are commonly cited. 
(4) The Ultimate Good. 
A favorite question in value theory is that of the 
summum bonum or the ultimate good. Philosophers have fre-
quently singled out one type of value which is considered 
ultimate, either as including all values or as the best of 
all values. The question is important, because invariably 
the values in any system are closely interrelated. Whatever 
1. Art.(l922), 537. 
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is selected as the Ultimate good is bound to have a signifi-
cant bearing on everything else in the system. There is 
certain to be a vast difference 8 for instance 8 between a 
system which takes the state as the summum bonum and a 
system whioh makes freely developed individuals to be the 
primal good., 
2. Value Theory in Karl Marx. 
i. Eeonomio Value Theory and Philosophical Value Theory 
in Karl Marx. 
It is the philosophical value theory,not economic theory, 
of Xar~ Marx which is discussed in this paper. At the 
outset it is very necessary to make this distinction in 
general and to note the distinction in the Marx literature. 
The necessity for making this distinction lies in the 
fact that Marx's explicit theory of value is economic, a 
theory which has now become famous--the labor theory of 
value. Marx dealt with economics at great length, chiefly 
in Capital, Critique of Political Economy, Wage-Labor and 
Capital, and in Value. Prioe. and Profit. Thus it is that 
when Marx1 s theory of value is referred to, the intended 
reference is almost always to his eoonomic theory, espeoially 
the labor theory. Many artioles and books have been written 
on 11Ma.rx1 s Theory of Value." Almost without exoeption these 
deal with economic theory and not philosophy. Those writ-
ings, then, are really in a different field from that of 
this dissertation, and it should not be expeoted that herein 
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will be discussed the subjects which are commonly treated 
in Marxist value theory, except incidentally. 
A further reason for making this distinction explicit 
concerns terminology. Marx's writings,_ especially Capital, 
a.re full of value terms. Such terms as "vaJ.ue, " lfuse-va.l ue, " 
•exchange-value," "elementary value form," and "relative 
value form" appear again and again. These terms were always 
used by Marx in their economic sense. By 11va.lue 11 Marx meant 
"exchange-value." Marx's statements about value, therefore, 
must be read in the light of their economic meaning, and 
meanings of a. philosophical nature oan only be inferred. 
Nevertheless, Marx's economic interpretations have philo-
sophical significance. By interpretation, one may find 
philosophical value theory reflected in the economic theory. 
ii. Marx's Value Theory as Implicit. 
{l) Marx's Philosophical Value Theory not Explicit. 
There is no explicit philosophical value theory in 
the writings of Karl Marx. In accord with the above dis-
tinction between pre-scientific and scientific theorists 
of value, :Marx is to be classed with the former (remember-
ing, of course, that by pre-scientific the writer does not 
mean unscientific in the general sense, but only With refer-
ence to philosophical value theory). Nowhere does Marx 
offer a systematic treatment of value theory, or of any 
of its. phases, including ethics. 
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Marxts role was one not uncommon in the history of 
thought: his influence on philosophy was immense 1 but he 
was not a professional philosopher. Marx was trained as 
such, had the abilities of a professional, had philosophi-
cal views, and his early writings were philosophical (though 
negative and critical). But his main efforts throughout his 
career were not direoted to the task of investigating a.nd 
explicitly stating a positive philosophical position. 
A word about Marx1 s life {lglg-lgg3) will serve to 
explain this fortuity. Marx was born a Jew. His father 
was a lawyer in Trier, Germany. When Marx was six years old, 
his family converted from Judaism to Protestant Christianity. 
At the age of seventeen Marx entered the University 
of Bonn, in keeping with the intellectual traditions of his 
forebears. But his schooling was fitful, taking him from 
Bonn to Berlin, and then to Jena~ Marx wrote examinations 
and presented a. dissertation on Epio~as at Jena, where he 
received the doctorate in.philosophy in lg4l. The irregu-
larity which marked his academic life was to become a charac-
teristic feature of his frustrated and luckless career. 
~xts intention to pursue the life of an academic was 
immediately disappointed. He failed to receive a university 
appointment, a.nd so turned to writing. From lg42-lg49 Marx 
engaged in unsteady jo~nalistio activity, complicated by 
government censorship, disputes with associates, and adverse 
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business ~elations with publishers. During this period, in 
1g43, Marx married Jenny von Westphalen, a woman of aristo-
cratic ba.okground and, ~eputedly., of great beauty. The 
marriage was happy., though ma.r~ed by severe family hardships. 
The middle 1:forties were the most p~oductive of Marx's 
life as a. philosophical write~. In 1g44 he wrote Okono~soh­
philosophische Manuskripte, published for the first time 
only recently, and Die Heilige Fa.milie·. In lg46 Marx oolla.'b--
orated with Engels in Die Deutsche Ideologie. Then in 1g47 
.... 
was written, in French, Misere de la Philosophie. These 
writings dealt with philosophical questions. But they were 
more polemical, oritioal, and negative than constructively 
philosophieal. 
In lg4g Marx wrote, with Engels, the famous Communist 
Manifesto, followed by a brief~ final fling at ~ournalistio 
work, and expulsion from Fra.noe. In 1g49 Marx went into 
eXile, in London, where he spent most of the remainder of 
his life. 
During the eighteen-fifties Marx supported himself a.nd 
family (though very poorly) chiefly by writing news features 
for the New Yo~k Tribune. During this time he became active 
a.e a. behind-the-scenes leader in the revolutionary working-
class movement. He also began studying seriously the prob-
lems of political economy. This study issued in his ~ 
Kritik der politisohen Oko.nomie, publis·hed in 1859, whioh 
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anticipated his muoh longer and very much more famous work, 
Da.s Kapita.l. 
Marx's final years produced some minor writings, but 
his ohief oonoern was the composition of Kapital• Only one 
. volume of this work was published during his lifetime. The 
second and third volumes were issued later by Engels. 
After lg47 Marx grew less and less interested in philos-
ophy, and more interested in economics and the working-class 
movement·. Consequently~ very little came from his pen in 
his mature years which bore directly on ethios, value theory, 
or any of the theoretical problems of philosophy. His writ-
ings did, however, have wide implications in philosophy and 
science. Their influence on social philosophy, ethics, value 
theory, and many other a.rea.s of thought has been immense. 
Marx lived in a time calculated to embitter the reform-
ing spirit. There was extreme distress among the common 
people and severe reaction in government circles. Marx's 
own personal life was disappointing, partly due to his great 
poverty, partly because of his ohronio, painful physical 
debilities, partly because of his humiliating financial 
dependence on Engels, and partly because his writings and 
his proffered leadership of the workers' movement met with 
little success. It is really no wonder that Marx tired of 
puxe philosophy, rebelled against it, and became somewhat 
hardened in his attitudes, especially regarding ethical 
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questions. His final years, however, were somewhat easier. 
for himself and his family. He died in lgg;. 
Marx made quite a point of avoiding ethics and ethical 
judgments. But it is not true that his writings, especially 
his earlier, philosophical writings, are without signifi-
cance for value theory. To the oontrary, implicit in these 
writings is a remarkable and important view whioh bears 
exposition, if for no other reason, for the reason of dis~ 
palling the general confusion and misinformation which marks 
so much thinking about Karl Marx. 
(2) The Problem of Oonstruotion. 
This writing is an interpretation. Any statement of 
Karl Marx's value theory must necessarily be a construction 
based upon his scattered writings. No single work can be 
regarded as basic. No single work can be marked as dealing 
pre-eminently with philosophical value theory. The various 
strains of Marx's thought must be gathered together and 
interpreted from the viewpoint of this subject. 
These conditions oreate the problem of construction, 
a problem whioh bears within it some difficulties. In view 
of the lack of specific statements, there is the danger of 
misinterpretation. The varying times and oo.oa.sions of the 
writings of Marx must be oarefully weighed in making inter-
pretations. There is the danger of seleoting.passages for 
the sake of proving preconceived interpretations of Marx. 
These dangers are cited simply to warn the reader. 
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iii. '!'he Data.. 
The primary sources of the data for this investigation 
are to be found in the extant published books, articles, 
speeches, pamphlets, and letters of Karl Marx. There are 
many unpublished Marxist writings which are virtually una-
vailable under present conAitions to the general scholar. 
Within the available Marxist writings are a great many 
passages dealing directly with philosophical questions. 
Other passages have philosophical and specifically axio-
logical significance. The data. of this paper may be defined 
as all those statements of Marx which are_ value judgments, 
which imply value judgments, or whioh discuss value judg-
ments and problems·. 
iv. Previous Work in the Field. 
There seem to be virtually no books or articles in exis-
tence Which deal exclusively, or even in considerable part, 
with Karl Ma.rx•s philosophy of value. In most writings on 
Marx there is not even a. mention of value theory, while in 
a few Marx's implied theory is presented in a sentence or 
two. Ethics and social philesophy are the only fields 
closely related to value theory whioh receive _extensive 
attention in the writings of commentators. The wealth of 
general literature on Marx does provide, however, much aid 
in constructing Ma.rx•s value theory. 
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3. Statement of the Problem. 
The problem o:f this dissertatlon should by now be evi-
dent. This inqUiry will be directed toward discovering and 
evaluating Karl Marx's views on those questions which are 
germane to general theory of value. 
CHAPTER I 
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DISCOVERY OF VALUE 
1.. Introduction. 
Marxism is essentially a method. Marx's conclusions 
were often tentative and vague~ sometimes inconsistent. 
But in methodology Marx was clear. The Marxist method~ 
therefore, will be considered in this chapter in a more 
leisurely and det~iled fashion than any other aspect of 
Marx's thought not directly related to value theory. 
The subject matter of this chap~er falls into three 
divisions, each corresponding to one of the three aspects 
l 
of Marx1 s methoq. The first deals with Marx's humanistic 
starting point. The second division outlines the principles 
of Marxts chief scientific procedure~ historical material-
ism. The third is concerned with the d~~lectical method. 
Logically, the dialectical approach should be treated 
with the scientific principles, sinoe Marx considered it as 
part of his scientific method. It is, however, treated 
separately for three reasons. First, because of its great 
importance in itself, it deserves special, extended atten-
tion. Second, the dialectical methodjs mre distinctly 
philosophical than the other principles of Marxist science. 
Third, the dialectical approach yields very different con-
clusions in value theory than do those principles treated 
under scientific procedure. 
It will be the argument of this chapter that each of 
the three aspects of Marxts method presupposes and implies 
a distinct type of value theory. The three approaches, 
the humanistic, the scientific, and the dialectical, are 
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the three cornerstones of Marx*s philcosophy of value. They 
are woven through the texture of his thought, with one aspect 
coming to the foreground at times, another at other times. 
These views, while not always in every respect contradic-
tory, are in many ways not fully consistent with each other. 
The balance of this dissertation is intended to reveal the 
significance of these approaches to value in the thought of 
Karl Marx and the measure of their mutual consistency. 
2. The Humanistic Starting Point. 
Study of Marx reveals that most of the essential con-
ceptions in his view were adopted surprisingly early in his 
career, and were borrowed from other thinkers. The first 
principle of Marx's method~.is no exception to this rule .. 
His realistic humanism is clearly intimated in writings 
dated as early as 15~. As was also customary with him, 
Marx gave full credit to Feuerbach as his inspiration. Marx 
had read and absorbed Feuerbaoh's Essence of Christianity. 
As a result, he was convinced that ideas and institutions 
shoul.d be studied from the historical and social standpoint. 
The measure of Feuerbach's influence can be discerned from 
these words of Marx, written in 18~: 
Feuerbach's greatest act wast (l) the proof 
that philosophy is nothing else than religion 
worked over in practical and speculative thought~ 
and therefore is to be condemned with it as only 
another form and method for the self-alienation 
of human beings; (2) the foundation of true 
materialism and real science~ in which Feuerba.oh 
ta.kes the social relation 'of man to ma.n 11 as 
the basic pr~nciple of theory.l 
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These words bear a good deal of comment. First~ there 
are two ideas explicitly expressed. Religion and philosophy 
are to be dispensed with, and the relation of man to man 
is the first principle of theory. The two ideas are closely 
interrelated. 
Partly because of personal disillusionment and partly 
because of scientific investigation, Marx early came to 
the conclusion that religion was false. Religion was not, 
he believed, man's response to the divine being, nor does 
the object of theology, the divine nature, really exist 
objectively. The true state of affairs was entirely differ-
ent. The fact is that religion is a purely human creation, 
a cooperative enterprise~ devised by men for practical ends. 
There was much that men could not understand. There was 
much they feared. Religion aided them in coping with their 
ignorance and their fears~ and ~o religion originated and 
prospered. 2 Marx concluded that 11ma.n makes religion, :reli-
gion does not make man. 113 
l. Marx~ ekM, 152. All translations of passages from OkM 
are by the author of this dissertation. 
2. Marx, Art.(l~)Dl, 607-6oa. Translations of passages 
from this article are by the author of this dissertation. 
3. Marx, Art. ( 1g44) Dl '· 607. 
Onoe this view of religion is accepted it is only 
natural to generalize the conclusion and apply it to all 
human ideas and instituaons. This Marx did. 11The criti-
cism o:f religion is the starting point o:f all cri tioism~ 11 
he declared. 1 Religion is a human oreationJ expressing 
human purposes carried out under certain objective condi-
tions (an unknown, difficult, and dangerous world). So 
with all ideas and institutions. The task of critical science 
thus becomes one of discovering beneath the surface of 
every historical fact human purposes and the conditions 
of the action taken to execute those purposes. The net 
result was a philosophy which had :for its chief principle 
of method the critical examination of human purposes and 
activities. In one of his earliest writings (lg44) Marx 
said~ 
Theory is capable of seizing power as soon as it 
demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad 
hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be 
radical is to seize the matter by.it~ roots. 
The root for mankind is man himself. 
A short time later Marx wrote! 
The premises from which we begin are not arbi-
trary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from 
which abstraction can only be made in the imagi-
nation. They are real individuals) their activity~ 
and the material conditions under which they live.~ 
1. Art.(le144)Dl, 607. 
2·. Art. (lg44)Dl) 614-. 
3. Marx and Engels, GI, 7• 
Ma.rx*s humanistic method. was influenced. by his studies 
in natural science as well as by his study of Feuerbach. 
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Marx was impressed by science, especially in its positiv-
istic aspects. He regarded physics as the pinnacle of 
natural science. 1 He praised Bacon as the Dforerunner of 
English materialism and of all modern experimental soience.n2 
It was Bacon who saw that the senses uare infallible and 
are the fountain-head of all knowledge.n3 Bacon saw further 
th&t! 
science is experimental science~ and consists in 
operating upon the sensuous given with a rational 
method. Induction, analysis, comparison, obser-
vation, and experiment are the essential condi-
tions of a rational method. With these methods 
the inherent nature of matter is motion first 
and foremost, not merely as mechanical and mathe-
matical motion, but more especially as impulse, 
spirit of life, tension, as the Qual--in t~e 
expression used by Jacob Bohme--of matter. 
This passage is significant not so muoh for defining 
matter as for the way in which knowledge of matter is viewed. 
It is not objective matter that man immediately knows, but 
rather it is the nsensuous given," a subjective, human 
reality. In adopting this viewpoint Marx treads on ideal-
istic ground,. and offers some surprisingly Berkeleya.n state-
ments. For example, the spirit of Berkeley seems present in 
these words: 
1. Marx, HF, 30~. 
2. Marx, BF, 30~. 
by the author 
3 •• Marx,. HF, 30~. 
4- Marx, HF, 30~. 
All translations of passages from HF are 
of this dissertation. 
Man is the immediate object of natural science, 
because immediate sensuous nature is for man 
immediate human sensuousness.l 
That is, the only natuxe that man can know is nature as 
given in his own senses. Therefore, man (his sensations) 
is the immediate object of science. Then Marx went on to 
say! 
Nature is the immediate object of the soienoe 
of man, and the first object of man as man is 
nature, sensuality, and human sensuous activity, 
because only in natural objects can men find their 
objective actuality and only through the science 
of natural beings can men find self-knowledge. 
The element of thought itself, the development 
of the life of thought and language is sensuous 
natuxe. The social reality of natuxe and human 
science or the natural science of man are identi-
cal expressions.2 
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Science is human science, it is manta tool, and the first 
object of science is man's own activity. Man is thus placed 
at the center of scientific endeavor, both as object and in 
aim. The whole framework of science is thus eha.nged. The 
aim is not to make men informed spectators of something 
beyond themselves. The final aim of science is not to un-
fold nature, but to unfold man. The realm of science is 
the realm of man*s sensuous activity •. Scientific truth, 
therefore, is much more dependent upon human activity than 
upon the simple existence of external facts. Animals have 
no science. Only purposing, active, conscious human beings 
have science. 
l. Marx, ekM, 123. 
2. Marx, mkM, 123. 
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MaTx1 s humanism was based, in the third place, on his 
pragmatic theory of ideas. For Marx, ideas have no inde-
pendent, objective significance. They are real and signifi-
cant only as human devices for coping with practical prob-
lems.l An idea that is not acted upon is only half an idea, 
at best. By themselves ideas are impotent. 
Ideas can never overcome an old world condition 
but can only overcome the ideas of the old world 
conditions. Ideas alone can really accomplish 
nothing. The execution of an idea requires a 
man, who exerts practical power~ In its verbal 
sense the critical proposition is therefore not 
a truth, which exists by itself, but always re-
quires. a 'proving.t2 . 
Once more the human standpoint prevails. Ideas are 
part of human activity, human practice. Man is not to 
be judged from the standpoint of ideas, but rather ideas 
are to be judged from the standpoint of human purposes 
and activities. 
Marx1 s general humanistic approach may be summed up 
by saying that all science and thought begins with a prob-
le~-a human problem. The initial framework of every scien-
tific study is composed of a subject, a purpose, and a 
problem. This pragmatic approach is essential to Marx's 
humanism. 
It was only a short step from Marx's humanistic method• 
ology to humanism in value theory. If to Marx*s scientific 
1. This principle is explored more fully in Chapter II. 
2. Marx, HF, 294-. 
principles are added his natuxal human sympathies and his 
Kantian tendencies~ the result is a view olose to person-
alistic idealism. This tendency may now be explored. 
Acceptance of the worth of human life as an essential 
value postulate is suggested by the folowing statements of 
Marx. 
1la.n is the highest being for mankind.l 
The first premise of all human history is, of 
couxse, the existence of living human individuals.2 
A higher form of society (is) a society in which 
the full and free developme~t of every individual 
forms the ruling principle.~ 
Capitalist Droduction ••• is utterly prodigal with 
human life.i+ 
In a higher phase ·of communist society (will be) 
the all-round development of the individual.? 
It should be noticed that these statements~ arranged in 
chronological order~ span the full life-time of Marx•s 
literary activity. The last statement was written more 
than thirty years after the first. 
Marxfs principle can be stated very simply. All 
thought and action should be directed toward the fulfil~ 
ment of human needs and purposes, and nothing external to 
man has intrinsic value. 
Perhaps the best illustration of Marx's use of his 
humanistic method is the Communist Manifesto. A chief aim 
4. CAP, II I, lOlJ.. 
5• OGP, 10. 
g 
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of that document was to consider history from the standpoint 
of the men who lived it, and the capitalistic system from 
the standpoint of the human beings it embraces. "Capitalism, 
said Marx~ "has resolved personal worth into exchange value.fll 
Marx assumed that all values are human values .. and that no 
good end is served if human ends are not served. 
As a view which stressed general human welfare, Marxism 
seems not to be especially unusual. After all, there are 
few social philosophies that do not make suoh an emphasis. 
It is desirable, therefore, to contrast Marx•s views with 
other representative positions. 
Marxist h"'ll'll&nism is opposed to idealistic value theories • 
.Marx wrotet 
Real humanism has in Germany no greater enemy 
than spiritualism or speculative idealism, which 
in the place of actual individual men puts 'self-
consciousness~ or tspirit,t and says with the 
Evangelist: 'It ie. spirit which giveth life--
flesh is useless.•Z 
All theorizing which makes its aim an abstract definition 
of objective values or the essence of man was rejected by 
Marx. That is, Marx believed that the task of ethics is 
not to begin with what the facts ought to be, or what man 
ought to be, but simply to see what the facts are and what 
man is as he actually lives. For Marx the gpod is not to 
be defined through objective ideals, but through human 
purposes and activities. All talk of objective, eternal 
1. OM, 11. 
2. HF, 179• 
values, Marx believed, was based on flman's consciousness 
of himself,nl rather than on his •real life content.n2 
Said. Marx-: 
We do not set out from what men say, imagine, 
conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, 
imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men ~ 
in the flesh. We set out from real, active men.~ 
Kantian formalism is an idealistic view often regarded 
as one of Ma.rxts sources. That there is a striking rese~ 
blance between Kant's doctrine of the dignity of persons 
and Marx1 e emphasis on human worth is evident. Occasional 
passages ~n Marx resemble even Kant ta verbal formulation, 
as well as his principles themselves. A full discussion of 
the relation of Marx to Kant will be presented later.4 
Marxism is opposed to any view which takes a non-human 
realm as the arena for the realization of values or as the 
realm to which man is subservient. To say that the task 
of man is to glorify God, or to serve the ehuroh, or to 
serve the state, or the king, or the truth, or any other 
institutional, ideal, or non-human realm is to adopt a view 
directly antithetical to Marx. Nothing has a claim prior 
to the purposes and needs of living, human individuals. 
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For general theory of value this standpoint implies, 
first, that the standard of value will be a human one. Fur-
thermore, the realm of value will be the realm of humanity. 
l. GI, 15g. 2. GI, 66. 3. GI, 11.1-. 4. Ohapter IV is devoted exclusively to this problem. 
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The methods of investigating the problem of value will be 
those methods which fall within human science. Sociology, 
economics, history, and other such fields of study will be 
pursued. The whole framework of value will be man, and only 
man. This humanism, again, is not so different from other 
views in its interest in man, as in its exclusive emphasis 
upon man, his consciousness, and activity. 
3. Historical Materialism. 
The doctrine of historical materialism is a doctrine 
which looks to the facts. It is applicable to the study 
of history or human society. Thus it is called historical 
materialism. The doctrine places its emphasis upon material 
facts, and so it is called materialism. In general, the 
doctrine may be characterized as an approach to the study 
of society, a method or canon of historical inquiry, which 
seeks to discover the causes of historical phenomena, and 
thereby to provide a basis for understanding and control-
ling social life and development. It is the fundamental 
principle, and the chief principle of method, for a science 
of human society. 
i. The Doctrine of Historical Materialism. 
Unfortunately, Karl Marx never took the pains to expound 
his doctrine in any very full or systematic way. His writ-
ings are applications rather than expositions of historical 
materia~ism. Through these applications, however, a clear 
idea of the doctrine can be gleaned. There are also a few 
passages in which the doctrine is specifically stated. 
These are of great help. One is contained in a Preface 
to the Critique of Political Economy of 1g59. This is the 
fullest statement given by Marx and is as follows~ 
I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal 
relations as well as forms of state could neither 
be understood by themselves, nor explained by the 
so-called general progress of the human mind, but 
that they are rooted in the material conditions 
of life, which are summed up by Hegel after the 
fashion of the English and French of the eighteenth 
century under the name 'oi vic society.; •· the anatomy 
of that oivic sooiety is to be sought in politioal 
economy •••• In the social production which men oarry 
on they enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will; these 
relations of production correspond to a. definite 
stage of development of their material powers of 
production. The sum total of these relatione of 
production constitutes the economic structure of 
society--the real foundation, on which rise legal 
and politioa.l superstructures and to which corres-
pond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production in material life determines the 
general character of the social, political and 
spiritual processes of life. It is not the cons-
ciousness of men that determines their existence, 
but, on the contrary, their social existence de_. 
termines their consciousness. At a. certain stage 
of their development, the material forces of pro-
duction in society come in conflict with the exist-
ing relatione of production, or--what is but a legal 
expression for the same thing--with the property 
relations within which they had been at work be-
fore. From forms of development of the forces of 
production these relations turn into their fetters. 
Then comes the period of social revolution. With 
the change of the economic foundation the entire 
immense superstructure is more or less rapidly 
transformed. In considering such transformations 
the distinction should always be made between the 
material transformation of the economic conditions 
of production which can be determined with the 
precision of natural science, and the legal, politi-
cal, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic--in short 
ideological forms in whioh men become oonsoioue 
of this confliot and fight it out. Just as our 
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opinion of an individual is not based on what he 
thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a 
period of transformation by its own consciousness; 
on the contrary, this consciousness must rather 
be explained from the contradictions of material 
life, from the existing conflict between the social 
forces of production and the relations of production. 
No social order ever disappears before all the 
productive forces, for which there is room in it, 
have been developed; and new higher relations of 
production never appear before the material con-
ditions of their existence have matured in the womb 
of the old society. Therefore, mankind always . 
takes up only such problems as it can solve; sinoe, 
looking at the matter more closely, we will always 
find that the problem itself arises only when the 
material conditions necessary for its solution 
already e~ist or are at least in the process of 
formation. In broad outlines we can designate the 
Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, a.nd the modern · 
bourgeois methods o:f production as se many epochs 
in the progress of the economic formation o:f soci-
ety. The bourgeois relations of production are 
the last antagonistic :form o:f the social process 
of production--antagonistic not in the sense of 
individual antagonism, but of one arising :from 
conditions surrounding the life of individuals in 
society; at the same time the productive forces 
developing in the womb of bourgeois society create 
the material conditions for the solution of that 
antagonism. This social formation constitutes, 
therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric 
stage of human society,l 
13 
Because of its :fundamental importance, this passage has been 
quoted in its entirety. The heart of the statement is :found 
in the words: Uit is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social 
existence determines their oonsoiousness.n 
Marx's correspondence reveals that he came to this 
view surprisingly early in his career. In a letter to Amenkov, 
written in lg46, he wrote: "Assume particular stages o:f 
l. Marx, oPE, 11-13. 
development in production, commerce, and consumption and 
you will have a corresponding social order.ul 
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This doctrine is implied or stated in a number of 
:Marx., s writings. 2 Virtuall.y all of his writings are appli-
cations of the doctrine. The view is explicitly stated by 
Engels many times. The most famous of these statements is, 
of course, that which appears in the introduction to the 
Manifesto.3 Engels also wrote a pamphlet, On Historical 
Materialism, but this is more concerned with applications 
than exposition of the·doctrine. 
In general, the doctrine of historical materialism can 
be reduced to the following propositions: 
1. The first historic facts are economic facts. The 
first historic act was an economic act; man first had to 
provide for his physical needs. (GI, 16) 
2. Men learned and devel.oped through their economic 
or material activity. (CAP, I, 199; GI, 13-14) 
3. Upon the foundation of their material life was built 
a superstructure of ideas and institutions. · (OPE, ll-13; 
GI, 13-14) 
4. The content of these ideas and institutions was con-
ditioned by the needs, especially material, of people. 
Changes in the ideas and institutions were and are conse-
quent upon changes in the economic life of men. (OM; GI, ;g) 
5. The economic life of society came to be dominated 
by individuals and minority groups who in turn accommodate 
the ideal, institutional, ana social superstructures to suit 
their own purposes. Hence there are class struggles. (og) 
1. OOR, 7. 
2 .. GI, 6-7, 16, 29, 3g, 39, 57, 6g-69; POP, 92, 97; OM, 6, 
11, 20, 24, 29; CWUS, passim; EQ, passim; OAP, I, 200, 
4o6 fn.; and CGP, g, 10, 22. 
3 .. OM, 6. 
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6. The clue~ therefore, to the nature of society is 
found in economic facts, in social, historical, and material 
conditions. (POP~ 90-92; GI; OM) 
7. On the other hand, no progress either in social 
life or in human thought can be expected for which histori-
cal conditions are not present. (OPE, 11~13; CAP; CGP)l 
In these principles is a naturalistic and realistic socio-
logy. 
The first comment to be made upon this view is that 
it is a method for studying history, a hypothesis about 
history, and does not in itself imply metaphysical mater-
ialism. All that is affirmed is that the best way to under-
stand history is to understand its material conditions. 
With this emphasis on material conditions it follows 
that the content of investigations based on this method will 
be those facts which commonly oo~ within the purview of 
the sociologist. Human beings, their social life, activity, 
and development, and, in generalJ economic forms and con-
ditions are the basis of study. A large share of the credit 
for Marx's adoption of this view is owing to Proudhonv2 
Analysis of pro.perty relations was Proudhon' s key tool for 
unlocking the mysteries of political economy. Marx adopted 
this approach, as is especially evident in his historical 
studies. He acknowledgEd his debt to Proud.hon, praising him 
l. All the foregoing parenthetical references to sources 
refer to writings of Marx. 
2. Marx's dependence on Proudhon is conclusively established 
by Raubtman in his Marx et Proudhon. See especially 
pages 34-35. 
for establishing criticism of property as the basis of 
political economy, and thereby making a modern science of 
political economy possible.l 
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Marx made material facts his primary scientific object 
not because he thought these were in themselves the most 
worthwhile facts, but because they appeared to have the 
greatest significance in determining man's whole life. The 
spirit of Marxts approach is expressed in his statement that 
nthe criticism of heaven is transformed into the criticism 
of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism 
of rights, the criticism of theology into the criticism of 
politics.w2 Art, literature, religion, philo~ophy, and 
all "ideology,n are looked upon as derivative. 11Para. Marx ••• 
la realida.d es lo oontrario (to Hegel): lo primario es la 
naturaleza; lo secunda.rio, el esplrituon3 
Next to be noted is the fact that this view places its 
chief emphasis on description, as against normative judg-
ments. While many moral convictions are to be found in the 
writings of Marx, it is clear that his aim was not to reveal 
moral issues so much as historical fact (although his own 
historical ndescriptions 11 shade toward highly generalized 
and morally colored interpretations). The aim of Marx's 
1. HF, 201. Marx also wrote a spirited attack on Proudhon's 
views (POP) .. 
2. Marx, Art.(lg~~)D2, 6og. Translations of passages from 
this article are by the author of this dissertation. 
). Ferrater Mora, Art.{l9~l)2, 3~9. 
Capital was not to denounce the capitalistic system as 
morally wrong~ but simply nto lay bare the economic law 
of motion in modern society.nl 
Moral appeals were ridiculed by Marx. This occurs 
frequently, especially in The Poverty of Philosophy, The 
German Ideology,· the Manifesto, Capital., and the Critique 
of the Gotha Program. Theorizing on the basis of moral 
principle was to Marx nideological nonsense about 'right' 
••• common trash. n2 The objection to moral appeals was 
17 
not that they were erroneous., but simply that they did not 
count. flCommunistes ne nient pas l 1 ideal; il nient simple-
ment que oat i~al tombe du oiel,n writes a contemporary 
Frenoh communist.3 The only justification for an appeal 
to moral convictions, on Marx's view, was the practical 
requirements of the movement. Slogans based on moral con-
victions do have a certain propaganda value, and therefore 
are of some use in the workers' movement. But as theory, 
moral analysis and judgment wa.s meaningless .. 
Consistent with this view, Marx did not attack the 
capitalistic system on moral grounds alone. He did not 
attack individual capitalists ~or their moral guilt. In-
deed, he even excused them for the crimes committed in their 
factories. Marx believed that given the capitalistic system, 
l. CAP, I, 14 .. 
2. CGP, 10. 3. Ga.raudy, OEM, gg• 
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the capitalist can do no other than what he does do. The 
capitalist can only be expected to put profit before human 
welfare. Marx said! 
My standpoint, from wb.ich the evolution of the 
economic formation of society is viewed as a pro-
cess of natural histol·y, can less than any other 
ma.ke the individual rt:1sponsible for relations 
whose creature he soci.a.lly remains, however much 
he may suJ:>jectively rs~ise himself above them,.l 
Marx• s doctrine can be E•xplioated best, perhaps, by 
citing an illustration. I~t The Civil War in the United 
States (a series of artiolt:1s written for a New York news-
paper, in part by Engels) iihe American Civil War is inter-
preted from the standpoint of historical materialism. 
Traditionally this war has been viewed as a struggle be-
tween freedom and slavery, a struggle over a moral issue. 
Marx, however, did not accEtpt this simple view of the 
matter. He believed that 1rhile the war did reflect itself 
·in a moral issue, the real cause of the struggle was not 
moral convictions at all. Rather, ~e conflict was between 
two incompatible economies •. 
According to the Ma.rxj.st ana.lysi s, in the North was 
an industrial economy which required a continuing supply 
of free laborers for its f~Lctories, and whieh required a. 
protective tariff on impo.r1;s to exclude foreign manufac-
tured articles. The Southn on the other hand, was an agri-
eultural economy which req11ired a stable body of slave 
1. CAP, I, 15. 
...... :o~,, ..................... • .. ·,• .. •,...... ~Jc:l .... ~.-....... , ......................... 1. 
19 
laborers,. a.nd because it wa.s an exporting area, desired 
a free trade system. Othe~ economic differences were in-
volved, but these were the chief dynamics of the conflict, 
as Marx viewed it in The Civil War in the United States. 
The moral and political questions which issued from the 
conflict were reflections, though true refl~otions, and 
were the result of, rather than the cause of, the conflict. 
This example of Marx's historical interpretation illus-
trates the flcritioal" aspect of the Marxist method, as well 
as the general nature of historical materialism. Marx's 
method might as easily be called historical criticism as 
historical materialism. The method is critical in the sense 
that it never accepts social phenomena as they appear super-
ficially. Historical criti·~ism delves beyond the formula-
tion of social problems fo~~d in social consciousness, in 
ltliterary history, tt to the t;,a.uses of sooia.l problems as 
they are found in the ma.ter:la.l relations of society. The 
Civil War appeared to be a 1gt:ruggle over a principle. The 
North claimed that the issUl! was freedom for the black 
race. Southerners clai:rned 1~hat it was states" rights. But 
actually, historical analys~Ls revealed that the real issue, 
the real dynamic of the com~lict was a conflict of economic 
systems .. 
Unoritiea.l historiogral'hy is satisfied with an account 
of the external appearances of the social process (battles, 
governments, personalities)~~ and an account of the conscious 
I ¥ 1 
--·-
,, ............. ~.-...................... •. 
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ideas reflected by the soc:J.al process (nliberty, equality, 
and fraternity,n for exampJ.e). But this procedure, Maxx 
believed, left the dynamicsJ of the social process untouched. 
He intended rather to base his social science on na, criti-
cal knowledge of the histol~ic movement. nl 
Marx placed great confidence in this critical, descrip-
tive approach to history a.r.~d social.problems. This .method, 
he believed, revealed both the conditions and the solutions 
to all social problems.. At'ter a. completely thorough des-
cription and critical a.na.lysis is given, there is nothing 
more to be said.2 
Applied to the general. problems of soeial theory his-
torical materialism yields what Marxists call nscientifie 
socialism. 11 Ma.rxt s socia.li.sm is nscientifio," first, in the 
sense that it substitutes scientific, descriptive explana-
tions for abstract, utopian. solutions. Against the nutopiann 
approach Marx wrote: 
The honest German who would benefit his true father-
land by eonferring on it the North American oon~ 
stitution, beautified and improved, resembles the 
idiotic merchant who copied the ledgers of his 
rich rival, and imagined that being in possession 
of this oopy, he had also come into possession 
of the coveted wealth.3 
Marxist socialism is nscientific,11 in the second place, in 
the sense that success is measured entirely in terms of 
l. Marx, COR, 172. This phrase is drawn from a. letter 
written by Marx to Schweitzer in 1g65. 
2. Marx and ~gels, GI, 35. 
3. Art.(lg44) , 165. · 
··~--=~' ....................... ,.......... ,c: ........................................ 
practical advances, rather than in terms of theoretical 
solutions. 11 The philosophetrs have only interpreted the 
world differently, the poix:~t is, to change it. "l True 
science, on Marxist prinoil'!'les, must be practical. 
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In summary, Marx's hia:torioal materialism is his chief 
principle of method in soci.a.l science. It is an approach 
which places its confidence~ in critical analy-sis of the 
material or economic conditions of the social process. 
·.ii. Critical Oozmnents. 
A great controversy rages over the degree of determination 
implied by Marx•s historica.l materialism. It is sometimes 
sUpposed that Maxx's is a strictly mechanistic view. Many 
writers seem to assume this as a matter of fact. This 
tendency is enhanced by exa.ggerated statements of historical 
materialism in writings of both friends and foes of Marx.2 
Enemies of Marx are prone to accept this interpretation 
because absolute determinisms are regarded as relatively 
easy to refute, especially before the popular mind. In any 
·1. Marx, liTheses," XI. 
2. For example, Weisengrftn writes~ liDas wirtschaftliche 
Leben ist also da.s absolut Frim&re (in Marx1 s historical 
materialism). Nicht allein' da.s Recht und die Politik, 
sond.ern auch Wissensohaft und Kunst, Philosophie, die 
ganze Kultur ~berhaupt sind abhlngig von den wirts~haft­
lichen Urph!nomenen. Die Selbstherrlichkeit des geisti-
gen Lebens ist nur eine soheinba.re ..... Die Kultur und das 
intellektuelle Dasein, sie warden bedingt duroh den 
Produktionsprozess und nur duroh ihn, ebenso wie er 
selbst nur badin~ wird duroh die Ver!nderungen der 
Technik' (MSF, 42). "Wir haben gesehen, wie die Teehnik 
also der eigentliche Tr!ger aller Geschichte ist 11 (MSF" 
44-). 
, ................................. . 
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case many agr~e with VenabJ.e 's judgment that nthe theory of 
historic inevitability• is the problem •perhaps least satis-
factorilY:: dealt withu in ~rarx.l 
The force of critical attacks upon Marx's view here 
depends upon the assumptio~~ that historical materialism is 
a strict determinism:. Ma.r:x:, of course, left himself some-
what open to this kind. of i.nterpretation. Even so, suoh 
was not his viewpoint.2 Historical materialism is neither 
strictly deterministic, no:r· lnecha.nistic, nor fatalistio.3 
Rather it is simply a.n. hypo·thesis thought to be useful in 
historical interpretation. 
It is significant that the word translated as "determine" 
in English renditions ordin.a.rily appears a.s 1tbestimmen11 in 
Marx's original German. So it is with the key passage: "Life 
is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by 
life.•~ In Marx's own German the passage appears thus: 
8 Nioht da.s Bewusztsein bestimmt das Leben, sondern das Leben 
bestimmt das Bewusztsein,n5 The German verb •bestimmen• 
really carried the meaning of the English verb •condition• 
or 11 influenoe,n rather than the stronger •determine.• The 
1. HNM, lg4,. 
2. Joad, for example, denies that Marxts historical materialism 
is a strict determinism (GTP, 469-471). 
3. Hook writes! •Marx's theory of history does not involve 
a. fatalism or a necessitarianism of any kind •••• Marx'e 
historical materialism is not merely a method of reading 
history but of making itlil CArt.(l93!J.)l, 54J. 
4. Marx and Engels, GI, 1.5. 5. Marx and Engels, DID, 16. 
-- ·--· 
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latter term. suggests a. direc't causal relationship which 
ltbes t immen 11 does not imply n.t all. 
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Marx did not mean to g:Lve the impression that the move-
ment of history is like the movement of the billiard ball. 
Free historical choices ha.vo been made. But the question 
is, on what basis were thosE• ohoices :made? Even when a 
ohoice is assumed to be COlnJ>letely free, there is always a 
reason for the choice. Few would assert that their choices 
are determined by mere whim. It was Marx1s aim to dieoover 
what the basis of historical. ohoioes was. He did assert 
that the basis was often different from what the chooser 
thought or ola.imed. 
Marx asserted also that in the past mankind has to a 
large extent been a slave to economio foroes. But he never 
asserted that this was necessary, and would always be so. 
Actually, he claimed the opposite. Hie aim was to define a 
path to the Wrealm of freedom"l wherein men could master 
history and their sooial life, although they would still 
have to oope with material conditions. Historical material-
ism is not an a priori which defines the universal nature 
of human sooiety. 
The essential cri tioal t:I,Uestion is not whether Marx 
was too deterministic. The c'onfliot really is between two 
alternative explanations of history. The collflict is ohiefly 
between those who insist tha1i the condition of historical 
1. Marx, OAP, III, 95~. 
I §I •••• JC, •. _._._._. .. u;-.... e-. ................ 1. 
choices is ethical principle and Marx who asserted that 
the condition has been economic-social conditions. There 
are, of course, other alter:n.ativestha.n either of these 
extremes, but this contrast serves to explain Marx's view. 
The question is, what ends :Ln history have men tended to 
serve? Marx's answer to th:Ls question. may well have been 
wrong, but that was his quention. 
Much misunderstanding ~Lrose as historicru. materialism 
beca.m.e famous. In his lateJ~ life Engels felt compelled to 
clear up the confusion that had arisen, and so wrote, for 
example, to Schmidt! "Our C:Jonoeption of history is above 
all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after 
· the manner of the. Hegelians. All history must be studied 
afresh.nl In the same letter he wrote these amusing and 
revealing words: 
The materialist conception of history also has a 
lot of friends nowadays to whom it serves as an 
excuse for not studying history. Just as Marx 
used to say about the Frenoh tMarxistst of the 
late 'seventies! •All I know is that I am not 
a. Ma:rxist.t2 
On the speoifio question of ·the extent of determinism indi-
cated by historical mate:rial:tsm, Engels wrote to Block in 
lS90: 
1 .. COR, 473. 
2. COR, 472. 
--- ~------- ---- - --------
According to the materialist conception of history 
the determining element in history is ultimately 
the production and reproduction in real life. 
More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. 
If therefore somebody twists this into the state-
ment that the economic element is the only determin- · 
ing one, he transforms it into a meaningless, 
abstract and absurd ph:r:a.se ..... Politioal, legal» 
philosophical theories, religious ideas and their 
further development in'to systems of dogma, ••• also 
exercise their influent:;,e upon the course of his-
torical struggles.l 
Marx and I are ou::rselvtss partly to blame for the 
fact that younger writ•~rs sometimes lay more 
stress on the economic side than is due to it. 
We had to emphasize th:Ls main principle in opposi-
tion to our ad.versa.rie1;, who denied it, and we 
had not always the t imc~, the place or the oppor-
tunity to allow the other elements involved in 
the interaction to oomo into their rights.2 
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Marx himself wrote a. let1;er to a Russian newspaper in 
1877 objecting to the uses ·i;o which his historical theories 
had been put. 3 He argued tb.a.t his was not a set of formulas 
Which could be applied unorltically to all peoples every-
where. Such procedure assun:ted just what Marx denied, that 
the same laws of political a~d economic development apply 
at all times and places to a.ll people in the same way. 
Historical materialism is notb therefore, intended as a 
universally valid principle o£ strict historical, mechan-
istic determinism. It is not a metaphysics of history. 
But in spite of Marx and. Engels's protests, historical 
materialism does appear to b·e somewhat oversimplified. Far 
more confidence is placed in eoonomio explanations by Marx. 
2. OOR, 477• 
--I 
-.II 
than many thinkers feel the-y deserve,l To ta.ke a. single, 
simple principle and ~et tm~t guide all historical investi-
gations is to risk missing 1zhe whole truth. Marx considered 
facts; but there is a questj,.on as to whether he considered 
enough facts. Marx did tend to exaggel.'ate the role of 
technology in history. His rejection of theol.'ies which 
place all their emphasis on great men or great ideas is 
wholesome. But, on the othe·r hand, his Hegelian inclina-
tion to understand the •whole,ft should have prevented h~ 
from missing the true significance of great men and great 
ideas,. 
Furthermore, the very simplicity of historical material-
ism hides difficulties and complexities involved in applying 
it. Marx's ~pplioations seem obvious. Historical oritioism 
looks easy, when Marx is doi:o.g it~ But a really proper use 
of this tool requires a tremt,ndously wide grasp of fa.ots. 
The complexity of any politi()al economy is very difficult to 
out through.. But the simpliC}ity of the principle itself. 
tempts the student to pass by the labor of historical inquiry, 
and to apPly the theory wi thc1ut the necessary preliminary 
investigation--hence arose tl:J.e need for Engels's apologies. 
Marx recognized this danger, and warned against it. But the 
difficulty remains. The exact influence of any economic 
factor in history is very difficult to estimate.2 It appears 
1. Joad, fox example (GTP, 4S9). 
2. Santayana stresses this point [Art.(l949), 27i]. 
I 
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that general use and applica.tion of the method of historical 
materialism requires a grea11 deal more generalization a.nd 
speculation., as well as wido grasp of historical facts, than 
Marx was willing to ad.m.i t. 
Finally" there is in Ma.rx'~ s approach the very evident 
danger of flscientism.•l Whether Marx deserves this opprob-
rium or not, it is clear that he placed a great deal of 
confidence in soienoets ability to solve all human problems. 
The influence of Marx•s historical materialism on modern 
social science has been imme:o.se.. Whether this influence is 
deserved or not, Marx1 s impaiJ1i has been great. Schumpeter 
goes so far a.s to say that 1f1ihe so-called Economic Interpre-
tation of History is doubtleus one of the greatest individual 
achievements of sociology to this da.y.•2 
iit. Historical Ma.terial:1.sm. and General Theory of Value. 
Taken by itself historical. materialism is merely a way 
of studying history, and does not necessarily imply any 
specific metaphysical or ethical theory. Its full develop-
ment in the hands of Marx doe~ however, suggest some very 
clear answers to the questions raised by general theory of 
value. 
In the first place, virt-.mlly all of the traditional 
ethical theories· are repudiatt,d. They are not refuted, in 
the sense that they are attackc~d. on purely logical or theoretical 
1. So argues Dean Muelder (POU, g) • 
2.·_ CSD, 10. 
grounds. But rather, what :1.s attacked is simply the claim 
that they are based on logical, theoretical, or objectively 
empirical grounds alone. 
Engels says bluntly that Wall former moral theories 
are the product, in the last analysis, of the economic stage 
which society had reached at that particular epooh..111 The 
Marxist literature is rife w:L th sociological interpretations 
of the traditional ethical theories. In the eyes of Xa.11tsky., 
for iastanee, Epicureanism wrts a natural refleetion of the 
interests of favored classes who found plenty of material 
enjoyments about them and whc• were satisfied with the world 
as it was.2 Such a.n ethical view, he asserts, is not likely 
to be adopted by downtrodden classes. In this interpret~ 
tion Kautsky was true to the Marxist position. Kautsky 
stresses the fact that ethical theories are reflections of 
social needs~-not mere mores, or customs, but social needs. 
Marx himself is clear on this pointa Ethical theories 
in the past have reflected ma·lie.rial interests and needs.3 
Thus there is in Marx a gener1a.l cynicism toward the tradi-
tional, classical ethical thel:>ries, and a consequent rejec-
tion of them, one and all. 
In the light of this it ts evident that there can no 
longer be a place for ethics c1r science of value as inde-
pendent fields of inquiry. Theory of value and all such 
studies as the one undertaken in this dissertation are 
really quite pointless. Waddington cites Marxism as one 
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of the four great frontal attacks on the traditional con-
viction that ethics and the general concept of the good re-
quire a. philosophical justification.l Waddington perhaps 
had in mind these words of Marx: 
Where speculation ends--in real life--there real~ 
positive science begins! the representation of 
the practical activity, of the practical processes 
of development of men •••• When reality is depicted~ 
philosophy as an independent branoh of activity 
loses its medium of existence. At the best its 
place can only be t-aken by a summing:..up of the 
most general results~ abstractions which arise. 
from the observation of the historical develop-
ment of men. Viewed apart from real history, 
these have in themselves no value whatsoever.2 
What then is left by historical materialism for general 
theory of value? How does Marx approach the problem of 
value and ethics? Should one conclude that on Maxx•s view 
there is no such thing as value? The answer is that his-
torical materialism does not at all deny the existence of 
values as facts~ and does indicate a definite approach to 
the problem of value. 
The solution of value problems is enhanced, on the 
Marxist view, in a. negative way by submitting all institutions, 
traditions, social forms, ideas, and vaJ.ues to thor.ough 
oritioism. Does a given institution serve its intended pur-
pose? What ends do given social and economic forms actually 
1. Art.(l94l), 270. 2. GI., 15. 
-- ------------------
' 
30 
serve? What is the real fm1otion in society of ideas and 
ethical conceptions? When n,ll the facts are considered do 
certain values (suoh as "rugged individualismn or "the 
communal interest") really e~arantee all the benefits they 
are supposed to insure? In asking these questions Marxism 
poses a challenge to insincerity. In answering them it 
assumes a critical attitude toward values whioh, Marx be-
lieved~ would tend toward a more realistic and praetioal 
approach to value achievement, Suoh an approach would lead, 
Bernal believes, to a "reva~~ation of values,n1 
On the positive side Ma:rx's sooial science aimed at 
serving ethical theory and a(}hievement by clarifying fac-
tually the value situation, In practical life, all admit, 
the problem of choice is usunlly clouded over by all sorts 
of exceptional circumstances. These circumstances create 
a confusion about ends which is stultifying to moral aotion. 
The moral problem ia often m.c,re a case of confusion about 
facts than confusion about pxinoiples. For this reason 
Marx felt that the service to moral endeavor rendered by 
factual, scientific inquiry was immense~ especially in 
dealing with social questions, 
Ethical theory must be based on analysis of practical 
life situations. Thus of the proletariat, in freeing itself 
from inhuman conditions, Maxx wrote~ 
-1 --,-\ ----
Its end and its historical action are in its 
own life situation as the whole organization 
of present d&y bourgeois society clearly and 
irrevocably indicates~l 
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That is to say, to generalize, that description and clarifi-
cation of practical life are necessary for revealing the 
ends and means of moral action. 
Clearly, Marx emphasized descriptive as against norma-
tive judgments, because he believed that the former was the 
greater practical need in actually making value achievements. 
This does not mean that Marx was a wertfrei scientist. 
Theory, Marx believed, was wertfrei in the sense that it 
is not the ground of norms and values. The content of scien-
tific theory itself does not include value judgments. But 
the scientist is not wertfrei. Science makes no value 
judgments, but the scientist does. It is the man, and not 
the theory that is the source of value judgments. The 
difference here is between a subjectivistic and an objective 
theory of value. Marx's view at this point, combined with 
the feeling that a simple enunciation of moral ideals was 
often quite useless, led Marx to assume a generally nhard-
headed,n amoral attitude toward ethical questions. 
Garaudy's exposition of the Marxist view of ethics and 
values is illuminating. He summarizes the Marxist view thus: 
1. Le mat-erialisme dialeotique nous permit de 
faire la critique des divers systemes de morale: 
a)/En aenonoant d~s leurs prinoipes theoriques, 
une metaphysique oachee; 
l. HF, 207. 
b) En expliquant leurs eommandements praetiques 
par la sooiologie et l'histoire; 
2. Le materialis~e dialeotique nous permet de 
oonstruire nos regles de oonduite, 
a),Oomme materialistes, en les fondant non sur 
une rerilation ou une metaphysique, mais sur la 
soienoe; . 
b) Oomme dialeotioiens, en donnant a la oons-
siencj at au devoir leur plain sans et leur effi-
oacite.l . 
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Marx believed that more trust could be placed in action 
guided by human purposes combined with sound knowledge of 
history and society than in action guided alone by objective 
moral principle. He felt that exclusive attention to ideals 
and ethical speculation served only to confuse the issues 
and subvert valid human purposes. 
4. The Dialectical Principle. 
Marxts dialectical method is a source of consternation 
to many of his readers, both friendly and unfriendly. Some 
believe that the dialectic is the chief weakness in his 
thought. Some say that dialectics is good, but Marx used 
the principle badly. Many simply do not understand it. But 
there is no need for this confusion. The dialectical method 
is not based upon any mystical powers supposedly attached 
to the number three. Nor is the dialectical principle based 
on a collection of magic formulas and esoteric doctrines. 
Rather, dialectics is simply an approach to science, especially 
the science of sociology, which usee a few rather simple 
principles now ~uite widely accepted. 
l. Garaudy. OEM, 11. 
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i. Dialectical Elements in Marx's Method. 
The first aspect of the Marxist dialectic to be noted is 
the emphasis on process. This concept, as is so with other 
phases of Marx's dialectic, was taken over directly from 
Hegel. The world is viewed as in process, and every phenome-
non, both in natuxe and in society, is viewed as developing. 
No thing oan be fully understood when only its intrinsic 
nature as a static thing is considered. The history of any 
social or natural phenomenon is as important for knowledge 
as is its present state, although the latter is required 
too. "The present society,n for instance, says Marx, nis 
no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and is 
constantly ohanging.ul 
This emphasis on development and change serves to define 
the object of sociological studies. What dialectical investi-
gation seeks to understand is social processes, rather than 
isolated, fixed social institutions. Ideas and institutions 
are viewed in terms of their function in the total social 
framework» past and present. Analysis turns its attention 
to relationships between what on the surface might appear 
to be unrelated social phenomena. 
This emphasis, originated by Hegel, and carried forward 
by Marx, has made a strong impact on contemporary social 
studies. DMarx ••• impressed a new dimension on economics--the 
1.. OAP ~ I 3 16. 
dimension of time. The concept of sequence, of process; of 
cumulative change which stems from Marx is basic in economic 
thought today.nl 
From the conception of process emerges the dialectical 
principle of contradiction. This principle is based ~n 
the fact that social phenomena are often caused by their 
opposites, and that, indeed, the contradiction or conflict 
of opposites is what provides the npushn in the social pro-
cess. For example, the proletarian class itself owes its 
existence to the class which it opposes--the capitalist 
class. The whole socialist movement, to extend the inter-
pretation, is not a reflection of the thought of Karl Marx, 
but is a reflection of the opposite of socialism, capitalist 
production. It is hard to imagine that socialism could 
have arisen as a movement if there had been no factories, 
no oppressive working conditions, no exploitation. The 
movement is a social development of opposite forces within 
society. 
Then next, the Marxist dialectic stresses the concept 
of totality. No concept, idea, institution, or social 
movement can be understood by itself. It must be studied 
in relation to the totality of which it is a part. This 
is no a priori principle based on the assumption that the 
whole is more important or better than the parts. Rather, 
it is based on the assumption that societies do, as a matter 
l. Mills, Art.(l949), 13. 
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of fact, function as wholes and therefore can be understood 
only when studied as a whole. For example, Marx wrote that 
nthe proletariat and the wealthy are opposites. As such 
they constitute a whole. They are both expressions of the 
world of private property.ul And again~ Marx said that 
"the production relations of every society form a whole.n2 
The decision as to what should and should not be treated 
as a whole is not based upon anything arbitrary, but is 
based purely on empirical observations indicating what 
does and does not function as a whole. Every fact must be 
considered in the light of all other faots.to which it is 
related. This principle yields a variety of dialectical 
wholes, the normal fulfilment of whioh constitutes value. 
More will be said below of the value aspect of dialectics. 
Finally, dialectics appears as an ideal of completeness. 
Investigation must be thorough. Every study, every book, 
must be a coherent whole. This aspect of Marx's method is 
interestingly revealed in a letter written to Engels in 
1g65. Marx wrote! 
I cannot bring myself to send off anything (to the 
printer) until I have the whole be~re me. What-
ever shortcomings they may have, the merit of my 
writings is that they are an artistic whole, and 
that can only be attained by my method of never 
having them printed until they lie before one as 
a whole.3 
Marx's dialectic is not nearly so mystical or mystifying 
as many readers feel that it is. The dialectic is based 
2. POP, 93• 3. COR, 204. 
essentially on the concepts of development, contradiction, 
totality, and completeness. 
ii. Relation of Marx's Dialectic to Hegel. 
;6 
Full credit is given to Hegel for the formulation of the 
dialectical method. Marxists trace the history of dialectics 
back to pre-Socratic philosophy. But the systematic and 
complete formulation of the method was Hegel's unique contri-
bution. 
Hegel viewed the world as an eternal process. The 
elements of this process are in ceaseless struggle or contr~ 
diction. The apple blossom is used to illustrate this world 
struggle. The blossom struggles for life. Nature, on the 
other hand, contrives to kill it. Ultimately the apple 
blossom dies. But the remarkable feature of this struggle 
is that from it issues fruit, the apple itself. The blossom 
dies and rises again in the apple. This continual struggle 
of opposites, this ceaseless interplay of polar elements, 
Hegel viewed as the essential feature of the world. 
Hegel gave a logical formulation to this world-view 
which is now famous. It is the thesis-antithesis-synthesis 
relation, or in words more tyPically Hegelian# affirmation-
negation-negation of the negation. This dialectical formula 
became for Hegel the method by which all scientific investi-
gations were to be carried on. He applied it to history and 
metaphysics, as well as logic. Dialectics was for him the 
first principle of all thought. 
1 
While Marx disparaged Hegel's use of dialectics, he 
had only the highest praise for Hegelts general contribu-
tion. Engels referred to Hegel as flthe colossal old chap.w1 
M&rx'a own. feeling of indebtedness to Hegel is reflected 
in this passage from a letter written to Engels~ 
I have thrown over the whole doctrine of profit 
as it has existed up to now. In the method of 
treatment the fact that by mere accident I have 
again glanced through Hegel's Logic has been of 
great service to me.2 
Not only was Hegel's formulation of the dialectic used 
as the basis of Marx's own dialectic~ but the whole spirit 
and tone of Marx's writings is Hegelian. Many of Marx's 
doctrines are Hegelian in tone. The concept of class 
struggle is an example. The Hegelian spirit dominates in 
Capital. Marx began that work with a simple abstraction, 
the commodity. From this simple starting point he pro-
ceeded dialectically to an understanding of the Whole nature 
of capitalism. The dialectical method and spirit appears 
in many passages in Marx. These two from the German Ide-
ology are illustrations. 
Division of labor and private property are, 
moreover, identical expressions: in the one 
the same thing is affirmed with reference to 
activity as is affirmed in the other with 
reference to the product of the activity.3 
The form of intercourse determined by the 
existing productive forces at all previous 
historical stages 1 and in it~ turn determin-
ing these, is civil sooiety.4 
l. COR1 200. 2. COR, 102. 4. GI, 26. 
The Hegelian tone and terminology appear plainly in these 
passages. Marx's ideas here would be very difficult to grasp 
in their full meaning if the passages are not read in the . 
light of the dialectical method. The reader must be able to 
ntranslaten the dialectical language in order to understand 
Marx in these and similar passages. 
Although Marxists are ready to give Hegel full credit 
as the father of dialectics~ they insist that in their system 
dialectics has been correc~ed and improved. It is their 
position that Hegel had a great idea, but he did not use it 
properly. Hence a revision was necessary. The following 
paragraphs are offered as an attempt to show that the 
Marxist revision of Hegel was superficial and was based on 
a misunderstanding of the Hegelian dialectic. 
The first point of the Marxist revision concerned the 
nature of reality. Hegel conceived of reality as ideal. 
Marx conceived of reality as essentially matter. 
By dialectics Hegel meant the progress of .ideas 
(thought) by means of contradiction, the process 
of its development toward a supreme and absolute 
spirit •••• But the dialectics of Hegel are ideal-
istic •••• Marx, on the contrary, employed dialec-
tics materialistically.l 
This version of the Marxist improvement on Hegel is the work 
of a contemporary, florthodox" Marxist. The view is that 
Marx was a materialist. Obviously then it was necessary for 
him to regard nature as a development and process of material 
things rather than as a movement of ideas, as in Hegel. 
1. Adoratsky, DM, 23. 
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The second point of the revision is a corollary of the 
first. Not only are the elements of the process material 
things, but matter itself is the driving force of the process. 
Guria.n. writes: 
The foundation of the ~Manifesto' is an Hegelian 
one. History is a process of necessary develop-
ment. But it is not the idea that propels one 
stage of development to another. The driving 
forces are material-economic needs.! 
Gurian is not a Marxist, but this statement would be sub-
stantially acceptable to Marx. It is matter, not ideas, 
which gives the "push" to the dialectical prooess. 
The third point of revision criticizes Hegel for what 
is, aooording tothe Marxists, an incongruity in Hegel's 
view. On the one hand Hegel maintained that the world is 
constantly in prooesse On the other hand, Hegel claimed for 
his system absolute truth, which is a fixed, final thing. 
E~els states this criticism with great emphasis.2 If Hegel 
did try to oombine a developmental world-view with the cla~ 
that he had. :found the final and absolute truth., then he was 
guilty of holding a contradictory position. The Marxists 
feel that he was so guilty. 
The Marxist revision of Hegel may be summed up in Marx 1 s 
graphic phrase that he had Wturned Hegel right side up." 
That is., Hegel had viewed the world as_ a reflection of ideas. 
The Marxists, ,on the other hand., view ideas as reflections of 
2. sus, 23. 
dialectically developing matter. Marx states this view in 
his preface to Capital .. 
My dialectic method is not only different from 
the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To 
Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., 
the process of thinking, which, under the name 
of *·the Idea.,"' he even transforms into an inde-
pendent subject, is the demiurgos of the real 
world, and the real world is only the external, 
phenomenal form of 'the Idea. 1 With me, on the 
contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the 
material world reflected by the human mind, and 
translated into forms of thought .. l 
Marx ridiculed Hegel for his habit of "transforming hats 
into ideas-fl2 Hegel was correct insofar as his view was 
di~lectical, but Wrong insofar as he was an idealist. Ideas, 
said Marx, are the products and not the cause of the pro-
cession of nature. 
Thia revision of Hegel is based on a misreading of the 
· Hegelian view. The Marxist error is two-fold. In the 
first place, the revision is based on the assumption that 
in Hegel there is a dichotomy of ideas (usually thought·of 
as human ideas in the Marxist literature), on the one hand, 
and expressions of those ideas (usually thought of as material 
expressions) on the other hand. The Marxists apparently 
read their own meaning of the word flidean into the word as 
it appears in Hegel. When the Marxist interpreters use the 
word they mean one thing only. They mean mental reflections 
of matter. Just what Hegel meant when he spoke of human 
1. CAP~ I, 25. 
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ideas is not entirely clear. The point is that when he used 
the word "idea" in his Logic, he was not speaking of human 
ideas. 
In fact, Hegel's Ideas--and Marx knew this per-
fectly well--are not human. ideas, and to turn 
the Hegelian philosophy upside down cannot give 
us the statement that ideas arise as reflections 
of material oonditions.l · 
The dichotomy of ideas and matter which the Marxists ha~e 
"turned right side up" really does not appear in Hegel at 
all. 
But the second part of the Marxist misunderstanding of 
Hegel is much more fundamental. The basic error lies in 
the failure to see properly the relation of Hegel's Absolute 
Idea to the world. The error is to be found clearly stated 
in Engels, who says that for Hegel: "Things and their 
evolution were only the realized pictures of the 1 Idea,t 
existing somewhere from eternity before the world existed.•2 
In this passage the error of thinking of Hegel 1 s ideas 
as human ideas is avoided, but only to fall into a worse 
error. The Marxist conception of the relation of the Idea 
and the world may be expressed .in a simple illustration. 
The Idea is to the world as a man is to the snowball he is 
rolling. The snowball is pushed by the man along in the wet 
snow, gradually getting bigger and bigger, growing and develop-
ing, but all the while dependent on the man for its forward 
1'. Croce, HME, 7• 2. sus, 23. 
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movement. What the Marxists fail to see is that the Idea 
and the world are identical in Hegel11 There is no man separate 
from the snowball:~ pushing it along. The Absolute oa.nnot 
exist, or does not exist, apart :from its expression~. In 
Hegel the Absolute Idea is the whole, and if one removes 
the Absolute from his system, there is nothing left. Only 
by the prooess of logioal abstraction can the Absolute be 
spoken of as separate from anything in the world, and such 
a logical abstraction, Hegel would agree with the Marxists, 
does not exist. 
What the Marxists have really done is not to turn Hegel 
upside down, but leave out part of Hegel. They leave out 
his conclusion--the Absolute. They :follow the path of the 
dialectio up to a certain point and then stop. 
As for the criticism that Hegel inconsistently claimed 
to have found the final and complete truth, it needs only 
to be said that Hegel never made any such claim. He did 
believe that he had found the clue to the universe. But 
that is far from claiming to know all the truth. 
What then is left to the Marxists after their revision? 
The answer is that they still have Hegel. For in spite of 
the revision, they still use the dialectical method very 
much as Hegel used it. They prooeed very much as though'~ 
they had idealistic presuppositions. Marx denied that he 
was a.n idealist, and his total view is naturalistic. But 
there is also a strong admixture of idealism, espeoially in 
regard to method. 
., .. ·;-~-cc--~----:-c 
iii. C.J:i t icisms of Marx's Dialectical Method. 
It is the opinion of many critics that Marx1 s attempts 
to be empirical in method were vitiated by his dialectical 
approaoh. The charge that Marx's method was unempirical is 
based mostly on the conviction that dialectics is mystical 
clap trap which has no place in any scientific investigation. 
Frequently this conviction is found among writers who are 
untrained in philosophy and who really do not have the 
slightest idea about what dialectical reasoning is. Such 
persons are, of course, truly mystified by the dialectical 
elements in Marx's writings. But there are many competent 
critics who charge that Marx introduced mystical elements 
into his thought, thereby forfeiting the claim to scientific 
adequacy.l 
But was Marx empirical? Schumpeter suggests that Marx 
was not an empirical scientist at all, and was little more 
than a rabble rouser. Schumpeter writes: 
In the second section (of the Communist Manifesto) 
Marx and Engels attended to two very necessary 
tasks. The one was to protect the commpnism 
which they meant to stand for against popular 
aspersions. Following a hallowed practice of 
all ages, they selected these aspersions wisely 
and stated them at the lowest possible level--just 
as radicals do today. Aided by this device, they 
again did a good job--a masterpiece in fact, in 
1. Representative ori tics who charge Marx with 11mysticism11 
are Bober (IOH, 44, 3g5), Eastman (MAL, 22-23, 3g, 4o, 
106; MAS, 15), and ~ze tArt.(193g), 39~). Jeze says 
Marx fleet un ~roph~te h_ebra!que domina par une tendenee 
messianiquefl {39~). Some who are not Marxists interpret 
the dialectic in Marx favorably, as an indication of 
his belief in providence and his prophetic interpreta-
tion of history. Tillich shares this attitude (PE, 173, 
253-254). 
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elu~ing the opponents' strong points and replac-
ing fact and reasoning by emphatic assertion--'the 
workingmen have no country'--wherever convenient.l 
Sohumpeter's statement is somewhat unobjeotive, but it 
reflects the attitu~e of many of the critics, especially 
of the popular group. 
Probably the greatest systematic, ~etailed, and scien-
tific attack upon Marx•s economic theories is to be found 
in the book written by BB~Bawerk, Karl Marx and the Close 
of his System. The most devastating and convincing criticisms 
of Marx's theory are to be. found in that work. This is 
B8hm-Bawerk7 s judgment on .Marx's method! 
Herein lies, I believe, the alpha and the omega 
of all that is fallacious, contradictory, and 
vague in the treatment of his subject by Marx. 
His system is not in close touch with facts. Marx 
has not deduced from facts the fundamental princi-
ples of his system, either by means of a sound 
empiricism or a solid eoonomico-psyohological 
analysis; he founds it on no firmer ground than 
a formal dialectic. This is the great radical 
fault of the Marxian system at its birth; from 
it all the rest necessarily springs. The system 
runs in one direction, facts go in another; and 
they cross the course of the system sometimes 
here, sometimes there, and on each occasion the 
original fault begets a new fault. The conflict 
of system and facts must be kept from view, so 
that the matter is shrouded either in darkness or 
vagueness, or it is turned and twisted with the 
same tricks of dialectic as at the outsetj or 
where none of this avails we have a oontrad.iction.2 
Many oritios are in agreement with this view. But many 
others range themselves on the other side of the question. 
Hook says simply, UMarx was an empirioist.u3 
2. KMS, 101. 3. TUKM, 79• 
.. ;:.~·'="·;-. -~-· ;;--.~,. . 
Whatever the truth of the matter is, Marx certainly 
thought of himself as an empiricist. That should be clear 
from Marx's use of the method of historical empiricism. or 
historical materialism. Marx's intentions to be scientific 
and empirical are clear throughout his writings, especially 
in those in which he attacks idealism. For example: 
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary 
ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which 
abstraction can only be made in the imagination. 
They are the real individuals, their activity 
and the material conditions under which they live, 
both those which they find already existing and 
those produced by their activity. These premises 
can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.l 
Marx intended to make historical facts central in inter-
preting history. UThe first premise of all human history 
is 1 of course, the existence of living, human individuals.n2 
However wrong his conclusions might have been, Marx tried 
to derive them from experience. In his view of the nature 
of man, for instance, his starting point was experience. 
•The difference between the individual as a person and what 
is accidental to him, is not a conceptual difference but a 
historical faot.n3 Here the contrast between a method which 
is abstractly logical or rationalistic and the historical 
method of Marx becomes clear. In commenting on Marx's method 
of interpreting history Hook says that Marx nseeks f.or the 
causes of cultural change within the social process itself 
and not in the realm of metaphysical abstraction. His method 
is realistic and materialistic.n~ 
l. GI 1 6-7. 2 .. GI, 7. ;. GI, 70. 
Marx intended to be empirical~ but was he? It would 
seem that, in spite of the views of some critics, Marx was 
empirical. Moreover, .there is only one sense in which it 
can reasonably .be denied that Marx was an empirical thinker, 
namely, that he was a bad one, an incompetent one. Marx 
may have been a superficial empiricist, but certainly his 
views were based in part;J at least, on history. 
Consider the evidence. In the first place, much of 
Marx•s exposition is in the form of commentaries on histori-
cal events. Examples of this are The Civil War in France, 
The Civil War in the United States, and The Eighteenth Bru-
ma.ire of Louis Napoleon. In his historical writings are 
found some of Marx's most fundamental doctrines.l More-
over, it is significant that these doctrines are often to 
be found only implicitly and not explicitly stated. That 
is, Marx commonly became so absorbed in the simple narra-
tion of and commentary on historical events that he did not 
explicitly state his doctrinal conclusions. Many of his 
doctrines can only be derived. This partially explains why 
so many different schools of Marxist interpretation have 
arisen. Marx never set :forth a d.efini tive statement of his 
doctrines. Perhaps the explanation for this lies in the 
:fact that he aimed to present what history teaches, rather 
than what Marx teaches. 
1. For instance, the doctrine that any communistic regime 
must completely destroy the forms of the government 
which it displaces is found in The Civil War in France. 
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A second indication of the historico-empiricaJ. method, 
in the midst of dialectical interpretation, lies in Marx's 
prolific use of historical illustrative material. It is 
complained that some philosophers state their principles 
without illustrating them. It is often complained of Marx 
that he illustrated his principles without stating them. 
Marx's basic work, Capital, abounds in specific ill~trative 
material. In discussing the role of labor in "The Produc-
tion of Absolute Surplus-Value" Marx considers the nworking 
Day." He quotes from official government reports of investi-
gations into certain industries.l MOst of the factual basis 
on whioh Capital was written was drawn from official govern-
ment reports. Marx cites "the potteries of Staffordshire" 
as a "Branch of English Industry Without Legal Limits to 
Exploitation.n2 He quotes from government reports that are 
speoifio to the point of giving the actual names, ages, and 
working houxs of some of the workers in the ceramics indus-
tries.; As a work in the principles of political economy, 
Capital is unique in its inclusion of such historical details 
as the amount of mineral and nitrogen in the food of a 
"Portland Convictn in 1S6~ and the number of cubic feet 
of space per worker in the crowded rooms of the domestic 
industries of Nottingham.5 
5. CAP, I, 511. 
In spite of these facts many critics are still uncon~ 
vinced that Marx was a sound empiricist. Croce maintains 
that the historical references in Marx are just window 
dressing, that in fact Marx's conclusions were not based 
on empirical evidence. Croce, whose criticisms of Marx are 
generally clear and forceful~ says: 
As regards method, Das Kapital is without doubt 
an abstract investigation; the capitalist society 
studied by Marx, is not this or that society, 
historically existing, in France or in England, 
nor the modern society of the most civilised na-
tions, that of Western Europe and America. It 
is an ideal and formal society, deduced from 
certain hyPotheses, which could indeed never 
have occurred as actual facts in the course of 
history.., •• As regards meth9d, Das Kapita.l is not 
an historical description.~ 
Croce adds that flMarx 1 s researches are not historical, but 
hypothetical and abstraot.fl2 In this criticism Croce is 
either brilliantly incisive or very wrong. Either he has 
gone beneath the surface of Capital and has found an abstract, 
non-empirical oore~ or else he has completely misread the 
work. It is not certain which is the oa.se. But it vo uld 
appear that the proof of Croce•s oase would require a great 
deal of explanation. Croce would have to explain the presence 
of so much concrete, historical detail in Marx. He would 
have to explain the fact that most of Marxrs researches for 
Capital were based on official English government reports. 
On the surface it would seem that Marx• s work was essentially 
an analysis of capitalism in England. And many critics who 
have gone beneath the surface believe that that is essentially 
what the work was. It would appear that Croce has not been 
entirely fair with Marx. 
It must be admitted that Capital is decidedly theoret-
ical. Marx does use abstractions and very theoretical oon-
oeptions. But Marx was fully aware of this. He was aware 
of the nature of an abstraction. One of the pre-eminent 
features of his thought is its rejection of hyposta.tization 
of abstractions. Some of the highest critioa.l praise that 
Marx has received has been for his destruction of the illu-
sion that such abstractions as economic laws are final and 
unchangeable reality. The older traditional economic theorjss 
regarded such economic relations as the law of supply and 
demand as the product of natural law. These laws were 
thought of as eternal~ fixed, a.nd immutable. Ma.rx rejected 
this. He maintained that men, not impersonal foroes suoh 
as laws~ make their eoonomio history.l 
It may be that Marx used abstractions and Uidealities" 
more than he would be willing to admit. But one thing 
that he learned from Hegel was that an apstraotion, taken 
by itself, is nothing. This is especially clear in those 
passages in The Poverty of Philosophy in which he is so 
oritioal of Hegel himself. This work is to a large extent 
an attack on idealism. Marx was especially impatient with 
philosophies which evolve impractical theories that have 
little or no relevance to the actual world.2 
l. This view is prominent in POP. 
2. See especially pages 92-101. 
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But it must also be a~itted that Marx's empiricism 
had its limits. There is serious question whether Marx 
considered enough facts. As was indicated below, Marx's 
analysis tended to be oonfiried to economic facts, and other 
realms of fact received only cavalier attention. 
In addition to the crit.icism that the dia.leotioal method 
is essentially unempirioal are a number of other criticisms, 
some superficial and some qu,ite cogent. One of the more 
superficial objections is offered by Fede:rn. His argument 
is that because one cannot know history's terminus a quo, 
because history cannot be seen as a completed whole, one 
therefore cannot know which stage in history is thesis, 
which antithesis, and so on.l Dialectics is a lever without 
a fulcrum. But this view presupposes an absurdly abstract 
view of dialectical reasoning, and misses its essential 
simplicity. 
Stronger criticisms are ,given by Harley~ who calls 
attention to the tendency of dialectics to generalize and 
oversimplify~2 and Hunt, who charges that dialectical interpre-
tation is too loose and too much given to yielding a wide 
variety of interpretations, one a.s correct as another from 
the dialectical point of view.3 The dialectical method 
has its difficulties, without any question. But the simple, 
essential principles of the dialectical approach would appear 
to be useful as they are applied in the hands of Hegel, Marx, 
1. Federn, TMO, passim. 2. Art.(l90l), 727. 3. TPO, 41. 
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and many others. Dialectical reasoning would appear to be 
one of the strong points in Marx's theory. 
Perhaps the most serious critical point to be raised 
with respect to the Marxist dialectic is a matter not related 
at all to the validity of the dialeotioal method in itself~ 
It concerns rather the essential compatibility of dialec-
tics and materialism. There is a serious question whether 
dialectics is consistent with materialistic presuppositions. 
There may very well be an incongruity in a materialism based 
on dialectics. Marx suspected this. He knew that dialeotios 
would Wfitn materialism only if it were radically retailored. 
That is why he undertook his grand revision of the Hegelian 
view. 
Schumpeter takes the view that when Marx took up dia.-
leotios as a fundamental principle of method. at that moment 
he ceased to be a materialist. In fact, Marx's view, Soh~ 
peter believes, is not materialistic at all.l Parkes takes 
a similar position.2 There is good ground for this line of 
argument. 
Dialectics is essentially idealistic. It is a logic. 
If one assumes that nature develops dialectically, one 
assumes that it develops logically. The conclusion is that 
dialectics is idealistic. On the one hand Marx said that 
nature develops according to matter. On the other hand he 
said that it develops according to idealistic logic. This 
1. OSD, ll. 
is the incompatibility in the Marxist view. Why did Marx, 
who was no intellectual midget, fall into this position? 
Santayana provides a possible answer: 
I think we may safely say that if Marx retained 
this.d.ialeotio without its theological fulfilment 
(as in Hegel), in his view of history, the reason 
was that he had a moral and dramatic future much 
more at heart than any speculative rigor or 
consistency.l . 
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That is one possible answer. Marx was an idealist at heart. 
His mission was really a moral mission. He assumed the 
cloak of a materialist and a rigorous scientist only because 
he wanted to meet the bully (the capitalist) on his own 
ground, the ground of cold, hard facts. 
Ma.rxt s answer, on the other hand, might be that his 
dialectic is not based on idealistic presuppositions, but 
merely upon observations of the way the world behaves. The 
world, as a matter of fact, does develop dialectically. 
Society does, as a matter of fact, develop dialectically .• 
To reduce this fact to a formula is no more to adopt ideal-
ism than does a chemist when he discovers chemical formulas, 
or a physicist when he discovers physical laws. This is a 
possible explanation. But after all is said, there do appear 
to be definite idealistic overtones in the systema.tic thought 
of Karl Marx. 
5) 
iv. The Marxist Dialectic and Value Theory. 
Marx's dialectic yields three principles which are of 
fundamental significance for value theory. They are: 1) the 
unity of thought and action; 2) peaceful resolution of con-
flicts; and )) the principle of developing wholes. These 
principles are very prominent in Marx's thought. They 
reveal the measure of Hegel 1 s influence upon Marx, especially 
in value theory. 
First, there is the principle of the unity of thought 
and action. This principle is a direct product of the Hegel-
ian doctrine of totality. No problem is solved until it is 
solved as a whole, until every side of the problem is dealt 
with. Clearly, human problems have both a theoretical side 
and a practical side. The practical side is part of the 
problem and cannot, therefore, be ignored. Because of the 
general tendency of theorists to overlook the practical 
aspect of human problems, Marx placed his greatest emp~a-
sis upon the practical. This emphasis leads some critics 
to believe that Marx ignored theory. But he did not. To 
overlook theory is as self-defeating as to overlook prac-
tice. Both must be considered. This principle of the unity 
of thought and action is both an epistemic, methodological 
principle and an ethical principle. As an ethical principle, 
it signifies that the goal is ethical action, that values 
become real only in practice.· 
Ma.rx1 s emphasis on the unity of thought and action re-
ceives its most striking formulation and statement in the 
uTheses on Feuerbaoh,u which were written very early. in his 
career. Certain passages in that set of eleven propositions 
sound as though they were written by John Dewey. These 
passages indicate both the very great influence of Hegel and 
Marx on the thought of John Dewey, and also the clearly 
pragmatic, instrumentalist tendencies in Marx's thought. 
A second principle of value indicated by Marx1s dia-
lectic concerns the resolution of conflicts as they occur 
in the social process. The dialectical movement of society 
is based upon confliot-~not necessarily violent conflict, 
so much as conflict of interests and aims. The great con-
flict 1 empha.s.ized most by Marx, was the class struggle.. In 
the capitalist era the conflict was between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat. Within the capitalistic system, as an 
economic system, was the contradiction between socialized 
production and individual appropriation. 
The question arises as to how dialectical conflicts 
are to be resolved. Is conflict, and force and violence, 
to be taken as an eternal feature of the nature of things, 
to be accepted and lived with as best possible? Or, can 
the conflicts which arise, a~ society develops, be controlled? 
Marx's judgment seems to be that in the past such conflicts 
have been resolved, but only through the operation of imper-
sonal forces, beyond human control, and often at the expense 
of Violence and suffering. It is quite clear, furthermore, 
that Marx placed a great value on rationalt human control 
' 
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of and peaceful resolution of contradictory forces 1 in place 
of impersonal control and violent resolution. Peaceful 
resolution of conflicts emerges as a central value in Karl 
Marx's scheme of things--this in spite of his acceptance 
of revolution as a means of social strategy. At this point, 
however, the pacifistic spirit of Karl Marx comes to the 
foreground. This pacifism has, of course, been a prominent 
feature of the socialist movement from the very beginning.l 
Finally, Marx's dialectical method issues in the concept 
of developing wholes as a principle of value. The developed 
whole becomes a principle for the definition of value. The 
aim of every process is the fulfilment of all the conditions 
within it 1 the realization of all its possibilities, which 
results in a harmonious, completed whole. When a process 
attains its natural fulfilment, value is realized. When 
the normal development of the whole is thwarted, there is 
disva.lue. 
Many kinds of holistic processes appear in Marx's 
writings. A single human effort may be regarded as a dialec-
tical process whioh is completed only as a totality-~suoh as 
a work of art or the writing of a book. Eaoh individual 
l. This whole matter of the free, conscious control of the 
social process is the central problem of Chapter II in 
this dissertation. 
human life is thought of a.s a dialectical whole. Marx 
wrote that Hin a higher phase of communist society (will 
be) the all-round development of the individual.n1 The 
most striking expression, of couxse, of this Marxist princi-
ple is that famous passage in The German Ideology wherein 
Marx and Engels wrote: 
In communist society, where nobody has one exclusive 
sphere of activity but each oan become accomplished 
in any branch he wishes, society regulates the gen-
eral production and thus makes it possible for me 
to do one thing to-day and another to-morrow, to 
hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear 
cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, 
fisherman, shepherd or oritic.2 
One of the essential features of the capitalistic system 
which was singled out by Marx was the division of labor. 
In this process of specialization one aspect of an individual's 
capacities is developed at the expense of the complete ne~ 
leot of his other abilities and possibilities. The result 
was thwarted, truncated, dehumanized half-men. The dialec-
tical principle, on the other hand, recognizes the multi-
tude of possibilities within the individual man, and is 
based on the assumption that those possibilities shoUld be 
rea.lizede Value is achieved when human possibilities a.re 
realized, when human abilities are developed. The greatest 
value is achieved, and a man is saved, when all his abilities 
are realized and developed. 
l. OGP 1 10. 2. GI, 22. 
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But the dialectic moves on to ever larger wholes. 
Society itself is a whole, and a society achieves its ful-
filment when all of the possibilities within it are realized, 
The social whole is based on nmutual interdependencenl and 
the nmutual interaotionn2 of the individuals within each 
society. All existing societies make up human society, or 
mankind as a whole, and the ideal of an international brothe~ 
hood of all men is one of the salient conceptions of the 
Communist Manifesto. The ideal of none world,n the ideal 
of all men living together in one harmonious whole, is one 
of the deepest and most pervading conceptions in Marx's 
writings. 
A still higher stage of the dialectic is history. Maxx 
conceives o:f all history as a single dialectical whole. 
This point should not be over emphasized, because there have 
been stages in historical development, especially in ancient 
society, when the relations between existing societies were 
practically nonexistent, due to poor communications; and 
Maxx recognized this faot. Nonetheless, the dialectical 
approach led Marx to consider history as a dialectical and 
holistic development. At this point he comes muoh closer 
to a metaphysics of history than does he in his historical 
materialism. 
Again, at this level of the dialectic, the fulfilment 
of dialectical process is a principle of valuee When historical 
1. GI, 22. 2. Marx, ICR, 291. 
processes move on to higher stages of development, value is 
achieved. The movement from medievalism to capitalism was 
viewed by Marx as a step forward, and a distinct human 
achievement. It was a value. 
The principle of the fulfilment of dialectical pro-
cesses, of developing wholes, of a hierarchy of dialectical 
stages, is, of oourse, distinctly Hegelian. Gregaine's 
account of the Hegelian value theory reveals the similarity 
between the two thinkers, Marx and Hegel. 
Il (Hegel) vait lea divers esprits devenir esprits 
universals en oe sene qu'un esprit partioulier 
attaint sa destin's en oontemplant et en acceptant 
l 1universalite rationnellement ordon~e des chose' 
et en se tranvant en harmonia avec ltuniversalite 
des esprits que jouissent de la m~me contemplation. 
L'esprit partioulier deviant aassi universal en 
agissent salon las lois morales, rationnelles, 
qui sont universelles, valables pour tous lee 
esprits.,l 
Pour ~egel, aucune valeur n'est entierement sub-
ordinee a une autre. Toutee sont, pour une part, 
absolues, ultimes. Elles font partie du systeme 
dialeotique des essences dont chaque el~ment est, 
il est vrai, moyen en vue des element sup~rieurs, 
mais aussi, en partie, fin en soi.,2 
In this aoQount there are essentially three points. First, 
a spirit achieves value through becoming universalized, or, 
in Marx's manner of speaking, through fulfilling all its 
possibilities. Second, universality is achieved through 
conforming to universal, rational, moral laws. Third, eaoh 
spirit is subordinated to a higher level of spirit in a 
l. SPD, 115. 2. SPD, 122. 
hierarchy which has not only metaphysical .. but axiological 
significance. 
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The first of these three principles is clearly accepted 
by Marx. The second is rejected. The conditions of uni-
versality are 1 for Marx, not found in a realm of rational 
law, but rather are found within the process itself. In 
the case of the individual~ for instance,. fulfilment is 
achieved not through conformity to an objective order or 
moral law, but through fulfilment of the conditions of 
development~ the capacities, found within the individual 
himself. This is a very subtle and touchy point. A good 
Hegelian might argue that there is here really no difference 
between Marx and Hegel. The apparent difference rises only 
from Marx's misunderstanding of Hegel. The third point, 
concerning a hierarchy of being, is difficult to assess. 
Apologists for Marx say that his view is opposed to Hege1 1 s 
at this point. Hegel had one whole~ they say, while Marx 
had many wholes. For Hegel, the Absolute is all important, 
whereas in Marx the individual is all important. That is, 
in Marx the axiological hierarchy does not correspond to the 
metaphysical hierarchy. But shades of the Hegelian position 
certainly appear in the Marxist literature. Otherwise, why 
would so many critics get the impreswion that for Marx the 
state is all important, and the individual of no importance? 
Certainly there are passages in the Marxist literature 
which seem to place a higher value on historical achievements 
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than on individual personality, even where those historical 
achievements were won at the expense of brutalizing masses 
of men. Ma%x's interp~etation that capitalism was a great 
step forward, even in the early days when its factories 
made the life of the worker a living hell, is an example. 
The reproach moved against him (the capitalist), 
that he has an eye only to the development of 
the productive forces regardless of thuman beings,' 
regardless of the sacrifices in human beings and 
capital values incurred, strikes precisely his 
strong point. The development of the productive 
forces of social labor is the historical task and 
privilege of capital. It is precisely in this 
way that it unconsciously creates the material 
requirements of a higher mode of production.l 
So wrote Marx on the virtues of capitalism. This type of 
interpretation occurs often in the writings of Engels, who 
even said in Anti-Dfthring that "the introduction of slavery 
under the conditions of that time (ancient) was a great 
step forward.,n2 
But the most striking case of attributing pre-eminent 
value to historical achievement ia Marx~s brilliant essay 
on India~ Some of the most remarkable statements in the 
entirety of Marxist writings are found in this essay. The 
spirit of the article is found in these words~ 
England, it is true, in causing a social revolu-
tion in Hindostan, was actuated only by the vilest 
interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing 
them. But that is not the question •••• Whatever 
may have been the crimes of England, she was the 
unconscious tool of history in bringing about that 
revolution. 3 
1. Marx, CAP~ III, 3049 2. AD, 274. ). IND, 1g7. 
j-
But if the crimes of England were not the point, if the 
brutal destruction of individuals was not the point, what 
in the world was the question? Aooording to Marx, the point 
was that England unified India. She gave India a. free press 
and an educational system. India got a better transporta-
tion system. The material foundations of a. new society 
were created. That was the point, even though it was only 
accomplished by ndragging individuals and people through 
blood and dirt, through misery and degradation .. nl The point 
was that REngland has to fulfil a double mission in India: 
one destructive, the other regenerating--the annihilation 
of old Asiatic society and the laying of the material foun-
dations of Western society in Asia.u2 Viewed as the fulfil-
ment of a. historical mission, British rule in India was a 
good thing.3 This is the conclusion of the essay on India. 
1 .. IND, 192. 2. IND, lgg• ). The idea suggested here of the persistent, immanent 
rationality of the total historical process bears 
close resemblance to Hegelts concept of the nguile 
of reason. 11 A statement of this principle, which 
Hegel applied to history, is found in the Encyclo-
p!die: HDie zweckm!szige T!tigkeit mit ihrem Mittel 
ist noch na.oh auszen geriohtet, wail der Zwack auoh 
nioht identisoh mit dem Objeote ist1 da.her musz er 
auch erst mit demselben vermittelt warden. Da.s Mittel 
ist ala Objekt in dieser zweiten Pr!misse in unmittel-
barer Beziehung mit dem anderen Extreme des Schlusaes, 
der Objektivit!t ala vorausgesetzter, dem Material. 
Diese Beziehung ist die Sph!re des nun dem Zwecke 
dienenden Mechanismus und Chemismns, deren Wahrheit 
und freier Begriff ist. Dies, dasz der subjektive 
Zweck, ala die Macht dieser Prozesse, worin das Objek-
tive sioh aneinander abreibt und aufhebt, sich selbst 
auszer ihnen hAlt und das in ihnen sich E:rhaltende 
ist, ist die List der Vernunft 11 (Hegel, EpW, lg4-1g5).· 
Viewed from this standpoint the Marxist theory of 
value is essentially impersonal and anti-humanistic. The 
welfare of individual human beings falls into insignificance 
before the importance of broadly conceived historical achieve-
ment. The warm concern for human welfare stressed in the 
first section of this chapter, and in other parts of this 
dissertationJ · ie vitiated by this impersonal position. 
But that is not the end of the matter. Several points 
should be made very clear. First of all is the fact that 
the authorship of the article on India is not at all certain .. 
There is good evidence that it was written by Engels. It 
is clear, furthermore, that this type of interpretation 
appears very seldom and only in an incidental way in those 
writings which were unquestionably written by Marx. Finally, 
it is clear that this type of interpretation appears very 
frequently in those writings which were unquestionably 
written by Engels. The sum of the matter is that Marxts 
thought is humanistic, even though impersonal traces may 
be found in his writings. 
CHAPTER II 
THE SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF VALUE 
1. Introduction. 
Tke central problem of value theory--definition cf 
the concept of value~is considered in the present chap~ 
ter and tke following one. As the argument proceeds, how-
ever, it will be evident that no definition of value, strictly 
speaking, is given. What is to be found in these chapters 
does give, nonetheless, the Marxist answer to questions 
posed by the problem of value. 
Defining value is a difficult but fundamental philo~ 
sophioal task--fundamental because the 09noept of value 
lies at the basis of every normative study and perhaps of 
all philosophy. But if the attempt is made to define the 
good by some specific type or quality of experience, such 
as pleasure, one commits what Moore calls the "naturalistic 
fallaoy.nl The error is one of assuming at the outset an 
unproven proposition which properly belongs at the end of 
a rational ethical theory. 
If, on the other hand, one proceeds by making oonoepts, 
rather than experience, central in defining value, he is 
likely to adopt the procedure of Socrates who made truth 
1. Moore, PE, 10. 
prior to value. Value is dependent upon truth, and is 
determined by truth. The difficulty here is that value theory 
is reduced to epistemology, which certainly bears on the 
problem of value, but still leaves many questions unansweredo 
Another alternative is to define value as experience 
in accord with the will of God (as in Christian theology), 
or, the philosophical equivalent~ experience in accord with 
metaphysical nat~re (Spinoza). The difficulty with the 
religious approach is that~ while acceptable to believers, 
non-believers are not convinced, nor is the view philosophic~ 
ally satisfactory. Spinoza's- sol uti on has merit, but does 
not entirely get around the Wna.turalistic falla.cy,u still 
involves further presuppositions, and still leaves the 
ques~n, wWhy should we pattern our lives after the met~ 
physical given?' 
In the light of these difficulties, it should not be 
hard to unde:rsta.nd why ma.ny feel that defining the good 
is an insoluble p:roblem. To define the good, as a. uni~ 
ve:rsally valid concept, such that the definition is theor-
etically adequate and entirely satisfactory is an ambitious 
goal for anyone. The same difficulties a.:re encountered to 
an even greater degree when obligation, or the good as an 
ougkt, is considered. 
It should not come as a. surprise, then, to learn that 
Marx attacked the problem of value from a radically untra.di~ 
tional point of view. He approached the problem of value 
' 
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(which he never approached directly and systematically) not 
by an analysis of concepts, but by an analysis and criticism 
of human eXperience. 
Marx's value theory really resolves itself into a 
philosophical anthropology. Marx turned away from the pro~ 
lem of the pure concept of value, toward the problem of dis-
covering just how and what men as a matter of fact do value. 
The categories of Marx's value theory, therefore, are human 
categories--activity, purpose, consciousness, matter (as it 
conditions human experience), and society, rather than the 
more theoretical categories of pure value theory--definition, 
criteria, objeotivity~subjectivity, relativity, metaphysical 
ground, and so on. These theoretical conceptions receive no 
attention from Marx. In this humanistic, anthropological 
approach to value Marx attempted what many thinkersl believe 
to be impossible, namely, to found a value theory and an 
ethics solely on empirical, scientific grounds. Marx's 
value theory emerges from his applications of the humanistic, 
historical, dialectical method, 
2. Human Activityt The First Subjective Condition of Value. 
i. Marx's Activistic View of Man. 
As has been shown, Marx was convinced by Hegel of the 
broad significance of the principle of activity. Marx applied 
the principle to the study of man, and found through that 
l. Urban, Art~(l94)), 62; Stewart, Art.(i949), 27f .. ; Vivas, 
Art.(l946), 15g; Browning, Art.(l949), 95· 
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application one of the defining characteristics of human 
life.l Man is an active being. Human life is a process. 
Human nature cannot be reduced to a statio essence or thing. 
Man is what he does. 
This activistic view of man is one of the most unequiv-
ocally stated principles in Marx's writings. For example! 
As individuals express their life, so they are.2 
The existence of men is their actual life-process.3 
The difference between the individual as a. person 
and what is accidental to him, is not a. conceptual 
difference but a historical fact.4 
The similarity is striking between Marx's view and ideas of 
the individual found in the idealistic tradition. In these 
views (notably in personalistic idealism as exemplified in 
Bowne) the substantial, independent soul is rejected tn favor 
of the aotivistic view. The individual is defined by its 
activity. 
Viewed from the standpoint of its object, human activity 
is called material activity. Material activity is the first 
condition of human existence. 
He (man) opposes himself to Nature as one of her 
own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head 
and hands, the natural forces of his body, in 
order to appropriate Nature's productions in a. 
form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on 
the external world and changing it, he at the same 
time changes his own nature. He develops his 
slumbering powers and compels them to act in obe-
dience to his sway.5 
1. See Marx, GI, passim. 
2. Marx, GI, 7• 
3• Marx, GI, 14. 
4. Marx, GI,. 70. 
5. Marx, OAP, I, l97-l9g• 
"Our sensuous nature," said Marx, is 1fpractical, huma.n sen-
suous activity.nl Material, sensuous activity is a uni-
versal feature of human life. It is never superseded or 
outgrown. True to the Hegelian spirit, each phase of Marx's 
dialectic is retained in succeeding phases. Men can never 
cease from material activity without ceasing to exist. 
Material activity is specifically defined-by Marx as 
production of the means of subsistence. 
Men can be distinguished from animals by cons-
ciousness, by religion or anything else you like. 
They begin to distinguish themselves from animals 
as soon as they begin to produce their means of 
subsistence-.2 
They distinguish themselves in other ways, as will be seen. 
But the first and simplest fact about man, on Marx''s view, 
is material activity. This view recalls Anaxagoras who 
believed, according to Aristotle, that 11man is the wisest 
of animals because he has hands.~3 
Before men began the production of their means to 
existence men were apes, then savages .. 4 But, nthe first 
historical (human) act is thus the production of the means 
to satisfy these needs (eating, drinking, habitation), the 
production of material life itself.n5 Animals, true enough, 
must exert effort in order to have the means to live.. They 
must kill, or climb trees in search of fruit. But what dis-
tinguishes man1 according to Marx, is that he does not, as 
1. "Theses, n V. 
2. Marx1 GI, 7• 3. Aristotle, Part. An., I, 
10, 6g7a7 • 
4. Marx, CGP • 4. 
5. Marx, GI, 16. 
the animals ordinarily~ do, merely take what nature has to 
offer, but devises means for producing material goods. He 
constructs implements and builds machines. He produces, 
as well as reaps. This fact is the first principle of the 
Marxist view of man~man lives by working.l 
Viewed from the standpoint of the subject, man himself, 
human activity is called Wself-activity.~2 Here material 
activity is viewed as an expression of a purposing, planning, 
perceiving individual. The self is defined in Marx by this 
characteristic. When the individual is active, the self 
oomes into existence and develops. This is one of Marx's 
most fundamental theories and is the starting point of his 
epistemology, his ethics, social philosophy, and historiog-
raphy. 
The self, for Marx, is no separate thing existing 
independently of the individual. It is, rather, simply 
equal to the individual's activity. The content of the 
self therefore is determined not by some inherent given in 
the self, but solely by the extent and quality of the indi-
vidualts activity. The latter is the individual's "real 
life-content" and. without self-activity he is an "abstract 
individual."; This emphasis is prominent throughout Capita*, 
especially in passages dealing with division of labor, where 
1. Marx wrote in a letter to Kugelmann, dated July 11, 1e6g~ 
"Every child knows that a oountry which ceased to work, 
I will not say for a year, but for a few weeks, would 
die 11 (LDK, 73). 
2. Marx, GI, 7~72. 3. Marx, GI, 66. 
the quality of the individual's life and experience is 
measured by the extent and quality of his activity. 
The conception that the self is essentially activity 
has a long history. Traces of it may be found in very an-
cient thought. Theophrastus and Strato regarded reason as 
a self-developing activity.1 Plotinus 1 s emphasis on the 
activity of consoiousness,2 and Augustinets stress on will 
as against intellect,3 are not at all foreign to this devel-
opment. In modern times Berkeley's equation of the self 
with its perceptive activity and the whole movement of Ger-
man idealism from Kant through Fiohte, Hegel, and Sohopen-
hauer lays stress on the will and activity of individual 
personality as against statio conceptions of the self. Marx 
built on this tradition and added his stress on material 
activity as the source and basis of self-activity. 
Not only is the present content of the self determined 
by its activity, but so is its progress. The self develops, 
advances, and achieves through activity. Conversely, Marx 
believed, the individual is degraded and deprived by restric-
tion of his self-aotivity4 In short, man learns by doing. 
If men do little, they learn and appreciate little. If 
they do much, they learn and appreciate much. 
For Marx, art appreciation follows artistic production, 
for example.. In the dialectical interplay between the self 
l. Windel'ba.nd, HOP, 179• 
2. Windelband, HOP, 2~. 
70 
and its objeots 1 the artistic sensitivities, already present 
in the individual, are awakened and developed. 
Only through the unfolding richness of the human 
being is the richness of subjective human sensu~ 
ousness, such as a musical ear, an eye for the 
beauty of form, in short, senses capable of human 
enjoyment and which prove to be essentially human 
powers, partly developed and created.l 
The question quite naturally arises--what explains the 
forward movement of human development? Does human progress 
just happen? If there are no objective ends toward which 
some supernatural force, for instance, is directing man, 
why is not human life more or less statio? These questions 
lead to the principle of· emergent means and ends. Man has 
certain primal needs--food, warmth, shelter. He purposes to 
supply those needs. In doing so he sets into action his 
physical organism in a.n effort to adapt nature to the satis-
faction of his needs-2 But he does not merely satisfy his 
present, felt needs. Something else happens. As the first 
need is satisfied1 new powers in the individual are developed 
and new needs are created. DAs soon as a need is satisfied 
(which implies the action of satisfying and the acquisition 
of an instrument), new needs are made.u3 These needs in 
turn stimulate the development of new human powers and new 
instruments, which in turn satisfy more and new needs, and so 
on and on. 
,.,. 
In all this one is reminded of Bergson's elan. 
1. Marx, LA, 16. 
2. GI,· 16; CAP, I, 19g• 
3. GI, 16-17. Parenthesis is Marx*s. 
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It is important to note that in all this process of 
human development the realm of ends is not given in adv~oe. 
Ends emerge from the process. There is no way of knowing 
in advance what human ends will be sought or achieved. Highly 
probable predictions can be made, but only past goals and 
present ends can be known with certainty. No one can say 
what, specifically, is the ultimate end of man. 
ii. Implications of the Principle of Activity. 
(l) In General Theory. · 
The Marxist humanism in method, which has already been 
reviewed, is reinforced by Marx's activistio interpretation 
of man. If man is essentially an active being, and if the 
realm of human activity is equal to the realm of human exis-
tence, it is only reasonable to conclude that human science 
should find its objects and its purposes largely in the realm 
of human activity. 
A very important principle in Marx•s historical mater-
ialism may now be added to the view as considered in the for&-
going chapter. This is a principle frequently overlooked 
by critics of Marx*s historical views, an error which is the 
more regrettable because it concerns the most vital feature 
of historical materialism. 
As was indicated above, Marx's method in studying history 
required. olose attention to material conditions,. But the 
real subject of history is not material facts at all. The 
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real subject of history is human activity, Natural condi-
tions are studied, because they influence human life. But 
the task of studying material conditions is not completed 
until the modification of these conditions by the "action of 
man"l is known<;! Man's role in history is active, and in the 
histoxioal process both man and nature change, both develop, 
. . 
and each conditions the other. So states Venable tn expound~ 
ing Ma.rx*s view: 
It is basic to the whole Marxian concept of 
society that man changes history and is thereby 
himself changed, and that,. in this sense, a.ll 
history is nothing but a continual transforma-
tion of human nature.2 · 
History is the story of man, his activity. It is not an 
account of the development of tools or techniques of pro-
duction. The latter bears on history, Marx vehemently empha-
sized, but it is not history. 
There is no history without people.3 History is not a 
sort of independent entity which man views from afar. The 
clarity of Marx's view at this point is evident from his 
statement that! 
History does nothing; it 'possesses no·collossal 
wealth;~ it 'wages no struggles!~ It is rather 
only man, actual, living man, who does allJ 
possesses all~ and wages all struggles. There is 
no 'history'~as though it were a separate person~ 
which uses men as the means for carrying out its 
ends, On the oontrary 1 history i~ nothing but men in the pursuit of their own ends,4 
l. Marx, GI., 7. 
2. HNM, 33. 
3: Marx, GI, 7• 4. Marx, HF, 265. 
____ " ______ --- ---~---------=------------
73 
What is true of history is true of all nature. All 
science, as well as histo:rical science, is ·conducted on the 
basis of the activistic interpretation of man- Again, Marx 
leans far in the direction of idealism, even Berkeley, when 
he says that: 
Industry (material activity) is (man's) real 
historical relation to naturet and thus of natural 
science to man. It (industry) is thereby grasped 
as the esoteric disclosure of the essence of 
human power. Thus also the human essence of 
nature or the natural essence of man is unde:r-
stood. Thereby natural science loses its abstract 
content and. idealistic tendencies and. (industry) 
becomes the basis of human science, as it has 
already become--though in alienated for~-a. basis 
of actual human life. Any other basis for life 
or science is from the outset a sham. In human 
history, at the starting point of human society, 
developing nature is the actual nature of men. 
Therefore, nature, through industry--even in its 
alienated for~-is truly anthropological nature.l 
Even while denying idealism Marx asserts that nature is de-
pendent on the sensuous activity of man. 
For general theory, fo:r philosophy, Marx's activistio 
'interpretation of man implies that the end and the subject 
matter of all thought are found. in the realm of human exper-
ience .. 
(2) Implications in Value Theory. 
What Marxts principle of activity implies for value 
theory is not hard to deduce, where it is not plainly stated~ 
First, it is evident that whatever value is., it is huma.n. 
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There are no values but human values. Value is real only 
in human activity. A thing cannot be good if it is not good 
for men.l Intrinsic values are found only in human exper-
ience. Here) again, is the Kantian tendency mentioned in 
the first chapter. 
Passages revealing Marxfs view are to be found in Capi-
~ and in the Critique of Political Economy.. In the intro-
duction to the latter Marx wrote: flThe product first be-
comes a real product in consumption~ e.g.~ a garment becomea 
a real garment only through the act of being worn. n2 A 
coat is not a value. But wearing a coat is a value. In 
Capital Marx wrote: nuse-values become a reality only by 
use or consumption .. u3 Human activity is the realm of in-
trinsic values. 
A second implication for value theory is that the prob-
lem of value is not so much one of defining concepts about 
value) but rather is a task) the task of creating in the 
world of affairs the conditions whereby value experience is 
possible. The problem is one of achieving ends, not defining 
1 .. Cork: »Marx's humanism is central and integral to his 
way of thinki~g. His supreme eoncern was man himself» 
tArt.(l949), ~71-
Somerville: liThe central ethical principle (of dialec-
tical materialism), called proletarian humanism, sees 
the source and significance of all values in mankind11 
CArt .. (l942)3, goJ. 
Murray: "He (Marx) has seen that all Materialism is 
incomplete, unless it really includes the subject. Man 
in his living activity, in his totality of existence, is 
the most significant object for the vision of a complete 
Ma.terialism11 (MAR, g6-g7). 
2. Marx, ICR, 27g., 3. Marx, CAP, I, 42-43. 
them~ Ends are usually given in the life-process itself. 
They do, of course~ require some reflection and clarifica-
tion. But it is action, rather than talk1 which is most 
needed. Marx scorned "literary socialism.nl Theory with-
out practice was to him meaningless. nyou cannot fulfill 
(aufheben) philosophy without putting it into practioe 1 n 
he wrote.2 That he really believed this is indicated by 
Engels 1 s account 1 in the preface to the third volume of 
Oa~ital~ of Marx's activity in the workers 1 movement.3 
Marx beli~ved that a purely "intellectual communistn was 
no communist at all. He was only1 in the Hegelian sense, 
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an abstract communist. »The word 'oommunist' ••• in the real 
world means the follower of a definite revolutionary party.n4 
Further in the same passage Marx wrote: "For the real. commu-
nist it is a question of overthrowing the existing state of 
things.n The end of such action was a society wherein the 
full and free development of all the capacities of each indi-
vidual would be possible.5 In this there is a hint of Aris-
totleta conception of value as the fulfilment of function 
or the realization of possibilities.6 
A third implication of_Marx's activism is neutrality 
toward the conceptual problem of the rank and validity of 
values and norms. It is man1 not theory 1 that values. The 
chief purpose of theory is to implement human action~ not 
to choose its ends. In Marx there is no rigid hierarchy 
of values, no summum bonum, no absolute values. There are 
no norms in the sense of universally valid standards of 
value. Purposes, values, and norms emerge from the process 
of human life. They are relative, human, and transitory. 
These emergent ends were for Marx the only really effective 
ends, and thus the only ones worth talking aboutw 
(3) Implications in Ethics. 
The implications of Marx's activism for ethics parallel 
those in general value theory. First is the primacy of ac-
tion directed toward human ends. This point has been dwelt 
upon at such length that nothing more needs to be said in 
its behalf. The clearest statement of this principle is 
probably the famous eleventh of the WTheaes on Feuerbach.n 
Marx wrote: UThe philosophers have only interpreted the 
world differently, the point is to change it.fl 
Marx's aotivistio ethics is simple and clear in its 
main message, and most Marxist scholars and critics are in 
general agreement in interpreting and stating it.l 
l. A sampling of authoritative opinion on Marx1 s activism 
is as follows: 
Gregaine~ nFeuerbaoh demeure dono, pour Marx, et de deux 
faoons, un pur t~orioien. Il croit trop a l'effioacite 
des id~es puree, et pour l'eviotion de la religion, at 
pour celle du r~gime capitalists. Selon Marx, il faut 
agir, et agir sur 1 t organisation '$oonomique. ~lus pre-
ois,ment, seule l'aotion revolutionnaire entraiment la 
olasse prol~taire ~ l'insurreotion peut aboutir ~ de-
livrer 17 homme de l'~solavage~oonomique et social et, 
... ·, ·,_ 
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A second ethical implication of Marx1 s activism con-
cerns the problem of choice. For Marx, the chief obstacle to 
free choices is the lack of material means to implement the 
will. Actually, in most life~situations, as Marx describes 
life, the realm of choice is so circumscribed by limitations 
of one sort or another that no free choice is really poe= 
sible. What men must accomplish is »the appropriation of 
a totality of instruments of produotionn1 so that the means 
to free choice are really available. Then, on the basis of 
the best facts available, the individual can make his choice. 
(~) Implications in Social Philosophy. 
Many of Marxls principles and doctrines which made up 
hie soeiaJ. philosophy bear the stamp of his activistic huma.n-
ism. The following remarks will offer a sampling of them. 
One much misunderstood doctrine of Marx's is the labor 
theory of value. Many have attempted to prove or refute the 
doctrine; many more have tried in vain to ascertain just what 
par contrecoup, de l'esclavage religieuxn (SPD, 177). 
Kautsky: 11No world--conception has been in so high a de-. 
gree a philosophy of deeds as the dialectical material~ 
ism» (EMCH, 7). 
Labriola! »The philosophy of practioe ••• is the pith of 
historical materialism.. It is the imminent philosophy 
of things about which people philosophize. The realistie 
process leads first from life to thought, not from thought 
to life. It leads from work, from the labor of cogni-
tion, to understanding as an abstract theory, not from 
theory to cognition. It leads from wa.ntsn (SP, 6o) • 
.Murrayt "Ultimately and essentially., Marxism is not an 
invitation to pleasant intellectual speculation, but a 
summons to actionu (MAR, 5). 
l. Marx, GI, 66~ 
the theory is.l Marx taught: "Labor is the only source 
of exchange value. n2 · This view, taken ove:r from Adam Smith, 3 
displaces the view that land, labor, and capital are the 
. sources of value. 
Marx did not mean to imply that all values are made 
possible only through labor. DMother earthn is also a creator 
1. Russell, for example, admits that he does not understand 
Marx's exposition of the view (PRF, lg). 
2. OPE, 31-32. 
3. The labor theory is developed chiefly in CAP, OPE, and 
VPP. Some of Ma:rx~e statements seem virtually to be a 
verbal repetition of Smithts exposition, which is as 
follows: DThe value of any commodity, therefore, to 
the person who possesses it, and who means not to use 
or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other 
commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it 
enables him to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, 
is the :real measure of the exchangeable value of all 
commodities. 
liThe real price of every thing, what every thing really 
costs to the man who. wants to acquire it, is the toil 
and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really 
worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to 
.. dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is 
the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and 
.which it can impose upon other people. What is bought 
with money o:r with goods is purchased by labour, as muoh 
as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That 
money or those goode indeed save us this toil. They 
contain the value of a certain quantity of labour which 
we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain 
the value of a.n equal quantity,. Labour. was the first 
price, the original purchase-money that was paid for 
all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by 
labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally 
purchased; and its value, to those who possess it, and 
who want to exchange it for some new productions, is 
precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can 
enable them to purchase or command •• ,.But though labour 
be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all 
commodities, it is not that by which their value is 
commonly estimated" (WN, 30-31) .. · In other economic 
views, also, Marx depended heavily on Smith. It should 
be added that Marx always gave full credit to Smith, 
when he did borrow from him. 
I 
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of values.l It was flexchange~value" which had its source 
in labor. That is, as far as political economy is concerned, 
labor is the source of value. In a general, philosophical 
theory of value, many other factors need to be considered. 
The labor theory has to do only with economics. Marx be-
lieved that neither manipulations on the money market, nor 
price fluctuations on the commodity market, nor any other 
accidental variations in the economic system could explain 
the value of a commodity. Fundamentally, the value of a 
commodity is created by the work that went into producing it. 
Since economics is not the problem of this dissertation, 
the economic soundness of the labor theory need not be con-
sidered. But as a principle in social philosophy the labor 
theory seems to argue that productive, human activity is, 
after all, the source of all social wealth not conferred 
directly by nature, and therefore, productive, human activity 
should receive the fruit of its effort. At least, the work-
i 
ere should realize that they are the creators of the world's 
' 
goods, and anything taken from them in the form of profit 
was simple robbery. If they were content with that-~very 
well. If not, they had better see that some changes are 
made. 
Another principle in Marx1 s social philosophy was the 
demand that the workers appropriate the means of production. 
The noapitalist expropriators are expropriated (under the 
l. Marx, CAP, I, 50. 
communist plan).nl This is desirable not simply in the 
interest of justice, but rather because, as was indicated 
above, it was necessary in order to make the means available 
to all men for the widest and fastest possible human develop-
ment.2 
A third principle in Marx~s social philosophy is the 
subordination of industrial production to labor. Under capi-
talism, Marx believed, the individual laborer's interests 
are subordinated to the interests of production and capital.3 
But once it is granted that human life is the only intrinsic 
value, and that industry is, after all, man's device for 
satisfying his own wants~ it becomes immediately apparent 
that to sacrifice human beings to the process of commodity 
production is the height of irrationality. 
Finally, there is Marx's doctrine of revolution. This 
doctrine is commonly taken to indicate simply that Marx, 
despairing of peaceful methods for attain~ng his ends, decided 
to encourage violent rebellions against existing governments. 
Actually, the doctrine of revolution goes much deeper than 
that. Marx did not want .a. mere political revolution, wrought 
by force. Rather, he wanted a fundamental reordering of 
sooiety~a goal which could not possibly be accomplished 
entirely by force. The Marxist revolution does not end with 
a political revolution. With that it only begins.. After 
the political revolution, society is to be reconstructed from 
its foundations with a view to nhumanizing» society, and 
creating the material and social conditions for broad human 
development. Once Marx's anthropological doctrine that 
ideals, ends, purposes, and norms emerge from the material-
social-historical process is granted, then the necessity 
for reordering society to make possible the wide~and most 
rapid development of man naturally follows. That is the 
revolutionary task. 
The dependence of Marx1 s ethical and social teachings 
upon his naturalistic view of man is apparent. The beliefs 
that man is first an active being, that value is a quality 
of human activity, and that man progresses through and only 
through activity--these doctrines rank as Marxist fundamentals. 
Human activity is, for Marx, the first subjective condition 
of value. 
3. Consciousness: The Second Subjective Condition of Value. 
i. Definition of Consciousness. 
Consciousness appears in the thought of Marx as the second 
subjective condition of value. Of chief concern to the 
student of value is what man does with consciousness after 
he gets it. But it is also of interest to know what cons-
ciousness is and how man comes by it. A few brief remarks 
on this latter problem, therefore, are in order. 
The problem of consciousness is among the most thorny 
issues confronting philosophy and psychology. Although 
consciousness is discussed a good deal 1 the reader of Marx 
searches in vain for any enlightenment on this problem. This, 
of course~ is understandable in view of the fact that Marx 
wrote chiefly on social philosophy and economice 1 rather 
than psychology and pure philosophy. Marx does consider the 
function of consciousness a good deal. But what this cons-
ciousness is exactly, which functions~ is never really ex-
plained. In the main, Marx contents himself with a genetic 
and functional account of consciousness. 
The clearest affirmation in Marx's early writings, of the 
significance of consciousness is found in a manuscript written 
in lg44. Marx wxote~ 
The animal is as one with his life-activity. He 
does not distinguish himself from it •••• Man makes 
his life-activity the object of his will and cons-
ciousness. He has conscious life-activity. He is 
not united in an unmediated, simple ultimate. 
Conscious life-activity ol~arly distinguishes men 
from animal life-activity. 
At the time of this writing Marx was still strongly under 
the influence of Hegelian conceptions and terminology. The 
term nmediationn indicates this fact. That Marxts view of 
consciousness was decidedly Hegelian can hardly be doubted--
though Marx did add his own embellishments. Weisengr~ recog-
ndzed the Hegelian source of Marx's view of consciousness 
and wrote in comment that nbeide Denker waren eben Metaphysi-
ker durch und durch. tt2 Weisengr'fln takes the position that 
Marx never freed himself from Hegelian metaphysics, in spite 
2. MSF, 60. 
of Marx's own insistence on the contrary. Marx's view that 
consciousness requires both a subject and an object, and a 
dialectical relation between the two, is offered as chief 
evidenoe.l 
In The German Ideology Marx comes as close as he ever 
does to offering a definitive concept of consciousness.2 
Among the more specific statements are these: 
Consciousness can never be anything else than 
conscious existence# and the existence of men is 
their actual life prooess.9 · 
Life is not determined)
1
by consciousness, but 
consciousness by life.~ 
We find that man also possesses tconsciousness;' 
but, even so, not inherent, not 1'pure1 conscious ... 
ness.5 
Language is practical oonsoiousness ••• for langu~ge, 
like consciousness, only arises from the need~ 
the necessity, of intercourse with other men.o 
Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning 
a social product.7 
Our conception of history ••• does not explain prac-
tice from the idea but explai~s the formation of 
ideas from material practice.B 
From these statements, and the exposition accompanying 
them, a definite view of consciousness emerges9 The first 
point is that there is no self or consciousness independent 
from the rest of the individual, but rather consciousness is 
a function of a total physical organism. Consciousness is 
l. MSF, 60. 
2. GI., 13-4-3. 
3 •• GI, 14. 4 GI, 15 .. 
5. GI, 19. 
6. GI"' 19 .. 
a function, rather than an independent entity. It implies 
a relation between a subject and an object. 
Second, consciousness develops in a natural way, as 
a response to tne material and social environment. It is 
a device for aiding in the control and adaptation of the 
environment and in communicating with the social environ-
ment. Nature and society provide consciousness with its 
stimulus and its material. Consciousness always implies an 
object--nature, society, or self. And the material in cons-
ciousness can never come from any other source than direct 
experience. 
The empirical and material basis of consciousness re-
ceived special emphasis in Marx's writings on art and litera-
ture. Art, literature, and all consciousness are products 
of experience and are limited by experience.l Musical and 
artistic tastes and creative ability develop as objects 
stimulate them into existence. That is, art appreciation 
follows artistic experience and creation. The slow develop-
ment of art, through the centuries, is offered as evidence 
of this. The limited extent of art appreciation among the 
masses is further evidence. 
l. In a tyPical passage Marx wrote: nThe sense of an object 
to me goes only as far as mt sense goes •••• The worried, 
poverty stricken man has no mind for the finest play; 
the dealer in metals sees only the market value, not the 
beauty and originality of the metal. He has no minera-
logical sense. Hence the objeotivization of human 
experience, both in a theoretical and practical way, 
means making ma.n's s~nses human as well as creating 
human senses corresponding to the vast richness of human 
and natural lifen (LA, 16-17). 
Marx1 s view is materialistic in the sense that cons-
ciousness is based on and is derivative from flmaterial life.nl 
As man's social and material life changes, so does his cons-
ciousness. That is not to say, as will presently be shown, 
that oonsoioueness itself is not a causal agency. It rather 
means simply that consciousness is conditioned by the material 
which it is given, although it can do much with that material .. 
The foregoing remarks were addressed to the consider&-
tion of consciousness in its passive aspects. On the active 
side, Marx believed that consciousness occurs as the individ-
ual is in action, acting on the physical environment and/or 
with other men. Thought and consciousness are functions 
of the organism in purposive activity. In Marx there is 
placed great stress on the so-called unity of thought and 
action. Thought is part of action. This active side of 
consciousness, in Marx's view, is often overlooked~ especially 
by those who read in Marx only that uconsciousness is deter-
mined by life.• Ziegenfuss, author of a recent one-volume· 
encyclopedia, seems to make this error of focusing exclusively 
on Marx's view of the passive side of consciousness when he 
says: 
Seine erkenntnistheorie Grundthese, die freilich 
nicht durohweg beibehalten wi+d, formuliert Marx 
in dam Satz: TEa ist nioht das Bewusstsein der 
Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondern umgekehrt ihr 
gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewusstsein be-
stimm.t' .,.2 
1. Marx, OPE, ll-13• OM, 2g. 
2. Ziegenfuss, Art. ~ 19 50) , 129 ..... 130 .. 
This conception of the naturalistic origin and materialistic 
determination of consciousness is taken to mean that on Marxts 
view consciousness has no other role than to take pictures. 
But Marx emphasized the importance of the role of conscious-
ness in directing action.l He stressed the importance of 
theory~ and, as a. matter of fact, spent much, if not most~ 
of his life energies in developing his so-called revolution-
ary theory. The original function of consciousness was to 
direct activity~ Marx believed,2 Thus the unity of thought 
and action. Pure thought, undertaken as an end in itself 
and out of relation to material life and human activity, 
Marx cons ide red to be a waste of time and a perversion of the 
human being. 
ii. Consciousness as a Condition of Value. 
The consideration of consciousness in its active role 
takes the discussion directly to the heart of the matter, 
i.e., consciousness as a condition of·value. Consciousness 
must do two things if it~ to aid in the achievement of value. 
It must yield true knowledge, and it must be effective in 
controlling action. In defining the role of consciousness 
l. G!egaine comments! UEn opposition a Hlgel, a Bauer, et 
a Feuerbach, Marx vai} la v~leur su~reme, non dans la 
connaissa.noe reohero~ee pour elle-~e, mais dans la ; 
synt~se entre la.,..connaissanoe et l'action •••• La pensee, 
y compris la pensee philosophique, n'atteiit son sommet 
de olart' et d'intensit'e que dans l'aote meme d 1 eclairer 
et de diriger l'action~ (SPD, 177). 
2. Lenin stressed this doctrine and expressed it in his 
famous dictum that »without a revolutionary theory there 
can be no revolutionary movementn (WTD, 2S). 
-~-- ·.· ·'·'' •. : . . 
in providing true knowledge, Marx offers his instrumental 
theory of knowledge and his scientific method, already dis-
cussed. In defining the role of consciousness in guiding 
action Marx offers his doctrine of conscious control~ or, 
in other words, the doctrine that human intelligence should 
control things; things should not control man. Marx poses 
the opposition of human intelligence versus accident, chance, 
fetishes, and things as the controlling agents in human life. 
This doctrine of conscious control is perhaps the real 
hallmark of Marx's humanism. By it the human is distinguished 
from the natural. The natural is determined exclusively by 
chance or some impersonal force. The human is whatever is 
brought under the sway of the conscious control of human 
intelligence,l Marx speaks again and again of 11 humanizing11 
history, or man, or society. When he uses this term, he 
always intends it to have one clear, specific meaning--to 
humanize is to bring life and nature under the sovereignty 
of human consciousness. History, up to the present, Marx 
believed, has always developed naturally, that is, by chance 
or by the operation of some materialistic determination. 
Marx's goal was to humanize history, and to do it by bringing 
history under the control of a conscious social plan. 
1. This doctrine is stated in GI, 70-72. The view suggests 
Fiohte who held that man's mission is to bring »opposing11 
nature under his control (VOM, 115-116). Nature, Fiohte 
believed, was a great stumblingblock to ethical fulfil-
ment (VOM, 115). 
___ -:.;__.:_-_ ------ -------- -
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Marx charged that under capitalism the main course 
of events is determined by chance, or, if not by chance, 
by the operation of blind, impersonal economic forces. In 
contrast he offers·communism, whose goal is a society under 
the direct control of conscious social planning. This might 
be called the symphonic theme of Das Kapital.l A typical 
passage is this one, found in Volume I~ 
The life process of society ••• does not strip off 
its mystical veil until it is treated as produc-
tion by freely associated men, and is consciously 
regul~ted by them in accordance with a settled 
plan. 
From Volume III: 
The capitalistic system works against a rational 
agrioulture.3 
The uhumanized' society which Marx envisaged is one in which 
1 society is organized as a conscious and systematic associa-
tion. n4 
Consciousness is the second subjeotive condition of 
value. It aids in the achievement of value when it is brought 
to bear on human problems--individual or social. Where cons-
cious intelligence controls, there is the opportunity for 
value. Where impersonal forces rule, there is the oppor-
tunity for evil. To bring all nature and a.ll history under 
conscious control thus emerges as one of the great Marxist 
ideals. Man should rulej things should not rule ma.n. 
iii. The Communist Consciousness. 
In principle most would agree with the Marxist ideal 
that man should be in control, so far as is possible, of the 
environment in which he lives~ and in control of himself. 
The chief disagreement is over the question, just what and 
how much can man control? What should he try to control and 
what is beyond him? Marxts viewp·9int on these questions ean 
be answered by offering some examples of his social theory, 
that is, by specifying the noommunist oonsciousnessn as it 
was present in the mind of Marx. These specifications will 
also serve to illustrate Marx's general view of conscious-
ness. 
A clear and simple illustration and application of 
Marx's ncommunist oonsciousnessn is the idea of class cons-
oiousness. Marx himself felt "conscious" of the fa.ot that 
the workers in capitalism were an economic class. Be taught 
that the workers should regard themselves as a class. He 
sought to develop a sense of class consciousness among the 
workers. On the face of it, this appears to be a knavets 
. 
trick, deliberately fostering a sense of class distinctions 
and class hatred among the masses.l However, Marx claimed 
to desire ultimately just the opposite. 
1. Sheed: 11Hatred was for Marx, the great princi~le whioh 
should produce the reign of the proletariatA tCAM, 170). 
Leys says Marx deliberately tried to "divide all humanity 
into two campsn (ESP, 2S7-2SS). 
Commenting on Marx's doctrine of class conflict and 
struggle, MacDonell has this to say! HMarx's own gos-
pel is dolorous enough and we might well call him the 
very Schopenhauer of economistsn (Art.(lg75), 3g5]. 
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Both Marx and Engels insisted that their goal was a 
classless, harmonious sooiety.l What Marx intended in his 
doctrine of class consciousness was simply to call attention 
to what he thought actually was a fact, namely, that the 
working masses did function as a class in capitalist society 
and that they were being abused as a class. Thus for the 
workers to be conscious of themselves as a class was simply 
for them to be conscious of the facts. And to be conscious 
of the facts of the case is to be truly conscious. The 
fact was, Marx argued, that nthe capitalists form a veri~ 
table freemason society arrayed against the whole working 
cla.ss.n2 Therefore, the proletariat "is compelled, by the 
force of circumstances, to organise itself a.s a. class. (3 
This is unfortunate. But sinoe the facts of the case are 
as they are, what would be wiser for the workers than for 
them to face facts, to become conscious of themselves as a. 
class and of their olass interests. In Marxrs mind, then, 
class consciousness was for the workers merely a case of 
1. Marx wrote in a letter to Weydemeyer, March, 1g52: nmo 
credit is due to me for discovering the existence of 
classes in modern society nor yet the struggle between 
them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described 
the historical development of this class struggle and 
bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes. 
What I did that was new was to prove: (l) that the 
existence of classes is only bound up with particular, 
historic phases in the development of production; (2) 
that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dict~ 
torship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship 
itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition 
of all classes and to a classless sooietyn (OOR, 57). 
2. Marx, OAP, III, 233. 3. Marx, OM, 31. 
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bacoDdng aware of the awful truth.l Once the nclassless 
societyn is a fact--and many writers regard this Marxist 
ideal as simple minded utopianism~there will no longer 
be any need or occasion for teaching class consciousness~ 
because there will in faot be no olasses. 
9l 
Another, closely related~ form of the ncommunist cons-
ciousness n was Marx's d.ootrine of n class morality. n The 
principle of conduct for the proletariat is to be the Uinter-
ests of the' working olassn or "class needs. tr3 Thus~ for 
example~ 11The German workers ••• must be oonsoious of their 
olass interests~n4 In the Address to the Communist League, 
just quoted~ Marx recommends a most brutal, and very unhuman-
istio~ oourse of conduot for the working masses in estab-
lishing their class interests. The oourse of aotion, and 
the methods used, are determined solely by the interests 
of the olass, rather than by any general principles of ethios~ 
this for the reason that (in the communist consciousness) 
the interests of the vast majority of men and the interests 
of justice can not b.e established. in any other way. Class 
morality therefore is simply aotion guided by intelligent 
awareness of sooial faots. Class consciousness and olass 
morality were, according to Marx, the inevitable produot 
1. However, Sulzbach believed Marx himself was not very 
clear about the truth. He wrote! "Karl Ma.rx ••• never 
really elaborated what he meant by 'olass•~ (Art.(l94o)~ 
~. . 
2. For instance: Parsons, Art.(l949), 26; Wright, Art.(1949)~ 
3~. 
3 •• Selsa.m stresses this point (Art. (191j.g) > 26 J. 
4 Marx~ ACL, 7l. 
,, :,, 
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of the working massTe own awareness of their real status, 
role, and stake in their society. In sum, nthe proletarian 
movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the 
immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority.nl 
iv. The Problem of Means. 
A very serious ethical problem, and one which receives 
extended attention from critics, is the ethics of Marxist 
methods, as they are generated by the relativism of nclass 
morality.n Marx appears to sanction any and every means, 
no matter how foul, for the fulfilment of the communists' 
grand designs. Violence, duplicity, and law-breaking are 
perfectly in order when such is necessary for the suc~essful 
proseoution of working class aims. This ethical opportunism 
deters many from taking a kinder view of Marx's gospel, and 
seems to compromise seriously .Ma.rx1 s interest in individual 
human welfare,2 
A word of description of the Marxist principle of tao-
tics, of specific Marxist taotios, and the Marxist defense 
of communist tactics is in order. The tactical principle 
is apparent. It is simply that the working class should be 
fully conscious of its position and interests in society, 
should clarify its purposes, and then should attain those 
l. Marx, OM, 20, 
2. Three prominent critics who find in its undemocratic, 
illiberal, and inhuman methods one of the chief weak-
nesses of communism are Cohen CArt. (1934), 91-93] 
Dewey[Art.(l934), g6~g9J, and Russell ~Art.(l9345, 
glj..J. 
purposes by whatever tactics are most effective, economical, 
and convenient. No specific methods are either prescri@.ed 
or proscribed on principle. Perhaps the closest Marx comes 
to a tactical prescription is his espousal of the revolution-
ary method on the grounds that life is, after all, a struggle, 
and that flforce is the midwife of every old society preg-
nant with a new one.n1 Other strategies than force might 
well be used. Marx urges "genera~ political action" where 
that will attain working class gpals.2 But each situation 
has to be studied in the light of its·partioular circumstances, 
and strategy was to be based on what that study reveals.3 
Often times, unfortunately, Marx wrote to Kugelmann~ "the 
solution cannot proceed along pleasant lines.u~ 
There is little evidence of a spirit of love and for-
giveness in Marx when he is discussing the direct action 
of the workers. An extreme example of Marx's insensitivity 
to bloodshed is the early Address to the Communist League. 
There, Marx seemed to delight in counselling heartless use 
of force, and even terrorism. For example! 
Far from opposing so-called excesses and making 
examples of hated individuals or public buildings 
to which hateful memories are attached by sacri-
ficing them to popular revenge, such deeds must 
not only be tolerated, but their direction must 
be taken in hand.5 
l. CAP, I, g24. 2. VPP, 59• 
;. Marx wrote in a letter to Nieuwenhuis in lggl! "The 
thing to be done at any definite given moment of the 
future, the thing immediately to be done, depends of 
course entirely on the given historical conditions in 
which one has to act" (COR, ;g6). 
4. LDX, 66- 5. AOL, 66. 
Marx's attitude toward tactical procedures many would des-
cribe as cynicism--hardly a liberal humanism, in any case. 
There are clear traces in Marx of an evolutionary 
attitude toward social progress. There really can be no 
doubt that Marx believed socialism would evolve. But there 
also can be no doubt that Marx believed the evolution of 
socialism could be helped along by violent revolution. In 
one let.ter Marx wrote that it is lithe practical and violent 
action of the masses by which alone these conflicts can be 
resolved.lll Marx persisted in his revolutionary attitude 
even in his mellower final years. In 1g71 he wrote, in the 
Civil War in France~ in praise of the notorious communards 
of the Paris Commune, who are still remembered uneasily 
by the French upper classes. 
The Manifesto, of course~ is a most thoroughly revo-
lutionary document. There Marx wrote with Engels! 
The communists disdain to conceal their views and 
aims. They openly declare that their ends can be 
attained only by the forcible overthrow of all 
existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes 
tremble at a communist revolution. The prole-
tarians have nothing to lose but their chains. 
They have a world to win.2 
On what grounds does Marx justify his plainly undesirable 
methods? There are three chief articles of defense. The 
first was that in the midst of a struggle ethical principles 
make no difference anyway. This is Marxts historical mater-
ialism asserting itself, and his doctrine of ideology, What 
1. COR, 16. 2 .. OM, 44. 
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really decides the issues are social and material conditions~ 
interests and purposes. Not that ethical principles should 
not prevail~ but simply that they do not, is Marx's posi-
tion. All talk of ethics, therefore, is likely to be mean-
ingless. The lofty ethical theories which this or that group 
carries into a struggle are just propaganda frontal which 
are conformed to or not as the conduct of the struggle re-
quires. Ethics, for Marx, therefore, is a subterfuge, a 
tfphony issue," a. recourse determined usually by ulterior 
motives. Consistent with his anthropology, Marx believed 
that a group would adopt whatever methods considered effec-
tive when confronted with a real issue.. A group threatened 
will repress; a group attacked by force will defend itself 
by force. Thus, onoe the proletariat believes what Marx 
believed about their position under capitalism, the prole-
tariat will revolt by force, whether Marx advises it or not. 
This attitude was no doubt partly a conclusion drawn by Marx 
from the great gap between practical capitalism as he viewed 
it and the ethical and religious views of representative 
capitalists .. 
The mention of practical capitalism suggests the second 
pillar in the defense of Marxts tactics. In declaring war 
on the capitalist class, Marx, as does every exponent of 
every war, portrayed the enemy as fiendishly evil.. That is, 
the ethical character of capitalism is such that its defenders 
-- -- --~----
can only expect a brutal reprisal. Maxx believed his methods 
were only what anyone would actually adopt when he found him-
self able to come to terms with a despot. So Marx opposed 
capitalism which "comes (into the world) dripping from head 
to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.fil 
As every reader of Marx knows, much of Capital is given 
to descriptions of the moral depravity of capitalism.2 The 
capitalist class was, in Marx1s view, engaged in indecent 
aggression against the working class, and therefore must be 
treated as any aggressor is to be treated. This argument 
1. Marx, CAP, I, S~. . 
2. Some examples! Apr~s moi le d~luge! is the watchword of every capital-
1st and of every capitalist nation. Hence capital is 
reckless of the health or length of life of the labour-
er, unless under compulsion from society (CAP, I, 296). 
The children (in silk manufacturing) were slaughtered 
out-and~out for the sake of their delicate fingers 
(CAP, I, 321). 
In proportion as capital accumulates, the lot of the 
labourer, be his payment high or low, must grow 
worse •••• Capital ••• establishes an accumulation of 
misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital. 
Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at 
the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, 
slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at 
the opposite pole (CAP, I, 709). 
In the history of primitive accumulation (of capital) 
••• great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn 
from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free 
and funattaohed' proletarians on the labour market 
(CAP, I, 7S7). 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extir-
pation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the 
aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest 
and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa 
into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-
skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist 
production (CAP, I, S23). 
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has no theoretical merit, but it satisfied Marx, apparently, 
and it satisfies many of his followers. 
In the third place, Ma.rxta violent methods were justi .... 
fied not merely because they were deserved, but because they 
were nnecessary.n Marx saw nothing intrinsically desirable 
about violence. Actually, he deplored human conflict and 
anticipated a day of peace and freedom, Furthermore, Marx 
expected that the socialist revolution would actually be 
less violent than the early revolutionizing activity of 
oapitalism.l But, nevertheless, the workers would really 
revolt-~because only by revolution could they win. "This 
revolution is necessary ••• because the ruling class cannot 
be overthrown in any other way."2 And furthermore, "with-
out a :revolution, socialism cannot be enfo:rced.n3 
After all is said and done, Marx•s defense of his unde-
sirable methods remains just that--a defense of undesirable 
methods. Marx's tactics were bloody, and while their dis-
tastefulness was admitted and excused, it was never denied. 
v. The Problem of Norms. 
Consciousness yields norms. The question of the nature, 
status, and validity of norms has occurred already in this 
dissertation, but here, in this section on eonsciousness is. 
the appropriate place to discuss the problem in some detail. 
For ·the sake of establishing the frame of this discus-
sion., a preliminary definition of norms may be offered. By 
the term norm is meant simply any standard--ethical, reli~ 
gioue, artistic, or other--which is regarded as a minimum 
level of action or attainment considered satisfactory. In 
American society, for instance, paying onete debts is a norm. 
It is evident, first of all, on Marx's view, that norms 
are a form of consciousness, and like all other forme of 
consciousness, norms are derivative. That is, norms are 
created anew as the material and social life of man pro-
gresses. The materialist view is such that norms follow 
material life, rather than the reverse. It is not the case 
that norms exist in an objective and independent realm and 
are gradually being revealed to man, and then put into prac-
tice. To put it simply, but somewhat incorrectly, the course 
of human life causes norms; norms do not cause the course 
of human life.l For example, says Marx, it is the banker, 
1 .. Marx wrote! Dit (historical materialism) ••• explaine the 
formation of ideas from material practice" (GI, 2a). 
Again Marx: »The abolition of feudal property relations 
and the foundation of modern middle-class society was 
therefore not the result of a oertain action which pro-
ceeded from a particular theoretical principle pressed 
to its logical conclusion. The principles and theories 
put forward during the latter 1 s struggle with feudalism 
were rather nothing but the theoretical expression of 
the practical movement» tArt.(lg44}4, 169J. 
Warren interprets! "Karl Marx pointed out that the deter-
mining forces of history are economic, and that norma-
tive ideas are the result, not the cause of social ac-
tionn CArt.(l942) 8 226J. 
Kautsky interprets: "It was the materialist conception 
of history that has first completely deposed the moral 
ideal as the directing factor of the social evolution1 
(EMCH, 201)., 
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not the clergyman, who really sets the standards of conduct 
in business praotice.l 
This is not to say (and hereby the foregoing nsomewhat 
inoorrectn remark is oorreoted) that norms are mere epiphe-
nomena without significance either in interpreting or prose-
outing human activity. Again, consciousness has a prominent 
active role in human life. But the point is that norms must 
be and are based on material and social conditions, and are 
of value when they guide conduct toward the fulfilrre nt of 
definite human and social needs.2 Ma.rx1 s is a sociology of 
norms, a naturalism which denies that anything outside human 
life, God or any other supernatural force, or even abstract 
reason, is the source of norms and ideals. Norms are purely 
1. CAP, III, 6~1. 
2. Three statements of this aspect of Marx's view.are as 
follows: 
BUkharin: flThe ethical norms are the rules of conduct 
for the preservation of the society, or of the olass, 
or of the vocational group, etc. They have a necessary, 
social, service significance. Yet, in fetishistic 
society, this human and social significance of standards 
is not recognized •••• This inevitable fetishism of ethics 
is excellently expressed by the bourgeois philosophic 
genius, Immanuel Kant, in his doctrine of the categori~ 
cal imperative •••• For the proletariat, the standards 
of its conduct are technical rules in precisely the 
sense of the rules aooording to which a joiner con-
structs an armchair •••• tEthics' will Ultimately, in 
the case of the proletariat, be transformed into simple 
and easily understood technical rules of conduct •••• 
Fetishism is the essence of ethicsj where fetishism 
disappears, ethics also will disappearn (HM, 23g~239). 
Hook: nHe (Marx) does not deny the reality of ideals -
in seeking to explain their social basis. Nor does 
he deny their normative character in grounding them 
on human need •••• He has a naturalistic ethiosn (FHM, 51). 
Kautsky: "Moral tenets are nothing arbitrary but arise 
from social needsn (EMCH, 17g). 
~-------~­
-- -·-------~---
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human responses to the environment in which man lives.l 
Norms are human creations, from which Marx strips every ves-
tige of authority that a metaphysical grounding may give to 
them. There is no divine will, no moral law, no eternal 
justice. There are no immutable principles of human con-
duct. An idea supposedly based on the moral law might be 
right or wrong~ but in either case its supposed basis is a 
figment of the imagination, or often times merely a clever 
device to win popular support.2 
Again, there seems little doubt that Marx's view here 
was Qased only partly on purely scientific considerations, 
and was to a great extent a reaction to what he regarded as 
l. Marx's naturalistic ethics is reflected in the following: 
11To speak in such a case of natural justice, as Gil-
bart is doingv •• is nonsense. The justice of the trans-
actions between the agents of production rests on the 
fact that these transactions arise as natural conse-
quences from the conditions of production. The juris-
tic forms, in which these economic transactions appear 
as activities of the will of the parties concerned, as 
expressions of their common will and as contracts 
which may be enforced by law against some individual 
party, cannot determine their content, since they are 
only forms. They merely express this content. This 
content is just, whenever it corresponds, and is ade-
quate, to the mode of productionv It is unjust, when-
ever it contradicts that mode. Slavery on the basis 
of capitalist production is unjust; likewise fraud in 
the quality of commodities 11 (CAP; III,· 399). 
2. Marx suggests this in a passage in The German Ideology: 
"Each new class which puts itself in the place of one 
ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to 
carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the 
common interest of all the members of society, put in 
an ideal formJ it will give its ideas the form of 
universality, and represent them as the only rational, 
universally valid onesn (GI, 4o~4l). 
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hypocrisy among political opponents who claimed the support 
of moral justice. 
The fact is that many normative judgments do appear in 
Marx's writings~ But with his sociological and relativistic 
approach he declared himself with the nwertfreift naturalists 
who believe that there is no place for value judgments in 
scientific theory •. Value judgments are in order when an 
individual is meeting a concrete problem in actual life. 
Thus ma.ny value judgments are found in Marx's writings which 
deal with specific historical problems (BLN, OWUS, CWF), and 
where he is functioning as the leader of an actual group of 
workingmen (OM, ACL) • But even there, Marx made value· judg-
ments and appealed to ethical motives only with reservations~l 
and in his purely scientific works (OPE, OAP) value judgments 
were supposed to be excluded altogether.2 Boudin says that! 
l. Marx wrote to Engels in lg64! DI wrote An Address to 
the Working Class (for the founding of the I.W.A~) •••• 
My proposals were all accepted by the sub-committee. 
Only I was obliged to insert two phrases about 'dutyt 
and 1right 1 into the Preamble to the Statutes, ditto 
•truth, morality, and justice,• but these are placed 
in such a way that they can do no harmn (COR, 162). 
2. Marx wrote to Meyer in 1g67 thatt UThe first volume 
of the work will be published in a few weeks' time 
by Otto Meissner in Hamburg. The title is! Capital! 
a Critique of Political Economy •••• Volume I comprises 
the 'process of capitalist production.' Besides the 
general scientific development, I describe in great 
detail, from hitherto unused official sources, the 
condition of the English agricultural and industrial 
proletariat during the last twenty years, ditto Irish 
conditions. You will understand beforehand that all 
this only serves as an 'argumentum ad hominem•n (COR, 
219). 
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nuarx never based his communistic demands on the moral 
application of the Ricardian, or his own theory of value. 
Nor on any morality for that matter.n1 
It is sometimes argued that certain words and oonoepts 
in Marx indicate a moral approach to the social problem. 
The word nexploitationn is commonly cited. It is true that 
Marx used this work in a way clearly addressed to the 
moral impulses in his propaganda pieces, especially the 
Ma.nifesto·lt In his pure theory, however, the term 11 exploita,-
tionn is speoifioally defined in a manner whioh would satisfy 
a positivistTs theory of meaning. Exploitation refers simply 
to 11unpaid labor." This is especially clear in Ma.rxts exposi-
tion of the labor theory of value throughout the three volumes 
of Oapital.2 Exploitation is simply the difference between 
what the worker gives to the employer and what he gets baok. 
This difference oan be computed statistically, and there-
fore exploitation is a statistically definable concept. So 
it is with many other supposedly moral concepts which appear 
in Marx. 
Consciousness does play an active, directive role in 
human life, and consciousness not only should, but does 
develop certain standards for meeting the problems of life. 
Marx's message was that those norms are human creations, and 
103 
therefore should be based on the best of human science and 
thought. Unfortunately, he leaned so far backward in his 
opposition to ideology, utopianism, ethics, religion, and 
all idealism, that he was unnecessarily careless in stating 
noJ:ms and ends. Hookl s pungent comment is that "Marxists 
were scientific about means, neveJ: about ends. ttl Marx was 
vague in delineating ends, in authoring a social program, 
and in stating what exactly was to happen after the revolu-
tion. He apparently regaJ:ded the immediate need of the 
working class, conquest of political power, to be the end 
toward which his energy and writings should be addressed.2 
The rest oould be left, apparently 1 to the scientific cons-
ciousness of workl~~ class leadeJ:ship in meeting problems 
and achieviing values that are at present unknowable. 
4. Freedom! The Third Subjective Condition of Value. 
i. Political Freedom and Human Freedom. 
Karl Marx severely attacked the view that freedom is a 
purely constitutional question. He distinguished npolitioal 
freedom" and what he called "human emancipation .. " The former 
without the latter was to him a sham. Therefore. he addressed 
1. Art.(l940), 297. 
2. In a letter to Nieuwenhuis, of February, 1881, Marx said: 
nA socialist government does not come into power in a 
country unless conditions are so developed that it can 
above all take the necessary measures for intimidating 
the mass of the bourgeoisie sufficiently to gain time--
the first desideratum--for lasting action ...... The doc-
trinaire and necessarily fantastic anticipations of the 
programme of action for a. revolution of the future only 
divert us from the struggle of the presenttt (COR, 386-
387). 
some of his sharpest literary attacks to those who were 1 
seemingly at least~ defenders of the principles of democ-
racy. This has naturally led many to feel that Marx was 
anti-democratic~ and a champion of authoritarian statism. 
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By npolitical freedomn is meant the constitutional 
guarantee that legal restraints upon the citizen will be 
held to the minimum. The citizen may speak~ think 1 and 
conduct his affairs without fear of intimidation or govern-
mental nmeddling.n But political freedom is limited to the 
legal realm and is purely negative in its force, in the 
sense that it guarantees that no undue legal restraints will 
be placed upon the citizen. This freedom has been the quest, 
however, of whole peoples for centuries~ and it is this 
freedom which is dearly prized by the people of modern demo-
cratic nations. 
Marx denied that political freedom alone conferred real 
human freedom.l He never denied, however, that political 
freedom was a good thing,2 although many times he appears 
to attack the ideals of democratic liberalism,3 especially 
when he spoke of the ndictatorship of the proletariat.n 
What Marx insisted upon was that the establishment of polit-
ical freedom was only the beginning~ net the end,. in the 
l. Marx wrote: flPolitical emancipation is not the practical, 
sure way to human emancipationtt £Art. (lfllt4-)D2 1 5fl2 J. 
2. Marx: ttThe first step in the revolution by the working 
class is to raise the proletariat to the position of 
ruling class 1 to establish democracy" (OM, 30) ~ 3. Marx! "Here (France) bourgeois republic signifies the un-
limited despotism of one class over other classestt (BLN, 22). 
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struggle for real human freedom. In any ease 1 certainly 
Marx never intended to serve as a tool for freedomts ene-
mies.,l 
ii. Marx's General View of Freedom. 
The crucial question~ in assessing Marx's view of free-
dom, is not so muoh one of his attitude toward political 
democracy 1 as his view of general freedom, or 1 as he called 
it, nhuman emancipation.n The critical question is whether 
Marx really offered anything worthwhile beyond political 
freedom. What did he add? 
First of all, Marx called attention to the fact that 
the greatest source of limitation on :ma.n 1.s freedom to do 
as he pleases is nature. WMen make their own history 1 n said 
Marx, flbut they do not make it just as they please.u2 There 
is always the material given, nature, with which men must 
wrestle. This~ again, is Marx's historical materialism. 
The most prominent determinant in man's life is matter. 
This fact usually goes unnoticed in discussions of political 
economy and social philosophy because the limitations i~ 
posed by nature are more or less taken for granted. But 
1. Cork writes that nMarx cannot beJclassed with modern 
totalitarians" [Art. (1949), 4.l.tg • 
Likewise Hookt nAn even greater difference between the 
communists of the Manifesto and the totalitarian commu-
nists of today is the fervent belief of the former in 
personal and civil freed.omu [Art. (194-g), 36]'. 
2. Marx, BLN, 13. 
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:faots of the natural order received great attention :from 
Marx, because if nature were the greatest limitation on 
man1 then society should be organized so as best to meet 
nature's limitations. A society that deals too feebly with 
the limitations imposed by things (as capitalism) stands 
under condemnation. Marx admitted that no social orga.niza,... 
tion can ever completely overcome natural limitations~l 
Nature's limits affect individuals. A person cannot 
fulfill his desires if he has not the material resources 
at hand so to accomplish his desire--whether the limitation 
is one of physical impossibility, lack of money, or native 
ability.2 flThe worried poverty-stricken man has no mind 
:for the finest play,w3 even if the theater were across the 
street from his home and the constitution guaranteed his 
right to go there without fear of being molested. The worker 
who is compelled, under the penalty of starving if he were 
not to work, to stand at a machine all his waking hours, 
pressing one foot pedal with his right foot and lowering a. 
lever with his left hand would likely become dull, even if 
he desired to become accomplished in mathematics.4 The 
pianist who is marooned alone on an island without a piano 
could not play the piano no matter how much he wanted to, 
even though in his position he ha.s absolute political free-
dam. When the material conditions for the realization of 
l. Marx, OAP, III, 954 .. 
2 • .Marx, LA, 35~ 
3. Marx, LA, 17. 
4. See Marx, OAP, I, 397-39g• 
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the human will are lacking, no amount of political freedom 
will supply the want. 
But there is another side to the coin. If laok of 
material means limits freedom, then the possession of mater-
ial means confers freedom. Thus Marx addressed muoh of his 
energy to the problem of making material means available to 
mankind. For example, he insisted that the shortening of 
the working day was an absolute requisite for the complete 
development and education of the masses. Only if the worker 
had the time to read would he be free to educate himself. 
Socialism, Marx believed, would provide greater freedom for 
all, than capitalism does, because, for one thing, it would 
concentrate more upon creating the material conditions neces-
sary for the fulfilment of human desires, needs, and capaci-
ties. This is the first essential in Marx's view of freedom. 
Second, there is another great limitation on man's 
freedom. Man is not only determined by things; he is also 
very often the tool of the creations of his own conscious-
ness •. These creations are called by Marx nfetishes,n and 
the archetYPal form of fetishism is religion. Man makes a 
fetish of a thing when he attributes to it powers and value 
that it in reality does not have. Thus God is a fetish, a 
human creation, a human idea, to which powers over man and 
the world are attributed. When man makes himself subservient 
to God, he makes himself the slave of his own idea, a non-
existing phantQm. Thus, human emancipation requires, Marx 
believed, the casting away of all fetishes whether they con-
cern the supernatuxal, the state, the economic system, or 
anything else.,l 
The third, and most important principle of freedom for 
Marx, is the doctrine of conscious control. Man is free as 
he is able to bring nature ~d especially his own individual 
and social life under the sovereignty of his own oonsoious 
needs, purposes, and plans. As was said above, consciousness 
is a condition of value. It is also a condition of freedom. 
Man is not free when his life is ruled by nature, impersonal 
forces, and accident. Here again Marx stands under the 
spell of Hegel for whom "rat~onal totality" was a prime 
value. To render the real rational was Marx's goal. 
This view has early origins. Traces of it may be found 
in Plato who regarded sensuous natuxe as the realm of neces~ 
sity. Freedom, on the other hand, occurred in the realm of 
intelligence.2 Spinoza, later, held that freedom was attained 
through reason. The chief condition of freedom, he believed, 
was intelligence.3 Marx's view also suggests Hartmann, who 
said that "freedom is the rising of initiative above the 
blind happenings of the world."4 Man can be the slave of 
things, as well as of other men. 
l. This whole concept of fetishism is discussed at length 
in Chapter V, on Disvalue. 
2. Plato, Timaeus, 6g. 
3. Spinoza, SEL, 367-371, 3g1-3g2. 
4. ETH, II, 144. 
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Marx believed that history has always proceeded natur-
ally3 that is, has been determined by impersonal forces 
rather than by men. That is the point of historical mater-
' 
ialism. But if history is brought under the conscious con-
trol of the human beings who live it, then men will be free 
and history will for the first time really be human history. 
Ferrater Mora wrote on the Marxist view of freedom: 
La naturaleza es, en el fondo, no la supresion 
de la libertad, sino la condici~n de la libertad. 
Esta libertad se realiza en la naturaleza cuando 
aparece en ella el hombre como el sujeto de la 
historia.l . 
Marx believed that the capitalistic system was essen~ 
tially nnaturalu in that it runs its course independent of 
human will and thought, determined in its direction more 
by accident and the operation of impersonal forces than by 
conscious human choice. Capitalism is marked by nthe rule 
of the conditions of production over the producers.n2 The 
bourgeoisie appear to have established freedom more widely 
than ever before. But actually, Marx says, "men are less 
free, because they are more subjected to the violence of 
things.n3 
In antithesis to a society in which things and blind 
chance rule, Marx offers a type of social order in which 
men rule. This is a society in which nmaterial production ••• is 
110 
treated as production by freely associated men, and is cons-
ciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan.n1 
Then for the first time is man able to enter the 11true realm 
of freedom. 112 Much light is shed on Marx's famous concep-
tion of the 11realm of freedomn by the only passage wherein 
it is discussed at all fully, a passage from the third volume 
of Capital. The entire passage bears quotation and is as 
follows! 
Capital ••• creates the material requirements and 
the germ of conditions, which make it possible 
to combine this surplus labor in a higher form of 
society with a greater reduction of the time 
devoted to material labor •••• In fact, the realm 
of freedom does not commence until the point is 
passed where labor under the compulsion of neces-
sity and of external utility is required~ In 
the very nature of things it lies beyond the 
sphere of material production in the strict mean-
ing of the term. Just as the savage must wrestle 
with nature~ in order to satisfy his wants, in 
order to maintain his life and reproduce it, so 
civilized man has to do it, and he must do it in 
all forms of society and under all possible modes 
of production. With his development the realm 
of natural necessity expands, because his wants 
increase; but at the same time the forces of pro-
duction increase, by which these wants are satis-
fied* The freedom in this field cannot consist 
of anything else but of the fact that socialized 
man, the associated producers, regulate their 
interchange with nature rationally, bring it under 
their oommon control, instead of being ruled by 
it as by some blind power; that they accomplish 
their task with the least expenditure of energy 
and under conditions most adequate to their human 
nature and most worthy of it. But it always 
remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins 
that development of human power, which is its own 
end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, 
can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as 
its basis. The shortening of the working day is 
its fundamental premise.3 
l. Marx, CAP, I, 92. 2. CAP, III, 95~. 
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iii. Freedom as a Condition of Value. 
Freedom emerges from Marxts theory as an absolute 
condition of value. Political freedom, freedom from 
fetishistic powers, and from all artificial and externally 
imposed restraints is necessary in order than man 1s experi-
mental, developmental activity may proceed at maximum speed. 
If, as Marx argues in ~is anthropological theories, man 
is broadened, enlightened,'and enriched only as his activity 
is broad and rich, then it is desirable to remove all possible 
restraints upon human activity. Human life is experimental 
just as activity in the laboratory is experimental. And 
just as the laboratory scientist learns and progresses 
by trying this and trying that, by testing this and that, 
so all human activity is like a giant laboratory. New 
goals and new values are learned by practice. And just as 
progress in the laboratory is most rapid when least hampered 
by artificial restraints, so it is with all life. 
Freedom in the positive sense, as rational control 
of human life, is also a condition of value. Only as man 
is free in this sense can he actually fulfill his purposes. 
As long as man is the victim of chance and material ciro~ 
stance, human values will be achieved only through struggle 
and luok. But as society is humanized, the opportunity for 
the enrichment of human lives will be maximized. 
iv. Two Problems. 
One of the most novel treatments of Marx's general 
theory is to be found in the book, A Philosophic Approach 
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to Communism, by Brameld. Brameld schematizes Marx's whole 
theory under two categories-- 11 acquiescence" and "activity .. " 
It is his argument that there is a polar opposition between 
the deterministic, fatalistic elements in Marx1 s theory and 
his call to action. On the one hand Marx interpreted human 
life as a product of material forces, standing under a neces-
sity from which no one can free himself. History marches 
on, from feudalism, to capitalism, to socialism, and the 
individual has no choice but to acquiesce in this inevitable 
historical process. On this side Marx is fatalistic. 
On the other hand Marx's view of man was activistic. 
Consciously, intelligently, freely controlled activity was 
for him the norm of human life. His writings were a call 
to human action. Is there not a contradiction between the 
fatalistic and the activistic elements in Marx? Brameld 
believed he found a large measure of conflict between these 
two approaches. His case is very strong. 
Marx was aware of this conflict and offered more or 
less plausible explanations for its resolution. He insisted 
that his historical determinism did not mean absolute, mechan-
ical determinism, but merely that human life must always be 
lived within the limitations of the material and historical 
given. On the other side, he insisted that while man could 
achieve a degree of free mastery over life, the realm of 
necessity would never be entirely overcome. The socialist 
---::::::: ... ::: _____ -----------~--------- --
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too must work within material limitations and can no more 
leap over history than anyone else. 
But the problem still remains. Some scholars still 
see a devitalizing determinism in Marx,l while others insist 
the theory is not fatalistic,2 It would seem that 1 after 
Marx has offered all his best arguments, the boundary line 
that is drawn between determinism and freedom is difficult to 
locate. Just why man is now, after all these centuries, able 
suddenly to make the leap from necessity to freedom is not 
always clear. If men can now become sufficiently enlightened 
freely to seize control of their common life, why was it 
impossible before~ even if the argument is granted that 
capitalism has created an environment which favors the cooper-
ative association of men? 
It is true enough that present day society is more mature, 
more widely educated~ and more widely united into large, 
organized groups than at any time in the past.. But much of 
the world still lives under feudalism~ and present day society 
has still much in common with past historical epochs. Cer-
tainly the confusion and disorder of the twentieth century su~ 
gest that conditions are still far from ripe for human peace 
and order. It is surely conceivable that a century or more 
in the future some scientist of society will author a new 
1. Harrison: nThe whole reason of Marxts gospel was the 
fatalistic necessity of socializationv (Art.(l915) 1 221). 
2. Cole~ WMM, lg. 
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and hitherto unthought of plan of social organization and 
will argue that men in the past, as in Marx's time and our 
own, could not possibly have thought of it because material 
conditione were not yet ripe, and history was still under 
the reign of blind material forces. Marx may yet suffer 
the same fate at the hands of future writers as earlier 
thinkers suffered in his own writings. In any case, it 
does appear that Marx did not satisfactorilly reconcile his 
doctrine of historical necessity 1 which at times borders 
on fatalism, with his call to action 1 which at times seems 
to presuppose absolute freedom~ 
In addition to the theoretical question of the fatal-
istic implications in Marx's view 1 there is the practical 
problem created by traces of authoritarianism. It may well 
be that many of Marxts doctrines and tactical procedures 
were such as to thwart the very ends, the realm of freedom, 
which he sought--even though his own view stressed the inte~ 
relation of means and ends. Many believe that Marx's general 
approach to the social problem, and his proffered solution, 
could lead only to the establishment of an authoritarian 
state. That is, the logic of Marxism is statism. Many argue 
that as a practical matter of fact, the centralized control 
of an entire national economy, the organized planning which 
Marx desired 1 would require a centralized government with vast 
powers and which would rule, probably, largely by force. 
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Haynes, criticizing Marx and all socialism, argues 
that socialism of any• stamp, in practice, Wolosely resembles 
life in barracks.nl Harris admits ths.t Marx was ttanima.ted 
by humanistic oonsiderations,n but likewise argues that his 
view inevitably leads to an 11 anti-libertariann and nauthori-
tarian11 political system~2 Similarly, Heimann makes the 
charge that Marx's stress on the collective whole of society 
leads to a kind of uniformity possible only in a dictator-
ship.3 
So prominent is this authoritarian flavor in Marx in 
the minds of some critics that rule by force is often taken 
for granted as a mark of socialism. 
,... 
Jeze, writing on Marx 
in a popular French magazine in 193g, said: 11 L'Etat 1 surtout 
socialiste, ce sent toujours des hommes qui gourvernent et 
imposent leur volant~ par la force.n4 The great Berdyaev 
took a similar position when he wrote: 
Lferreur fondamentale du communisme, bas~ sur le 
marxisme, consiste dans le fait qu'il 'oroit ~ la 
possibilit~ d1 une r~alisation forc~e non seule~~ 
ment de la j~stioe 1 mais en~ore de la fraternite des hommes, & la possibilite d'une organisation 
obligatoire non seulement de la soo~te, mais de 
la communion des hommes entre eux., .... .,Le oommunisme 
est ••• ineluotablement totalitaire.5 
In his excellent critique of Marxism, Marxism: An Autop-
§.Z, Parkes oi tes inher_ent authoritarianism as a central 
weakness in the whole view. Whereas Marxists argue that 
4. Art.(l93g), 395· 
5. Art.(l937), 200. 
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under capitalism there is collective anarchy~ and in commun-
ism mankind consciously and freely plots its future~ actually, 
suoh a society must mean the slavery of most of mankind.1 
Issues would arise whioh only dietatorship could sattla.2 
The denoument of communism in Russia~ of course~ adds 
weight to this whole argument. But evan without the unfor-
tunate aspects of recent Russian history~ many would doubt 
whether the application of Marx's. principles to society 
could make good his promise of freedom. 
5. General Criticism. 
Taking account of the whole of Marx's subjective con-
ditions of value, it is evident that certain critical ques~ 
tiona force themselves upon the attention of the student. 
Three questions especially may be addressed to Marx. First, 
is description enough '1 :- Second, is the view factually~ 
descriptively true? Third, and finally, is it really human-
istic? These questions will now be taken up in order .. 
Is description as important as Marx's methodology seems 
to assume? Can a mere survey of facts solve the problem of 
value? Is it true that every profound philosophical problem 
resolves itself into a question of empirical facts--even in 
Marx1s own view?~ Marx contended that description was the 
essential task of theory, and that science and philosophy 
have no higher task than that of laying bare the faots. But 
l. MAA, 112-113. 3. Marx, GI, 7 .. 
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then the critic says to Marx, liVery well, you have said 
that man is active and that in his activity he achieves 
value. You have said that men need a clear and enlight-
ened consciousness of their needs and goals. You have said 
that men should control things, and their own lives. You 
have said that man needs to be free, so that his. task will 
be lightened and speeded. That is all perfectly obvious. 
But we still have the question of what, in all this free, 
conscious activity is worthwhile. The question of value 
remains. We still want to know wha~ is worthwhile and why. 
That question is unanswered.n 
Marxls rejoinder is that the problem raised by the 
critic is a false problem, one that is not the task for 
theory, in any case. Marx answers that the critic fails 
to understand the problem and has failed to locate the real 
source of difficulty. But these answers never satisfy the 
critic who wants to know what is the content of value, what 
are the basic principles of value, what are true, valid 
norms, and how the validity of values and norms can be 
proved. 
That Marx was cavalier in his attention to ends is 
evident in his writings, and also in the lack of clear 
direction and high purpose among many contemporary followers 
of Marx. Aiken believes that Marx's vagueness oonoerning 
ends was due to a basio equivocation in his theory. When 
Marx adopted the principle, or something very close to it, 
of self-realization, he made a key principle of an idea 
that is not primal. 1 To adopt such a view as the primary 
value principle is to skip over the question of what the 
self is, that is to be realized, and the question of what 
exactly realizes the self. Mere descriptions of what selves 
do, Aiken and others believe, is not an adequate basis for 
a value theory. 
Second, is Marx's view true? That is, is Marx's des-
cription of the facts, factually correct? Is it really a 
description at all? Marx intended to argue from facts. 
His whole effort was to depict and interpret historical and 
social facts. With this view, as with any other descrip-
tive theory 1 the first really crucial question is whether 
it is true to the facts, whether it meets even its own 
standards of scientific procedure. If it is not true to 
the facts, it is nothing. 
Unfortunately1 the factual correctness of Marx's 
theory is very difficult to prove. Marx wandered far be-
yond simple descriptions in his analyses of history. He 
was dealing with »higher sociology» as Einstein deals with 
uhigher mathematics.n ·Because Marx treated theoretical 
sociology, his writings are full of very broad generaliza-
tions. And as in all very general theory, Marx's hypotheses 
and conclusions are difficult to prove or disprove. 
1. Aiken, Art.(l945), 343. 
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Perhaps the most fundamental historical generaliza-
tion in Marx's writings, one on which the whole theory of 
historical materialism is based, is found in these words: 
nmot criticism but revolution is the driving force of his-
tory.n~ If this thesis is wrong, then most of Marx's theory 
is wrong. The thesis is a factual statement, and its truth 
can be tested by reference to facts. But how many facts 
would need to be consulted before such a statement could 
be proved? The methodological equipment required poses in 
itself a staggering problem. In fact, because of the 
immensity of the task, the reader usually passes over such 
generalizations without testing them, and accepts or re-
jects them in accord with the degree of his trust in Marx. 
Consider such general statements as those of Marx 
on the Oivil War in the United States. Marx claimed that 
the issue was one created by the conflicting economies of 
the North and the South. The issue was not either states' 
rights or the freedom of the negro. But how can this be 
proved? It cannot be proved exactly and conclusively. So 
it was with many generalizations in the Marx literature, 
upon which often rested the essential proof of Marx's case. 
The fact that the first really sound and thorough criticism 
of Marx's economic theory was not forthcoming until BS~ 
Bawerk wrote Karl Marx and the Olose of his System more 
l. Marx, GI, 21. 
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than a quarter of a century after Marx stated his theory, 
suggests the difficulty of grasping, understanding, and 
testing Marx1s theoretical generalizations. This much is 
clear. Marx's case rested upon facts, and its truth depends 
upon its factual correctness~ That factual correctness is 
difficult in the extreme to test and prove. Marx''s science 
had very little of the exactitude and simplicity which was, 
in his own view, a mark of true science. 
Third, is Marx's view really humanistic? It is clear 
that Marx intended to be humanistic, and, further than 
that, some have even regarded his ethics and social phil-
osophy as essentially personalistic. The emphasis on activ~ 
ity suggests personalism, for, as Hartmann suggests, stress 
on activity and stress on personality go hand in hand~ 
nActivity stands forth prominently as the first factor in 
personality.nl But more in point even than this is Marx's 
stress on individual human welfare and development. 
There are some,however, who deny that Marx's view had 
any connection with personalism. The most outstanding author-
ity to take this position is Berdyaev. -nr1 est extrement 
n ~ ' facile, he says, nde demontrer la cara.ctere a.nti-personnal-
iste du Marxisme.n He goes on to say! 
Ce dernier est hostile au principle de la personne, 
ainsi que l'eet,toute doctrine purement sociologique 
de l'homme forme par la soci~t~.2 
l. ETH., II., 137. 
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It is Berdyaevts argument that person is a spiritual and 
religious category for which there is no place in a view 
that denies the spiritual and the religious. Marx had only 
the individual, which is a biological and sociological oate-
gory.l Marx's anti-personalistic view which n.reoonnaissait 
la domination du ~neral sur ltindividuelJn was, Berdyaev 
says~ a heritage from Hegel.2 Berdyaev does admit, how-
ever, that the souxoes of Marx's criticism of capitalism 
were personalistic and humanistic.3 
Without doubt there is a serious question as to what 
place there will be for the individual in Marx1 s communist 
state. The dangers created for the individual have already 
been intimated in the section on freedom. It is true that 
if the society Marx would create were to be a giant state 
in which the individual is swallowed up, his view could not 
be called humanistic, muoh less personalistic. It is evi-
dent, too, that Marx vacillated between a warm human inter-
est and a harsh historical and political realism6 
However, statism was the farthest thing from Marxts 
intentions. His desire was for a social order in which 
human individuals would be free and would prosper. There is 
no indication that he regarded any particular social order, 
even communism, as an end in itself.4 For Marx, the problem 
l. Art.(l937), 1go. 2. Art.(l937), 1g5. ;. Art.(l937), 1g7. 
~. Marx wrote: ncommuriism is the necessary form and the 
energizing principle of the next stage in history, but 
communism in itself is not the end of human develop-
mentu (~kM, 126). 
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was how to secure for the individual, who lives in a society 
of men and in a material worldJ the maximum opportunity 
for truly h'l.lll:lB.n experiences. That this was Ma.rxts view is 
a basio assumption of this entire chapter. Marx's view 
that value is achieved through free, conscious, human activ-
ity seems to support this interpretation. Marx at times 
wavered from his humanistic principles. But taken as a 
whole his view is properly termed humanistic. 
CHAPTER III 
THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF VALUE 
l. Matter as a Condition of Value. 
i. MarxTs Materialism. 
Before undert~king an exposition of Marx's view of 
matter as a condition of value, it is necessary to offer 
some light on the problem of matter itself. The question 
must be answered,, what is the matter which conditions 
value? 
12:; 
It is as difficult to find a clear definition of mat-
ter, as it is to find a clear definition of any metaphysi-
cal category in Marx•s writings. Marx did, however, regard 
himself as a materialist. His materialism does manifest 
certain clear traits. These may now fruitfully be discussed. 
It is necessary first to clear away certain misconcep-
tions. · There is the misunderstanding, for instance, that 
Marx's materialism, and all materialism, must be ethical 
materialism. It is sometimes supposed, especially in popu-
lar thought, that Marx regarded material things as the only 
things worthwhile in life. The materialist is often fic-
tionized as a loose, pleasure loving, irresponsible indi-
vidual. But this characterization does not belong to Marx. 
He was explicitly opposed to hedonism, especially Bentham's 
utilitarianism.l His doctrine of activity and struggle 
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implies a clear rejection of pleasure philosophy. As for 
the more basic question of the priority of material values, 
there can be no doubt where Marx stood. Basic in his 
attack was the oharge that capitalism makes things the 
"';" 
end of life~ and man and his activity are the means to 
material production.l Marx regarded material things as 
significant in the achievement of value, and his ethios is 
materialistic in the technical sense. But it was the 
priority of material things over human life that he wished 
to end. The values of human activity, that is, of exper-
ience, in all their forms~artistio~ literary, intellectual, 
and so on--were of far more significance than the produ~ 
tion of material things. It was the production of material 
things Which dominated the past. It was his desire that 
ma.n should dominate the future. 
Nor is Marx's view mechanistic~ This misconception, 
common among laymen and popular writers, grows from the 
fact that in the history of thougp.t, early materialism was 
mechanistic. The belief that all materialism is mechanistic 
has almost the status of a tradition. The brilliant Jacques 
Barzun interprets Marx mechanistioally.2 Actually, Ferr,ter 
- , , 
Mora correctly says that: nLa teoria de Marx sa oponia. 
tanto al espiritualismo como al materia.lismo meoanicista..n3 
Supernaturalism and mechanistic materialism were equally 
1. Marx, GI, 66. 
2. DMW, viii, 146. 
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enemies of. Marx's materialism. Marx is properly regarded 
as one of the pioneers of mo~ern, critical, aotivistie 
materialism, and he cannot properly be classed with the 
old fashioned mechanistic, atomistic, Whard1 materialists. 
In the third place, Ma.rx•s materialism cannot be re-
garded as the basic principle of his ethical and social view. 
His materialism was more methodological than metaphysical 
or ethical. Ducattillon misrepresents Marx when he sayst 
/ Oe ma.terialisme est la base, l 1affirmation fonda-
mentale du communisme, comma ltaffirmation de 
Dieu pour le ohristiani~me. Pour le commnnisme, 
la. mati~le est premi~re, pour nous, Dieu est 
premier. ~ 
Matter was not Ma.rxt s basic affirmation. Matter, for .Mux, 
had not the same normative or causal significance as the 
will of God does for Christians. Matter was a means to 
value, and was merely an obstacle, in many oases, to be 
overcome. Matter was never construed as that to which man 
is to give himself, nor should men merely succumb to mater-
ial processes. Nor does matter have the same metaphysical 
significance for Marx as does God for Christians. Marx never 
1 affirmedn matter in the way'Ohristians affirm God. Matter 
I 
as a metaphysical fact is not at all clear in Marx. Ducat-
tillon would have been more correct had he said 1 man1 is a 
primary communist affirmation, occupying someWhat the sa.m.e 
place in the general Marxist :scheme as God in the Christian 
1. Art.(l937), 2~. 
view. The center of Marx1 s :universe was neither God nor 
! 
matter, but man. 
But what then is Marx's materialism? It does not 
s.ignify the primary ethical ;value of material things. It 
is not mechanistic, nor is materialism his "basie affir-. 
mation." If not, what place does materialism occupy in 
I 
Marx's scheme? This question cannot be answered by giving 
the Marxist definition of ~tter, for Marx never gave any. 
The question can only be answered by describing in Ma.rxts 
views of the world, man 1 and science those traits which 
in Marx's own mind distinguished his view as materialistic. 
In his view of the world Marx stressed process and 
the "externality" of nature •. l The sensuous world, nature, 
is in process and the existence of nature is independent 
of man (although man certainly can modify the material 
world). Marx's view of the world, therefore, is an evolu-
tionary realism, or as it is! usually called, dialectical 
materialism. The subject of' this movement, matter itself, 
is re.ally never defined. That is, Marx has no ontology. 
The material world is simply taken as the object of man's 
sensuous activity. What matter is in itself, what the 
I 
I 
"essence" of matter really is, apparently was not a signifi-
cant question for Marx. The matter, or "nature," of the 
world was for Marx the way i~ acts as man views it. At 
times activity appears as th~ one distinguishing mark of 
Marx's material. But then~ man's non-material life~ his 
mental life, for instance, is sometimes referred to as a 
form o:f a.otivity.l The two terms cannot, therefore, be 
equated. 
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Sometimes matter appears to be that which is not yet 
subordinated to the human will. But then, when iron and 
coal are appropriated and used by men they still woUld be 
regarded by Marx as matter. There really is no completely 
consistent use of the terms matter, the real, and nature in 
Marx, It would appear that the concept of matter defined 
as the object of man's sensuous activity most adequately 
expresses Marx's view. 
For Marx the problem wa$ not to consider matter as an 
object of contemplation, to "interpretn matter. Rather the 
problem was to change the existing world.2 The problem is 
not theoretical, but practioalj the demand is not for defini-
tion, but action.3 
This view is evidenced by·many passages in which Marx 
takes the fulfilment of human purposes as the test of real-
ity. The most striking of these is found in the introduo-
, 
tion to the Critique o:f Political Economy. There Marx wrote! 
A railroad on which no one rides, which is, con-
sequently, not used up~ .not consumed, i@ but a 
potential railroad, and not a real one.4 
Further in the sa.me passage: 
l • .Marx, GI, 71. 
2. Marx, GI, 3~; ftTheses,n XI. 
The product first becomes a real product in con-
sumption; e.g., a garment becomes a real garment 
only through the act of being worn; a dwelling 
which is not inhabited, is really no dwelling.l 
It is this point, wherein human purposes and activity are 
a defining feature of reality, which leads many to regard 
Marx as an incipient idealist·. 2 
· But even in the passage just quoted the "product," 
the object of man's activity:, is distinguished from "a mere 
natural object,_" and the latter would surely be regarded 
by Marx as a material thing. Nonetheless, the most common 
defining feature of the real. in Marx's writings was its 
nature as the object of man's sensuous activity.3 
Marx's view of the external world is strongly depend~ 
ent on his view of man, a further indication that in his 
theory man is prior to matter, even though in the world at 
large Wthe priority (metaphysically) of external nature 
remains unassailed.'4 In Marx's general view of man, the 
"material" is detined in a somewhat different sense from 
the above. Here, material, or material activity, is viewed 
as man's "practical activity" itself, rather than simply 
the object of his activity.5; Thus the traditional dualism 
of mind and matter, of man and nature, is denied. Again, 
idealism is suggested. Human activity taken as a whole 
1. Marx, IOR, 27g• 29. Of. Eastman, MAL, 45. 
). In one place Marx went so far as to say! "The sensuous 
activity of men ••• is ••• the basis of the whole sensuous 
world as it now exists" (GI, 36). 
4. Marx, GI, 36-37. 5· ·Marx, "Theses," I. 
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-includes both subject and obj eet, both consciousness a.nd 
matter. The two poles of the traditional antithesis appear 
as aspects of a single type of reality--material activity. 
This clearly is the positiontaken by Marx in the "Theses 
on Feuerbaoh." In the first! of these Ma.rx wrote: 
The chief defect of all: materialism up to now ••• is, 
that the object, reality, what we apprehend through 
our senses, is understood only in the form of the 
object or contemplation; but not as sensuous human 
activity, as practice; not subjectively •••• Feuerbach 
••• d.oes not understand human activity itself as 
objective aetivity.l 
In the same vein Marx said in The German Ideology: 
We understand that the celebrated 'unity of man 
with nature' has always' existed in industry and 
has existed in varying forms in every epoch 
according to the lesser or freater development 
of industry, just like the struggle' of man with 
nature, right up to the development of his pro-
ductive powers on a corresponding basis.2 
Further along in the same passage Marx wrote, in comment 
on Feuerbaoh': 
Certainly Feuerbach has'a great advantage over 
the 'pure' materialists in that he realizes how 
man too is an 'object of the senses.• But ••• he 
onlf conceives him as a. •sensuous object,' not 
as sensuous activity.'; 
This doctrine is widely applied in Marx's thought. An 
example of this, again, is the labor theory. Marx held that 
ftla.bor" is real only when ae~ive.~ The reality which is 
the basis of social and indiVidual wealth is human activity. 
None of the other commonly supposed·sources of value is 
truly real. Capital is merely an expression of human action. 
1. DTheses," I. 
2. Marx, GI, 36. 
3. Marx, GI, 37. 
,4. Marx, CAP, III, 949. 
It is a method of bookkeeping. The only creative, material 
reality in political economy'is human, sensuous activity. 
, 
It is in accord with this principle that Marx said! 
He (Feuerbach} does not isee how the sensuous world 
around him is, not a th~ng given direct from all 
eternity, ever the same,: but the product of indus-
try a.nd the state of soo
1
iety. l 
In Marx•s method, the term matter has still a different 
cast. Here still the na.ctive, energetic life of mann is 
considered the object with which the scientist works, es-
pecially the social scientist'. 2 Human activity gives to 
science its aim and its material. But further than that, 
' 
matter, or the real, appears as holistic, non-mental, and 
efficient. The emphasis on $oles is, of course, taken 
over from Hegel. The objects of Marx's science form wholes. 
A thing cannot be understood until the whole of which it 
is a part is understood. Analysis is an important tool of 
science, but the real problem: is to discover and understand 
functioning wholes. Marx studied the capitalistic system 
as a whole. He held. that "the production relations of 
every society fortn a. whole.n3 This methodological principle 
is especially stressed in the!C:ritigue of Political Economy. 
In his introduction to that work Marx argued that nproduc- . 
tion, distribution, exchange, • and consumption are identi-
cal •••• They are all members of one entity.v~ The conclusion 
implied is that matter and :rea1ity are holistic. 
l. Ma.rx, GI, 35. 
2. Marx, POP, SS. ~~: Marx, POP, 93• Marx, ICR, 291. 
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Matter is also nonmentc:U. Ooneeiousness is a deriva-
tive :from matter. The real :roots o:f any process are non-
mental9 It was :for this re~son that MarK turned Regel 
! 
11right side up.ul For Hegel the Idea was prior to the 
material expression. But :fo
1
r Marx, the ideal is simply an 
expression o:f the material. : Religion~ :for insta.nee, is 
an ideal expression of 11 the iactual relations o:f life. 11 2 
For Marx, "the only materialistic method11 is one which 
seeks to 11 discover the earthly core of the misty creations 
of religion.ll3 A method is not materialistic i:f it studies 
' 
human activity, human rea.lit~, by first examining men's 
ideas, and then studying wh~t is supposed to be the expres-
sion in life o:f those ideas •. 
The third characteristiC) o:f the object o:f science is 
that it is efficient. By this is meant simply that soience 
seeks to discover the oauses: o:f the processes which it 
studies. What Marx looked :for was not essences, but dynamic 
:forces. The objeot o:f Ma.rx1 $ study o:f history was to :find 
the real oausal factors in history. Marx studied capital-
ism to find lithe economic law of motion o:f modern sooiety.ft4 
Because he believed that material conditions were determin-
ing :factors in history and s9oiety, there developed in his 
' 
thought a tendency to equate' the material and the real. It 
seems evident that this equation was the result o:f his par-
ticular method, the scientific, which is most successfUl in 
' 
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dealing with material thing$. The scientific method, to be 
successful, must be abl.e to isolate and measure causal fac-
tors. It is a tendency with any method to equate its object, 
the particular type of objedt it treats most successfully, 
with reality. So a. strict application of the scientific 
method tends to generate a materialistic view of reality--
simply because sensuous material provides the objects it 
can handle most successfull~. This tendency seems to have 
influenced Marx. 
The plainly antimetaphysical attitude of Marx prevented 
! 
his giving a definitive, met:aphysioal statement of the nature 
of matter9 In general 11 he t:ook matter to be the object 
of man's a.otivity, sometimes man's activity itself, and 
generally qualified as holi~tic, nonmental, and effioient. 
Marx was realistic, and the :categories of activity, pro-
cess, and wholeness dominat~ his view of matter. It is 
evident that Marx is to be ~lassed with the sophisticated, 
critioa.l materialists of the present day, rather than with 
old-fashioned materialists. 
ii. Bow Matter Conditions Value. 
Matter taken in the seco~d sense cited above, as human 
activity itself, has alread~ been discussed as a subjective 
condition of value. The present section considers matter 
' 
as the object of man's a.ctivjity.., the objective world, as a 
condition of value. It is the material world defined as 
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whatever responds to and conditions human activity which 
is a.n objective condition of' value. Here is considered 
what Marx referred to generally, and simply~ as the material 
world. 
Matter by itself does not create value. Nor is it of 
value in itself. But matter conditions value in the sense 
that no human activity is possible without matter. Value 
is a human fact. But no hu.nians could exist without matter. 
Man is a physical organism. His body requires material 
things (food, clothing, and ishelter), for its sustenance. 
Man1 s productive activity is absolutely dependent upon 
material conditions~l Matter is a condition of human exis-
tence, and, therefore, of human value. The life of man 
requires a material matrix just as a quantity of water must 
have a vessel to contain it. Neither man nor a quantity 
of water can float free in the air. 
But matter does not only condition the mere physical 
existence of man; it conditions also the quantity and quality 
1. Said Ma.xx: "Apart from the degree of development, greater 
or less, in the form of social production, the produc-
tiveness of labour is fettexed by physical conditions. 
These are all referable .to the constitution of man 
himself (race, et~), and to surrounding nature. The 
external physical conditions fall into two great eoonomi~ 
cal classes, (1) Natura~ wealth in means of subsistence, 
i.e.~ a fruitful soil, waters teeming with fish, etc., 
and \ 2) natural wealth in the instruments of labour, 
such as waterfalls~ navigable rivers, wood, metal, coal, 
eto.• (CAP, I, 562} .. Also Marx~ flindividuals ••• are 
effective, produce materially, and are active under 
definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions 
independent of theix will" ( GI 6 13). · 
of his activity. The quantities ~roduoed by the agricul-
tural laborer, for instance, are "conditioned upon natural 
oircumstances.nl In quality, Marx believed that man's 
activity is conditioned at all levels by material factors. 
Consciousness itself is a product of nmaterial practice.n2 
Intelligence, ideology, religion, art, and literature are 
' 
all so conditioned. In productive industry and political 
economy matter is all import'a.nt, :fox- oommodi ties always 
take the fom of matter3--n()t to mention the influence of 
material conditions on the general pattern of the economic 
order. Here the whole doctrine of historical materialism 
could be repeated, for its t~esis is that matter condi-
tions life. 
Marx's argument is not that material things are desir-
able, but rather that they are indispensable. It was not 
a question, for Marx, whethe~r man should try to extricate 
himself from the world of matter, pain, and struggle in 
favor of a highex-, non-ma.tex-ia.l realm. Hie argument was 
that man lives in a material world, and that was that* 
Thus Oombellach misses the point when he compares Marx and 
Rousseau in this manner! 
Marx said: 'The poor should take the goods they 
laoked ••• seize them by violence;' Rousseau said, 
1Pause and consider whether they are even worth 
your stooping to pick them up. f'f-
l. Marx, CAP, III, 950. 
2 .. Marx, GI, 2g. 
3 •• Marx, CAP( I, ~3. 
4 Art. {1949 J, 443 .. 
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Marxts view was that the issue posed by Rousseau~ via Co~ 
bellaoh~ was not a live issue. Not to "stoop and pick them 
up~" is to cease from human existence. Men live in a mater-
ial world, engage in material activity, operate upon the 
material world and develop that way. Thus they always have 
and thus they always will, whether anyone tells them to or 
not. The only question is the extent to which the material 
world and manta material activity can be intelligently and 
consciously controlled.l That matter conditions value is a 
fact~ not a plank in the Marxist platform. The realm of 
necessity will always remain.2 So Marx believed. 
The peculiar flavor of the relationship between man 
and his. material environment can be captured only by stat-
ing the view in terms of dialectics. Thereby the principle 
receives a. more accurate statement~ and the Hegelian influ-
ence is revealed more clearly. 
In the Marxist scheme man, the subject~ stands as the 
thesis and dialectical opposite of the material world, the 
object and the antithesis. Man and matter sta.nd in this 
dialectical relationship in st~ict accord with the Regeli~ 
pattern. Neither pole oan exist without the other. Man 
alone is an abstraction, nothing. He cannot exist without 
the material world. The material world, in turn, as it 
exists now, is a product of human activity. As in the 
2. Marx, CAP, III, 954-. 
Hegelian t%ia.ds, the two interact. Ma.n acts upon matter; 
matter acts upon man. The two are in constant struggle. 
From this dialectical struggle comes a synthesis. The syn-
thesis, for present purposes, is value. Thus value is not 
a mere subjective attitude, but is a 0reconciliationw of 
subject and object. Marx•a description of the labor pro-
cess is clearly in this vein: 
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which 
both man and Nature partioipate •• ;.He (man) opposes 
himself to Nature as one of her own :forees ••• in 
order to appropriate Nature's productions in a 
:font adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on 
the external world and cha~g~ng it, he at the same 
time changes his own na.ture.l 
The Hegelian origin, and the distinctly philosophical 
spirit of the Marxist value theory is indicated by Engels! 
Herr Jung strives with might and main to prove 
that the basic feature of Regel's system is the 
affirmation of the free subject against the do~ 
ination o:f rigid objectivity. But one does not 
have to be too well acquainted with Hegel to know 
that he aspires to a much loftier point of view, 
that of reconciling the subject with objective 
forces, that he had a tremendous respect for 
objectivity~ that he placed reality far higher 
than the individual's subjective reason, and 
demanded of the latter that it recognize objec-
tive reality as reasonable. Hegel is not the 
prophet of subjective autonomy.2 
Neither Hegel nor Marx was a 'prophet of subjective 
autonomy.n The subject is limited by its material environ-
ment, and at the same time is able to aohieve the fulfilment 
of its destiny~ the realization of values, through that 
material environment. The material world, from one point 
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of view, is a prison which man cannot escape. At the same 
time, it provides him with the material of his practical 
activity and enables him to achieve the realm of freedom.l 
Matter a.ppea.:r:s, thus, in Marxts thought a.s an absolu~e. con-
dition of value. It is for that reason that men must nseize 
the means of production~" and subject them and all matter 
as much as possible to human purposes. 
2. Society as a Condition of Value. 
1. Society a Human Creation. 
Ma.rx''e thought was social. He believed that man is a 
social creature. But the preeminence of the social did not 
lead Marx to regard society as an end in itself~ a being 
independent of man, existing before and above men4 and of 
prior importance to the individual ma.n. Marx did not hypo-
statize society. This he specifioally denied: nto consider 
society as a single individual is ••• a false mode of specul~ 
tive reasoning.n2 Marx criticized Hegel for making of his-
tory nothing but the self-development of the Absolute, rather 
than the development of individual men. 3 Whereas Hegel 1.s 
society was only a mass (Masse), Marx's society was consti-
tuted by individual men.~ WThe individual is the social 
essence," Marx wrote.5 Neither in present society as Marx 
l. Marx wrote~ 0 The first principle of profane {as opposed 
to idealistic) socialism rejects emancipation in pure 
theory a.s an illusion, and demands for real freedom be-
yond the idealistic 'will, t· very tangible., material 
conditional! {BF, 267)·. 
2. ICR, 2g2,. 3. HF, 257. 4. HF, 257. 5• eJ.tM, 117. 
_ viewed it nor in his ideal society of the future does society 
have any priority over the individual in reality or value. 
To the contrary, society is man's own creation. UWhat 
is society, whatever its form may be? The product of mente 
reciprocal action.wl Marx defines his conception of society 
further in The German Ideology, when he says! 
By social we understand the co-operation of 
several individuals, no matter under what 
conditions, in what manner and to what end. 2 
These passages indicate Marx• s generic definition of society. 
Society is simply a name given to groups of men living in 
interaction with each other. It is more than a mere collec-
tion of men--for two men living near together, but having 
nothing to do with each other, would not constitute a. 
society. Where men are livingtogether in interaction, 
there is society. 
Taken in this way, society is treated as an object for 
study just as is any other object. Society is regarded as 
a. natural object, functioning independ·ently of a.ny super-
natural agency, and subject to the conditions imposed by 
the material world. Society is in process, constantly 
fluctuating and changing, so that its forms are temporary 
and functional. 
Society is a product of human activity, in summary, is 
a. human creation, though the creature can get out of hand. 
1. Ma.xx, POP, 152 (letter to Annenkov, December, lg46). 
2. GI, lS. 
ii. Man a Social Creature. 
While there can be no society without individual men~ 
there also can be no human beings without society. Man is 
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a social cr§ature. Thus the dialectic moves on. Individual 
man and society form another dialectical triad. The sub-
ject, the individual~ is the thesis. The individual finds 
himself oounterpoeed with society, the object, hie anti-
thesis. Neither can exist without the other. Each con-
ditions the other--society is a human creation and man is 
a social creature. The present section is devoted to a 
description of the content of this dialectical interplay 
between man and society. 
In the first place, man is a social creature in the 
literal sense. The individual's physical existence is a. 
social product. Men a.re born a.nd reared in families. With 
rare exceptions the individual depends to a.n extent on 
others for his creation, for the house he lives in, for the 
food he eats and the clothes he wears. In Ma.rx•s words~ 
ftindividuals make one another, physically and menta.lly.ftl 
Ma.n's mentality~even consciousness itself~is a social 
product. Man becomes self-conscious in society. UMan first 
sees and recognizes himself in other men.w2 As men become 
aware that they are individuals, living in society with 
others, their consciousness extends and language develops. 
noonsciousness is ••• from the very beginning a social 
1. Marx, GI, 2g. 2. Marx, CAP, I, 61 fn. 
l4o 
product.nl Communication and co-operation with others 
yields self-consciousness, language, and the basis for en-
riching consciousness. 
The many forms that consciousness, the mind, develops 
are social products. Man's sense of values and his ethical 
views are social creations. 
Our wants and pleasures have their origin in society; 
we therefore measure them in relation to sooiety; 
we do not measure them in relation to the objects 
which serve for their gratification. Since they 
are of a social nature, they are relative.2 
Men assess their needs and estimate the goods of the world 
in relation to their ability to produce goods, to the felt 
wants that have been awakened in the course of production.~~ 
to the form of society, to the place of the individual in 
the social hierarchy, a.nd so on.. 11All social life is essen.-. 
tially practical,w3 a.nd practical activity in society gener-
ates our needs and desires, and the way men think of these 
needs a.nd desires. In general# "to stamp an object of 
utility as a value, is just as much a social product as 
la.ngua,ge .. ,4 
The higher forms of consciousness# likewise, do not 
escape s ooial conditioning. Ethics a.nd morality are for 
Marx simply the rules of the group pertaining to oonduct.5 
l. Marx, GI, 19. 3. Marx, "Theses,n VIII. 
2. Marx, WLO, 33• 4-. Marx, OAP, I, S5 •. 5. Selsa.m! lfFor Marx and Engels •• qgood and evil are to be 
found only in human sooietyn CArt.(l94g), 2~. · 
Hook: flMOrality he (Marx) adds, is social •••• Morality 
is based ~on needs, upon what ma.n as a. social creature 
desires" (FHM, 52). 
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Interested persons often try to attach universality and 
objectivity to ethical ideas, but this was merely, in Marx's 
mind, a device to gain wider adherence to and practice of 
those ideas. Actually, however, all such ideas are purely 
·relative to the social process. They are not mere figments 
of the imagination, but rather play a definite role in 
sooiety and are based on social needs. They are, however, 
transitory, because any state of society is transitory. 
Sooiety develops and changes. 
Not only are man's physical existence and mental life 
sooial products, but the productivity of his own material 
activity is very dependent on society. This is true of all 
pro duotive a.otivity, varying from the most crude to the 
most refined. The worker who digs a. foundation for a public 
building presupposes a society organized to need and use 
suoh a building; he presupposes the social development of 
engineering knowledge sufficient for the skillful construc-
tion of suoh a bUilding; and he presupposes sufficient 
industrial activity among others to provide him with tools. 
The skilled producer, suoh as an artist, not only depends 
upon social industry for the materials of his trade, but 
also society provides him an object to repreeent.l The 
differences in the variety and productivity of material 
activity between men living under medieval feudali~m and 
men living under modern capitalism illustrate Marx's point. 
l. Marx, LA, 75. 
The illustration does not prove, of course~ Marx's theory 
of the oauses of these differences. 
The sum of the matter is that man is in his whole nature 
dependent on society from the time of his first breath to 
his last. This is true now, and always has been, Marx be-
lieved. He wrote! 
The further back we go into history, the more 
the individual, and, therefore, the produciEg 
individual seems to depend on and constitute 
a part of a larger whole.l 
iii. The Achievements of Social Man. 
The dependence of the individual upon society implies 
that men can and do accomplish things in groups that they 
could not accomplish alone. Considering the individual-
social relati6n from the standpoint of society, rather than 
the individual, as in the foregoing paragraphs, it is evi-
dent that socialized men have powers that individuals do not 
have. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
The achievements which socialization makes possible 
are by no means entirely a matter of speculation. Marx and 
Engels believed that the fruits of socialization could be 
seen and measured, because under capitalism human industry 
was already socialized to a very large extent. Engels said 
that under capitalism flmeans of production and production 
itself had in essenoe become sooial.ft2 That is• it is 
already a fact that large groups of workers are brought 
together in co-operative industry, under single managements, 
and working according to a common plan. The huge corpora-
tions of the present day, where several hundred thousand men 
work for a single management, are illustrations of the 
socialization capitalism begets. This tendency was already 
marked in the England of Marx t a day 1 so that Marx could 
view in English industry the productivity of socialized 
labor as a fact, rather than as an ideal of the future. 
It was this which largely explains Marx's belief in 
the inevitability of socialism. Socialism would oome not 
simply because people would get tired of capitalism, see 
its evil~ and then demand socialism. Socialism did not 
need to wait until the masses were persuaded of its merit. 
To the contrary, socialism was really becoming an established 
faot even in Marx's time, and the more so day by day. Capi-
talism begets socialism by socializing industry and all the 
means of production. It tends to concentrate larger and 
larger units under common, systematic managements. This· 
was in Marx's mind the essence of socialism. The steel 
industry in American life today functions virtually as a 
social enterprise. Competition in that industry is prac-
tically gone, and common, integrated management has taken 
its place. The only point at which capitalism resists sociali-
·zation is ownership. The actual process of production itself 
capitalism socializes in a ruthless way at breakneck speed-
making changes in the direction of socialization, sometimes 
even more rapidly than a. people and a government committed 
to socialism would dare. The final task, socializing owner-
ship of the means of production and making the political 
revolution, would probably be ushered in by force, but would 
be inevitable, Marx believed, once the material basis of 
socialism had been created. 
Viewing this socializing tendency Marx believed that 
he saw the virtues of social production. He believed that 
capitalism had proved conclusively that men can accomplish 
things eo-operatively that they cannot accomplish or even 
approach when working separately. This is a main theme of 
the chapter on uco-operationft in the first volume of Capi-
tal.l Marx"s statements of this theme are worthy of quota-
tion: 
When numer~~ labourers work together side by side, 
whether in one and the same process, or in different 
but connected processes, they are said to oo~operate, 
or to work in co-operation. 
Just a.s the offensive power of a squadron of 
cavalry, or the defensive power of a regiment of 
infantry, is essentially different from the sum 
of the offensive or defensive powers of the indi-
vidual cavalry or infantry soldiers ta.k:en separately, 
so the sum total of the mechanical forces exerted 
by isolated workmen differs from the social force 
that is developed, when many hands ta.ke part simulbo> 
taneously in one a.nd.the same undivided operation, 
such as raising a. heavy weight, turning a winch, 
or removing an obstacle. In such cases the effect 
of the combined labour could either not be pro-
duced at all by isolated individual labour, or it 
could only be produced by a great expenditure of 
time, or on a very dwarfed scale. Not only have 
we here an increase in the productive power of 
the individual, by means of co-operation, but the 
creation of a. new power, namely, the collective 
power of the masses.2 
Apart from the new power that arises from the 
fusion of many forces into one single force, mere 
social contact begets in most industries an emu-
lation a.nd a. stimulation of the animal spirits that 
heighten the efficiency of each individual work-
man. Hence it is that a dozen persons working to-
gether will, in their collective working-day of 
144 hours, produce far more than twelve isolated 
men each working 12 hours, or than one man who 
works twelve days in succession. The reason of 
this is that a man is, if not as Aristotle con-
tends, a political, at all events a social animal. 1 
The combined working day produces, relatively to 
a.n equal sum of isolated working-days, a greater 
quantity of use-values •••• The increase, the special 
productive power of the combined working-day is, 
under all circumstances, the social productive 
power of labour, or the productive power of social 
labour. This power is due to co-operation itself, 
When the labourer co-operates systematically with 
others, he strips off the fetters of his indi-
viduality, and develops the capabilities of his 
species.2 
The colossal effects of simple co-operation are 
to be seen in the gigantic structures of th~ 
a.noient Asiatic~ Egyptians, Etruscans, etc.J 
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This theme is further expanded in the third volume of Capi-
tal, with the addition of greater stress upon the enhance-
ment of productivity through the socialization of intelli-
gence, as well as mere physical power. In a typical passage 
Marx wrote! 
This entire line of economies arising from the 
concentration of means of production and their use 
on a large scale has for its fundamental basis 
the accumulation and co-operation of working 
people, the social combination of labor. Hence it 
has its source quite as much in the social nature 
of labor as the surplus-value considered indi-
vidually has its source in the surplus-labor of 
the· individual laborer. Even the continual improve-
ments possible and necessary in this line are due 
solely to the social experiences and observations 
2. CAP, I, )61. 
made in production on a large seale through the 
combination of social labor.l 
The essential point, for purposes of the present chap-
ter~ is that co-operative endeavor immensely increases the 
productivity of men. The celebrated virtues of nmass-
produetion" are, of course, a tribute to this fact. For 
Marx this was an important fact. This was an evidence of 
the value of the principle of co-operation as it could be 
applied to· all realms of human endeavor.2 
ll\.6 
Increase in the quantity of material goods was not the 
only salutary by-product of co-operation. Effort carried 
on in the group is enjoyed more. There is an nemulation 
and stimulation of the animal spirits.n3 
Science is benefitted by co-operative investigation. 
nsocial experiences and observationsnl\. provide a basis for 
scientific investigation which is indispensable to scien-
tific progress. Many scientists working together, pooling 
1. CAP, III, 95. 
2. Bernal~ 1•The change from individual to collective moral-
ity corresponds to the realisation of the relative 
ineffectiveness of isolated individual action under 
modern conditions. If in the last century a man was 
struck by the misery and ignorance of the natives in 
Central Africa, he went out there as a. medical mission-
ary; today he would realise that the health .and wealth 
of the African people is a political and economic prob-
lem to be solved by joint action with the African 
people •••• Pieeemeal changes not only fail to achieve 
a general improvement, but actually retard it by divert-
ing effort and by giving a delusive impression that 
something is being done. Because collective action in 
the industrial and political field is the only effec-
tive action, it is the only virtuous actionn {FN, go). 
). Marx, CAP, I, 35g. 1i-. Marx, CAP, III, 95• 
their findings and dividing their labors~ can accomplish 
what many more scientists working separately could not. 
So it is even With the arts. Increased material pro-
ductivity in society means that the material needs of all 
oan be met.with the expenditure of less time. and more 
time is made available for artistic productivity. It also 
makes available more of the material means of artistic 
activity, such as musical instrumentsq Society provides 
the technical progress needed for artistic progress, as 
well as providing the artist with a greater variety of stimu-
lating and interesting subjeots.l 
Great material and moral2 progress were made possible, 
Marx believed, through co-operative, social endeavor. Where 
co-operation really takes place, this progress is natural 
and inevitable. Whether or not Marx was over-optimistic 
in his hopes for extending the principle of co-operation, 
Hunt really misses the essential point when he says: "Marx-
ism greatly exaggerates the power of communities in gen-
eral •••• The morality of all collectivities is invariably 
low.n3 The collectivities referred to are, apparently, such 
l. Marx, LA, 75-76. 
2. The word "moral" is used by Marx in a psychological sense. 
Sentiment, feeling, estimation, the subjective come 
within the meaning of "moral." Thus Marx used the term 
in a more or less naturalistic sense to indicate what 
in man is commonly referred to as the spiritual .(see 
OAP, I, 442, 450 fn.). 
). Hunt, TPO, g3. 
institutions as city and national governments. Marx himself 
had no praise for such collectivities as these commonly were 1 
and even, of course, demanded their abolition. They were 
not, he believed, instances of actual group co-operation, 
but were really institutions existing apart from the group, 
and often actually_against the group. The low morality of 
such groups is only to be expected, since they were created 
in capitalistic societies whose ethical principles are 
based on egoistic individualism. 
The material and moral progress heralded by Marx could 
be possible only where co-operation is an actual fact. This 
could not happen where social and economic conditions mili-
tated against it, exoept in isoiated and exceptional oases. 
This point is stressed in The Critique of the Gotha Pro-
gramme• Marx believed that if socialism were forced upon 
a people where neither social and eoonomio conditions nor 
popular sentiments were ready for it, the result would be 
.as ohaotio and undemoeratic as with any other enforced sys-
tem. 
Oritieism of Marx misses the crucial issue if it poses 
the question, will men co-operate? The pertinent questions 
are, rather, these: are not men co-operating now, do they 
not gain by it, a.nd eannot suoh co-operation be extended by 
creating the material conditions necessary for it? It was to 
the latter questions which Marx spoke, and his view oan be 
destroyed only by refuting his answers to those questions. 
t 
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iv. What Social Man Might Accomplish. 
Basing his argument upon the accomplishments already 
achieved through oo-_operation, Marx sketched in scattered 
passages a piotuxe of what could in the future be accomp-
lished through extension of co-operation. Here Marx jour-
neyed into the normative realm as he seldom did elsewhere. 
Many of his pronouncements bear the lofty air of utopianism. 
Throughout, howeverJ there is emphasis on the practical 
possibility of attainment and the material basis required. 
First, Wthe alliance of the working classes of all 
countries will ultimately kill war.nl One of the first 
fruits of socialization is peace. Marx went on to say, 
in the passage just quoted that~ 
The very fact that while official France and Germany 
are rushing into a fratricidal feud, the workmen 
of France and Germany send each other messages of 
peace and goodwill; this great fact, unparalleled 
in the history of the past, opens the vista of a 
brighter future. It proves that in contrast to 
old society, with its economical miseries and its 
politioardelirium, a new society is springing 
up, whose International rule will be Peace, because 
its national ruler will be everywhere the same--
Labourt2 
Marx was no pacifist. He advocated the use of violence 
where necessary. He was a revolutionary. He had no moral 
principle which excluded necessarily the use of force. But 
he believed that peace ultimately could be won, though not 
until class rule was abolished. 
2. OWF, 27 • 
~/ 
:;:....,. 
The significant feature of Marx's view is not that he 
held to the ideal of a peaceful world. There is nothing 
d~stinctive about that--everyone wants peace. What is 
distinctive is the particular way in which, he believed, 
peace could be won. 
Marx believed that peace would be a fact only when 
m~n is socialized. A society based on social co-operation 
is by definition a peaceful society. It is a society in 
which men work out their problems in common, rather than 
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as individual pitted against individual, or group against 
group. Of course, conflict can never be eliminated. There 
will always be differences. But essential to co-operation 
is the settlement of differences by peaceful means, rather 
than violence. 
Under socialism, peace would be a practical possibility 
because, also, socialism means the rule of the masses--
universal democracy. The nalliance of the working classesn 
will mea.n that international problems will be attacked from 
the viewpoint of the whole, and in the interest of the 
broad masses of individual men, rather than from the view-
point of this or that interested group as in the.past. 
Un~er socialism common problems will be met just as they 
are met in any other social organization--peacefully, as 
intelligently a.s possible, and with a. view to the best 
so.lution for the organization as a whol.e. Violent conflict 
within socialized society would be as unthinkable as viol.ence 
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within an industrial organization. In an industrial plant~ 
workers in the machine shop do not ordinarily throw bombs 
at workers in the paint shop. Peace within a socialized 
world would eventually be taken for granted as much as 
peace among states in an advanced federal democracy. 
Peace would be further insured by virtue of the faot 
that a socialized economic order would tend to cultivate 
the virtue of co-operation, rather than the egoism of capi-
talistic society. Thus the desire for resort to violence 
would be lessened. A world of peace seems unlikely now 
because economic and political systems are based on compe-
tition and selfishness, and are undemocratically organized, 
But changes in economic conditions of.life would alter this, 
Thus Marx1 s ideal of peace was given a rational and empiri-
cal basis. It is apparent, however, that the great weakness 
in all this is the purely practical problem of welding the 
world 1s mass of .two billion people into an effective community. 
Socialism would also make possible a world of material 
abundance. The increased productivity of social labor was~ 
Marx believed, already proven. Through the extended appli-
cation of science and co-operation to machine industry, the 
quantity of material goods could be .increased almost indef-
initely. Marx believed that a social order which could 
retain the advantages of capitalism (mass, machine produc-
tion, socialization of the labor process), while eliminating 
the disadvantages (waste through competition, deliberate 
maintenance of an economy of scarcity, and periodic crises 
and depressions) could establish an era of abundance un-
dreamed of, even in the most progressive capitalistic na-
tions. 
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The great advantage in increased productivity, in Marx1 s 
mind, was not mere increase in the amount of material goods 
themselves. That, actually, was a side issue. The point 
is that when material productivity increases, the relative 
amount of time necessary to satisfy the material needs of 
society is decreased. Marxts goal was not more goods, but 
more time available for other things than material produc-
tion. Increased material productivity would have the happy 
dialectical result (assuming a rational social order) of 
making possible more non-material enjoyments. In short, 
the goal of increased material productivity is the shorten-
ing of the working day. The relevant sub-section in Oapit§l. 
is titled, nrncreasing intensity and productiveness of labor 
with simultaneous shortening of the working day.~l 
Reducing the working time of the individual worker 
would leave more time available for the development of the 
individualts whole person. Marx described the laborer in 
the capitalist factory as a one-sided machine-animal. But 
in socialism! 
The intensity and productiveness of labour being 
given, the time which society is bound to devote 
to material production is shorter1 and as a conse-
quence, the time at its disposal for the free 
development, intellectual and social, of the 
l. Marx, CAP, I, 5go. 
individual is s~eater, in proportion as the work 
is more and more evenly divided among all the 
able-bodied members of society.l 
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Marx contended that capitalism presupposed egoism and 
reinforced it, and that a few were enriched at the expense 
of the many. Capitalism was a disordered product of selfish 
individualism. This charge is heard again and again. For 
example: 
The so-called rights of man, as distinguished from 
the rights of the citizen, are nothing else than 
the rights of the member of bo~geois society, 
that is, of the egoistic individual, of man 
separated from man and the community.2 
The most satirical statement of this type is found in Oapi-
This sphere (simple circulation) that we are 
deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and 
purchase of labo~-power goes on1 is in fact a 
very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone 
rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. 
Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a co~ 
modity, say of labour-power, are constrained only 
by their own free will. They contract as free 
agents, and the agreement they come to, is but 
the form in which they give legal expression to 
their common will. Equality, because each enters 
into relation with the other, as with a simple 
owner of oommodit.ies, and they exchange equivalent 
for equivalent. Property, becauae each disposes 
only of what is his own. And Bentham, because 
each looks only to himself. The only force that 
brings them together and puts them in relation 
with each other, is the self·ishness, the gain 
and the private interests of each.. E.ach looks to 
himself only~ and no one troubles himself about 
the rest, and just because they do so, do they 
all, in accordance with the pre-established har-
mony of things, or under the auspices of an all~ 
shrewd providence, work together to their mutual 
2. Marx, Art.(lS44)2, 73• 
advantage, for the common weal and in the inter-
est of all-.1 
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i I~ was Marx's belief that the individual does not achie~e 
his ~est in competition and conflict with his fellowmen.2 
i Suo~ only produces egoism, conflict, and human suffer~ng. 
' 
Ra.thbr, the individual is fulfilled and is happiest in co-
: 
oper~tion with his fellowmen. The best human qualities are 
\ 
i developed in society. Marx further believed that these 
·, 
i . 
human qualities could only develop when the political-
' i 
econ~mic system itself was socialized. 
i 
I 
1
, Concern for the individual was certainly prima.ry in 
' 
Marx1s thought. Again and again Marx speaks of Wthe all~ 
I 
roun~ development of the individual.w3 The social ideal 
I 
was ~otually stated in individualistic terms in Marx's slo-
gan-i"from eaoh according to his abilities, tp each aooord-
ing 1:\o his needa. "14- The Manifesto takes this position also! 
! 
11In communistic society, accumulated labour is 
[but a. means to widen, to enrioh, to promote the jexistenoe of the labourer.5 
I 
l. M~rx, CAP, I, 195• 
2. ~utsky interprets the Marxist position: WThe oompeti-
t1ive struggle between individuals of the same society 
~aS under all circumstances an absolutely deadly effeot 
on the sooial impulses. Since in this struggle each 
one. asserts himself so muoh the better, the less he 
aalows himself to be led by social considerations, the 
mbre exclusively he has his own interest in eye. For 
m~n under a. developed system of production of oommodi-
t;i.es it seems only too clear that egoism is the only 
n~tUI'al impulse in man, and that the social impulses 
ate only a. refined egoism or an invention of priests 
t~ get mastery over man, or to be regarded as a. super-
natural mysteryw (EMCH, 155). 
3. Marx, OGP, 10. 1+. C.GP, 10. 5. Marx, OM, 24. 
In place of the old bourgeois society, with its 
classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an 
association, in which the free development of 
each is the condition for the free development 
of all.l 
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In these passages the social whole is specifically subordin-
ated to the individual. The social ideal is stated in terms 
of individual welfare. There certainly was no intention in 
Marx's socialism to obliterate the individual. 2 
Marx's view was not a denial of the individual, but an 
assertion that the individual could have free and full 
development only in society. This is the essential point 
of Ma.rxts article, 0 0n the Jewish Question," written in 
lS44. Marx always maintained this position, and stated it 
bluntly in his introduction to the Critique of Political 
Economy. He wrote: "Ma.n ••• is not only a social animal, 
but a.n animal which can develop into an individual only in 
society.u3 
But society does not guarantee the development of 
the individual. Only in a society which tends to bring to 
the fore the social impulses, rather than repress them, aan 
this happen. Capitalism represses the social individual 
into an "alien being." But socialism, which minimizes 
1.. Ma.rx, OM, 31. 
2. Somerville offers a good statement of Marxts position! 
"To say that the ethics of dialectical materialism is 
social is not to imply any negative attitude towards 
the fulfilment or enrichment of individual personality. 
In fact, the conception is that the proper organizatioR 
of society is the precondition of the fullest ethical 
development of the individual" (Art.(l9~3),-50l). 3. ICR, 26g. . 
incentives to selfishness and maximizes incentives to social 
responsibility, and whose material foundations would support 
these tendencies, could accomplish what hitherto has been 
regarded as a more or less impossible ideal~ In the capi-
talist factory workers are, of course, irresponsible gener~ 
ally~ The most elemental care to prevent waste is taken 
only when required.1 But, 11it is entirely different in the 
factories owned by the laborers themselves, for instance 
in Rochda.le.n2 
Socialism would be a boon for the individual because 
it would enable him to live in peace, it would provide him 
with material abundance and seaurity, it would provide him 
leisure time and the material conditions for the develQp-
ment of his intellectual, social and other creative inter-
ests, and, most important of all, it would make friends of 
his fellow men, rather than competitors. These could be 
achieved through ~ocialism. 
A further achievement would be freedom. A socialized 
society, said Marx, is a free society. 110nly (erst) in 
community with others has each individual the means of cul-
tivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, 
therefore, is personal freedom possible.113 The lines of 
Marxts argument in support of this contention have already 
been indicated. Freedom depends upon material conditions 
to a large extent. The llrealm of necessity" is imposed by 
1. Marx, CAP, III, 102. ). Marx, GI, 74-. 
2. Marx, CAP, III, 102. 
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nature. By enabling man to control nature better, to rea~ 
the material goods of the earth with greater ease, socialism 
will go far to establish freedom. 
In the political realm, socialism is to establish free-
dom by eliminating class rule. With the elimination of the 
economic conditions which create the oppressive rule of small 
factions, ;Cliques, and classes, will go political oppres-
sion. The Ddictatorship of the proletaria~u simply means 
that the workers of society, the broad masses of men, the 
majority, will always rule in every way, and the drones 
will become workers. ffThe dictatorship of the proletariatn 
is simply another way of expressing majorit~ rule. The 
aim of the working class, Marx said, is nto establish democ-
racy.111 
Finally, and very significantly, Marx foresaw in social-
ism the possibility of achieving a rational social order. 
Marx*s view is preeminently a science of society. It is 
based on the fundamental assumption that intelligence can 
be applied to society as a whole. Many do not accept this 
assumption. One of the first questions raised by the person 
presented with socialism for the first time is the possibil-
ity of its achievement. Most npraotioal• men prefer to 
leave social change to natural social development, and to 
accept social oon~itions as they find them. 
It was the feeling of impotence before the historical 
process which Marx expressly denied (this in spite of his 
l. OM.., 30. 
historical materialism). Marx believed that men could take 
their common life in hand~ rendering it orderly and rational. 1 
Social problems were intrinsically no more insoluble than 
any other problem. He believed that socialism was possible, 
that production oould be flproduotion by freely associated 
men ••• oonsciously regulated by them in accordance with a 
settled pla.n.n2 He foresaw a 'conscious reorganization of 
soo1ety,n3 whose aim would be society as a. "conscious and · 
systematic association.n~ When that happens, "the practical 
relations of everyday life offer to men none but perfectly 
intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his 
fellowmen and to nature. n5 
Marx called his ideal society the 'realm of freedom.n6 
The socialized society would be a realm of freedom becauset 
socialized man, the associated producers, regu-
late their interchange with nature rationally, 
bring it under their common control, instead of 
being ruled by it as by some blind power.7 
To render society rational was Marx's greatest goal. To 
lift society from the exclusive determination of nature and 
material forces and from the ohaos of boom and depression, 
oonfliot and disorder--this was Marxts task, a. task which 
l. Weisengrtn: nsowohl der Kommunismus als der Sozialismns 
sind Systeme, welohe eine bessere Staatsgesellsohaft und 
Wirtsohaftsordnung herbeizuf!hren suohen. Beide gla.uben~ 
dasz eine absolute L~sung m~glioh sei1 (MSF, 354). 
2. Marx, OAP, I, 92. 5. OAP, I, 92. 
3., OAP, III, 106, 6, OAP, III, 954. 
4 OAP, III, 773• 7• CAP, III, 954. 
he believed could be accomplished. Only then could there 
be peace, abundance, individual enrichment~ and freedom. 
3. Conclusion. 
In Marx's thought value is a dialectical concept. 
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Value is not an essence, or a particular quality. It is 
the product of a process. In this dialectical process are 
two polar opposites: man and his object, Without both 
there can be no value. Value occurs when man acts upon and 
responds to his material and social environment. 
Since value is a process, part of a larger process, the 
problem of value can be solved only by an analysis of the 
elements of that process. The subjective pole, man, is 
himself revealed as an aotive~ conscious being. But he must 
have an object for his conscious activity. The subject alone 
is nothing. His object is twofold! the natural world and 
other men. These both condition his activity and give it 
substance. They are fetters, and yet they provide the 
material for his achievements. 
The objective factors, matter and society, neither 
constitute value, nor are they of value in themselves. 
They merely provide a framework for human activity; they 
are the opposite in which the subject is objectified and 
fulfilled. Thus Marx's value theory appears to follow in 
its fundamentals the Hegelian mode of reasoning. Value lies 
in the reconciliation of subject and object. 
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Speaking less philosophically and more speoifioally, 
Marx's view is that human activity and value cannot be 
understood at all until the influences on human life are 
revealed. Man*s object, nature and sooiety, have a great 
deal to do not only with what values man achieves, but with 
what values he desires. Men's estimations and achievements 
are closely bound up with their environment. Thus it is of 
utmost importance to study all of the conditions of human 
experience and to understand their funotion with respeot 
to human life. Onoe they are understood, it is of utmost 
importance to aot, to operate on those conditions so .that 
the reconciliation of subject and object will be relatively 
painless and fruitful. 
Once again, the crucial oritieal question is the fao-
tual correotness of Marxts view. If he is right in saying 
that all estimations of value are conditioned by the mater-
ial and sooial environment, and that man is a oonditioned, 
funotioning agent responding to those conditions, then it 
is utterly futile to attempt the creation of a value theory 
or ethios whioh is valid independently of this or that par-
ticular historical epooh. If Marx's factual basis was 
correct, it is useless to attempt a purely philosophical 
value theory. But if Marx's aeoount of the faots themselves 
is wrong, then his own whole theory falls to the ground. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
1. Introduction. 
Because Karl Marxts life and teachings have become 
so fractious an issue in the worlds of political and intel-
lectual enterprise, many interpretations of the Marxist view 
have arisen. The enemies of Marx have certain characteristic 
interpretations which are foisted upon him; frien4s of Marx 
metaphrase his theory variously; even professing Marxists 
cannot agree on Hwhat Marx really meant;' then there is 
the current party line. This variety of explanations creates 
many problems of interpretation. 
The confusion is to a large extent Marx's own fault. 
Only in eoonomios did he explicitly state his positive theory. 
In other areas the interpreter must depend upon Marx's 
criticisms of other views and on scattered8 incidental, 
sometimes conflicting statements. 
It should, by now, be evident to the reader that a 
certain ambivalence appears in the value theory of Marx. 
At times Marx is a warm humanist, stressing the worth of 
human personality. At other times Marx is a cold realist, 
placing science and history in the judgment seat. The 
former attitude has given rise to a moralistic, even Kant-
ian interpretation of Marx. The latter has given rise to a 
scientific, sociological, naturalistic interpretation. 
In the present chapter the Ka.ntia.n interpretation a.nd 
what may be called the historical approach will be considered. 
This discussion may yield several benefits. Some light may 
be cast on the validity of the Kantian interpretation itself. 
The antithetical view Will be assayed. Finally, the chief 
discordant elements in Marx1s thought will be revealed. 
2. Ka.nt 1 s Ethical Position. 
Although the Kantian ethics is well known, the task 
of this chapter will be simplified by a brief review of 
the Kantian position. At the risk of oversimplification, 
Kant's position has been reduced to the following six propo-
sitions, all based upon the clear treatment in Kant's Fund&-
mental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics. 
1. The subject of ethics is moral laws. 
2. Moral laws are determined by reason. 
3. MOral laws become morality th~ough the exercise of 
the rational, autonomous will. 
4. The autonomous, rational will is exercised, and it 
determines action, when there is llrespeot for law," or when 
action is from a sense of duty. 
5. Only moral beings, those capable of self-willed 
rationality, have dignity or intrinsic worth. Therefore, 
human beings, as capable of rational morality, have dignity 
or intrinsic worth~ 
6., Morality presupposes freedom, which, although not 
provable, is accepted as a necessary postulate of morality. 
The statements may now be comment~d upon. 
First, the subject of ethics is moral laws. Empirical 
facts are related to ethics, but the chief task is to discover 
the basis of moral obligation na, priori solely in the con-
cepts of puxe reasononl Moral laws are uindependent of 
nature and have their basis not in experience but in reason 
alone. 112 Guides to conduct may be found through consulting 
experiencej but these 11ma.y be called a practical rule ••• never 
a moral law,n3 A moral philosophy must be nthoroughly 
cleared of all that is empirical and only belongs to anthro-
pology.n4 The task of moral philosophy is to find the fflaws 
of the human will.n5 These laws are the nbasis of obliga-
tion," and 11must contain absolute necessity. n6 Ethics 11 is 
meant to investigate the idea and principles of a possible 
pure will, and not the acts and conditions of human voli-
tion in general, which are for the most part derived from 
psychology. w7 Flllrther, nthe nature of man or the circum-
stances in which he is placed"g are of no direct concern 
to ethical theory. The sole task of ethics is to discover 
the laws of the human will as they are determined by reason. 
Herein is Kantts formalism. 
But moral laws, as determined by reason, do not con-
stitute morality. The moral laws must be willed by a ration~ 
al, 11autonomous will.n Such a will is the only thing in 
the world which can be called without ~ualification good.9 
The good will is good in itself,. independent of its practical 
1. FPME, 3. 4. FPME, ;. 7· FPME, 5· 2. FPME, 72. 5· FPME, 1. s. FPME, ;. ;. FPME, 3. 6. FPME, ;. 9· FPME, s. 
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consequences.l The good will is the nhighest goodu and 
nthe condition of every other.n2 Moral worth does not lie 
in the consequences of an action, but in the truth of the 
moral law aooording to whioh it was oarried out.3 Morality 
is thus independent of content. But the will whioh aots 
from an external compulsion is not good, even though the 
maxim of its aotion is good. The good will wills itself, 
it "gives a law to itself."~ No speoial merit oan be attached 
to aotion from oompulsion~a stone does that. The prin~ 
oiples of aotion of a rational, autonomous will, however, 
are self-imposed, and in that is a nsupreme principle of 
morality. w5 
The autonomous will imposes principles on itself out 
of nrespeot for law.n6 This respeot for law is the sense 
of duty. The moral will aots not from compulsion, nor 
from inclination, nor for any ulterior purpose, but from 
a sense of duty. The will is moral when it views ~oral 
laws as commands, as nimperatives.n7 In morality there must 
be a sense of obligation. This sense of obligation is 
an indispensable oondition of morality. 
Because human beings are capable of rationa.l, autono-
mous, moral action, they have dignity or intrinsio worth. 
nMorality, and humanity as capable of it, alone possesse$ 
1 .. FPME, 9· 
2. FPME, 11. ). FPME, 15, 16. 
4. FPME, 59• 
5• FPME., 59. 
dignity. 111 Only rational beings are ends in themselves. 
This issues in Xa.ntts famous imperative: »Aot so that in 
you:r own person as well as in the person of every other you 
are treating mankind also as an end, never merely as a 
means.w2 Human beings must never be exploited, used as mere 
means, but must always be respected and regarded as of in-
trinsic worth. This doctrine, of course, is oentral to the 
argument for a Kantian interpretation of Marx. 
Finally, morality presupposes freedom (~s well as God 
and immortality). A free will is a will subject to moral 
laws.3 If reason and the moral will are mere functions 
of other entities, and are not self-determined, they are 
not free, and therefore not moral. Whether or not the 
freedom of the will can be proven empirically, the freedom 
of the will is a necessary condition of the moral life. 
Therefore, freedom must be presupposed, by an aot of faith 
if necessary, if morality is to be possible. 
Kant's ethics ie one of history's loftiest philosophi-
cal expressions. The purity and simplicity of the view 
inspire admiration and conviction, even among most of those 
who question its theoretical merit. This view, whioh de-
fines value as the exercise and fulfilment of a rational 
Will 1 4 and whioh stresses the value of the individual h~ 
man personality, has inspired muoh thought and action. Some 
believe it inspired Marx. 
1. FPME, 53. 
2. FPME, !l-7. 
3. Arguments for the Kantian Interpretation of Marx. 
1. Vorl!nder's Case. 
Many have accepted a Kantian interpretation of Marx. 
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Some of these are scholars of the front rank whose views 
cannot be taken lightly, the moreso because their interpre-
tations are well argued. Karl Vorllnder may be taken as 
the representative of this group. In 1911 he published a 
a significant work entitled Kant und Marx. It was the 
intention of that effort to prove that Xant and Marx were 
the great intellectual fathers of the socialist movement. 
Kant, the ethicist, and Marx, the scientist, gave to social-
ism its philosophy. Vorllnder further sought to show tbat 
Marx was strongly under the influence of Kant, and that 
both in turn bore a strong influence on post-Marxian thought, 
especially socialist thought. The first chapter of the 
book deals with Kant as a philosopher of socialism. The 
second chapter treats the thought of Marx and Engels, and 
ensuing chapters treat the development of socialist thought 
after Marx. 
The crucial portions of the book, for present purposes# 
are those which discuss Kant himself. Vorl!nder begins 
by admitting that Kant and Marx were radically different 
in personality, time, manner of writing, interests and 
method. But in spite of these differences a movement has 
grown, socialism, which inscribes both names on its banners; 
both were philosophers of socialism (3). They were marked 
by a baeio similarity in both method and oonolueions. This 
could be no aooident (3-~). 
Vorl4nder begins hie proof by citing a remarkable pas-
sage in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Therein (B372-374) 
Kant praises Plato's Republic and argues the praotioa.l possi-
bility of building a better society. The obstacles to 
freedom, Kant argues, "are due to quite removable causesn 
(B373). From this beginning Vor14nder proceeds to argue 
that Kant was a philosopher of socialism (6). 
Kant stressed the importance of rendering empirical 
facts in accord with pure ideas (suggesting a definitely 
Marxist attitude). In his philosophy of history Kant saw 
the task of uniting experience with 1'.an Idealf as the ul ti-
m.ate historical goal (g). Furthermore, Kant's philosophy 
of history was scientific (g). Kant h.ad a sense of natural 
development in human history, and attempted to find the 
principle of that development (9). Even historical mater-
ialism, Vor1inder believes, is incipient in Kant (10-ll). 
Further indications of Kant's socialism were his stress 
on the social (1Q-l1) and on freedom (11~12). Kant believed 
that only in a society of peace and freedom could the indi-
vidual develop all his abilities and only then would the 
"highest object of nature be realizedu (13). In the Oritigue 
Kant wrote of the ffpower of freedom to pass beyond any and 
every specified limitB (OPR, B374). Muoh of Vorl!nderts evi-
dence is dxawn from Z'Ultl ewigen Frieden. 
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Kant considered society as a whole~ and recognized 
the whole as conditioning the individual (13). Further-
more, Kant was not a utopian. He recognized empirical 
obstacles to social improvement (13). His ideal was a 
constitutional state in which there was freedom for every-
one, with only such restrictions as were necessary to guar-
antee the freedom of all (1~, 17). Kant united, Vorl!nder 
believes, a pure ethics with a realistic philosophy of 
history (16). 
Kant emphasized the idea of public rights or justice. 
In practical politics Kant was a flradioal demooratfl (19) 
with strong reformist inclinations (20-21). He desired 
the rule of law, through a representative legislature, 
rather than the rule of a single individual or faction 
(22). Kant favored Rousseau's noommon willfl conception, 
opposed Hobbesian absolutism. (22). 
In dealing with the problem of war and peace Kant 
insisted that the rulers be responsible to the people (25). 
This was a crucial principle of government, Kant believed. 
Kant was an internationalist (26). He desired co-
operation among nations with a view to ending war, estab-
lishing an era of peace and freedom (26). Kant, in spite 
of the narrow boundaries of his own travelled world~ was 
a cosmopolite (26). As a believer in coequal co-operation 
among nations, he rebuked colonialism as much as Marx, and 
deplored power politics (27). He opposed militarism, 
aggression, the njustioe of power,n and the so-called Real-
politik which Marx also opposed. The community of nations 
was to be based on nder Idee des Rechts und der Moralfl (2g). 
There are even traces of a revolutionary attitude in 
Kant (2g) and belief in common possession of property (29), 
or fldistributive property,n as he called it. There is 
also a distinct emphasis on action (30). 
Vorl!nder concludes his discussion of Kant by noting 
the backwardness of many of his specific political yiews. 
He was, says Vorl!nder, a child of his time politically, 
and was not a part of any real socialist movement. Never-
theless, he created the philosophical groundwork of social-
ism, just as Marx was to build the scientific groundwork 
later on (30-32). 
This review of Kant''s social views is capably suppo:rted 
by evidence drawn from various Kant ian wri tinge. Vorl!l.nder ~*' 
is convincing. There unquestionably are similarities be~ 
tween Kant and Marx. The emphasis on freedom,. the confi-
dence in the possibility of social improvement, the empha-
sis on individual freedom and the worth of personality, 
the conception of the social whole and the desire for 
changing social conditions, the desire for peace, the cosmo-
politanism, hatred of power politics and exploitation of 
nation by nation, the desire for justice in the distribu-
tion of landed property--all these indicate a strong social 
view in Kant~ and all of these features seem to reappear 
in Marx. Plainly there is much in common between Kant and 
Marx. 
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With respect~ specifically, to value theory and ethics~ 
Vorl!nder concentrates most of his argument on a. single, 
rich page (2g5). There he cites (l) the Marxist emphasis 
on the value of personality, especially as revealed in the 
Manifesto, and the doctrine of exploitation, and (2) the 
moral criticism of capitalism, especially as revealed in 
Capital. Marx's position was ethical, he believes, and his 
ethics was specifically Kantian. Vorl!nder climaxes hi~ 
case with the comment that socialism is never a flblosze 
Magenfra.~u (2g5). With every socialist the issue is 
basically moral. So it was with Marx. 
ii. Further Proof. 
Still more ea.n be said in behalf of the Kantia.n inter-
pretation. That Ma.rx1 s position was basioa.lly ethical is 
insisted upon by many writers, including even enemies of 
the Marxist position. Several examples may be oited. 
Croce wrote'! 
Idealism or absolute morality is a. necessary 
postulate of socialism. Is not the interest 
which prompts the formation of a. concept of 
surplus-value a moral interest, or sooial if it 
is preferred •• e.Without the moral postulate 
how could we ever explain Marx•s political ac-
tivity, and that note of violent indignation 
and bitter satire which is felt in every page 
of Das Ka.pital.l 
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Flubacher said of Marx and all nineteenth century socialism: 
Its basic position can be summed up as a mental 
and moral revulsion at the evils and injustices 
of the existing economic system.l 
Jones writes: 
If ever there was an idealist in the ethical 
sense of the word it was Karl Marx.2 
Rader: 
We can now understand the substance of Marxian ethics! 
the demand that human beings be treated as human 
beings, and things as things. In his own way, Marx 
is as insistent as Ruskin that 'the only wealth is 
life'.3 
Mella.rt 
Historically, socialism springs from definitely 
ethical motives and ethical sentiments •••• In 
all socialistic writings the dominating ethical 
note is altruism, brotherhood, love for one's 
neighbor, service of the community, sympathy 
with the oppressed,4 
Finally, a.ooording to Wright! 
Prima facie the communist gospel accepts nearly 
all of our highest values, and its relation to 
the ideals of the eighteenth century illuminati 
is obvious.,5 
The case for the Kantian, moral interpretation is uobvious.n 
A multitude of passages direct from the writings of 
Marx could be cited to indicate an ethical interest. This 
aspect of Marx1 s writing is so well known and so little in 
need of proof, that just the following will be cited: 
Capital is dead labour, that vampirelike, only 
lives by sucking living labour, and lives the 
more, the more labour it sucks.6 
-- ~ - ~---~ ----- ------
Capitalist production ••• is utterly prodigal 
with human life.l 
The whole rule of Britain in India was swinish, 
and is to this da.y.2 
nswinishn is not a scientific term, nor does it have a de-
finable meaning in any scientific sense. It is addressed 
to the emotions and the judgment implied is ethioal. 
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On a number of specific points there is a distinct 
X:antian flavor in Marx•s thought. The Manifesto is usually 
cited as chief evidence of the influence of Kantts concep-
tion of personal worth. This feature of Marx's thought is 
also prominent in his earlier article, non the Jewish Ques-
tion." He wrote: 
The individual (in bourgeois society) leads not 
only in thought~ in consciousness, but in reality, 
a double life •• ,regarding other men as means, 
degrading himself into a means and becoming a 
plaything of alien powers.3 
In the so-called Christian State it is true that 
alienation counts~ but not the individual. The 
only individual who counts, the king, is a being 
specially distinguished from other individuals.LJ. 
Contempt for theory, for art, for history, for 
man as an end in himself, is the real conscious 
standpoint and virtue of the monied man"S 
Marx's standpoint, on the other hand, was that ":man is the 
highest being for mankind."6 Man is an end in himself. 
l. OAP, III, 104. 
2. COR, 70. 
3v Art.(lg44)2, 55-56. 6. Art.(lg44)Dl, o15. This view was taken over bodily 
from Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity, according 
to Mehring (KM, go). 
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Violation of this principle is exploitation, a sin whioh 
is scored in dozens upon dozens of passages 4 Marx left 
thousands of pages of printed material. But it is doubtful 
whether more than a half dozen or so of those pages could 
be turned without finding mention of capitalist exploit&-
tion and the dehumani.z~d state of man. 
There is an abundance of evidence, also~ indicating 
Marxts cosmopolitanism. Marx's teachings had a universal 
application. Marx called upon the nworkingmen of all 
eountriesn to unite.l In the »Address to the Communist 
League» Marx ignored international boundaries, except as 
they were political obstacles to the union of the labor-
ing masses. In his criticism of the Gotha program Marx 
criticized Lassalle severely for his nnarrow nationalist 
viewpoint.n2 In his correspondence Marx referred to hi~ 
self as an ninternationalist.fi3 The whole of mankind oomes 
within Marx's purview. There is nothing provincial about 
his thought. It is universalistic. 
At a number of other points the Xantian spirit appears 
in Marx's writings. Marx seems to postulate certain prin~ 
ciples and values. Class values and the labor theory are 
instances of this. Marx manifested a strong sense of duty> 
both in his own life, and in his writings. He told Kugel-
mann that he would persist in his work on behalf of the 
1 .. OM, 44. 2. OGP, 12 .. 3. COR, 34-7. 
the workingmen in spite of the personal difficulties and 
humiliations whioh that would entail.l The centrality 
of the doctrine of freedom in Marx also suggests Kant. 
Finally, there appears to be a definite parallel be-
tween Kant's flrational willft and Marxts nintelligent ac-
tion.n Just as activity and consciousness were conditions 
of value for Marx~ so will and reason were conditions of 
value for Kant. 
Vorllnder 1 s well substantiated case for a socialist 
interpretation of Kant and a Kantian interpretation of 
Marx, supported as it is by other thinkers., as well as a 
great deal of further evidence in the Marx sources the~ 
selves, presents a formidable critical position. There can 
be little doubt that the position has merit. 
4. The Case Against the Kantian Interpretation~ 
i. General Remarks. 
It is evident in Vorl&nder's treatment that his chief 
intention was not to prove Marx a Kantian. His main., and 
stated, purpose was to show general similarities in their 
respective social philosophies and to show that they in-
fluenced the same movement. It seems apparent that Vor-
llnder's greatest interest was in proving Kant to be a. 
philosopher of socialism, rather than that socialism is 
Kantian., although the latter he certainly was interested in 
l. LDK, 39. 
---· --~-~-----_-______ -- --- ---
too. The theme of Vorl4nderts work is Kant and Marx, that 
is, the two complement each other. This Vorl!nder proved 
unquestionably. The broad similarities in their sooia.l 
philosophies, cited above, indicate a similar range of 
interest and a body of similar views. The views on free-
dom, social progress, the value of the individual, and the 
social whole, the cosmopolitanism, and the desire for jus-
tice are common to both Kant and Marx. 
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There are some, however, who deny that Marx's theory 
was significantly Kantian. These oritios stress the his-
torical interpretation of Marx and reject the Kantian inte»-
pretation. Their rebuttal to the Kantian interpreters is 
strong and the evidence for their oase may now be considered. 
11. Kant and Marx Oontraeted. 
{l) Reason vs. Empirical Science. 
The case for the historical or naturalistic interpre-
t~on may be presented by posing three sets of contrasts1 
reason vs. empirical science, form vs. content, and person-
alism vs. humanism. The first contrast oonoerns method: 
reason vs. empirical science. The contrast may be sharpened 
by these quotations! 
Kant: 
A law in order to be considered moral, that is 
to sa,y a basis of obligation, ·must contain abso-
lute neoessity •••• The basis of obligation is not 
to be sought for in the nature of man or the cir-
cumstances in whioh he is placed, but a priori 
solely in the concepts of pure reason8l 
Marx: 
Every profound philosophical problem is re~ 
solved •• vquite simply into an empirical fact.l 
For Kant the guide to the moral life was reason; for Marx 
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it was empirical science. For Kant every question of value 
must be settled'ultimately in the court of reason. For 
Marx, a course of action requires no other validation than 
the human purposes which inspire it and the empirical science 
which guides it. For Kant the achievement of value requires 
the fulfilment of a rational will. For Marx, a rational 
will achieves value when the particular circumstances of a 
problem are clarified through science~ and on that basis 
action is successful in achieving its end. 
Marx rejected Kant's view of reason altogether. nThe 
world of the senses,n said Kant, nmay be extremely various.n2 
But ntheworld of reasoning always remains the same.n~ But 
Marx's whole view of man runs counter to this position# as 
well as his historical materialism. For him, reason is a 
derivative function to which the empirical world is prior 
both physically and logically. Reason does not always remain 
the same. Reason is itself a product of the empirical 
world and cannot, on Marxist principles, be said to be above 
and apart from it. 
As far as value theory is concerned, the essential 
question at issue here is this: to what extent does reason 
l. GI, ~5. 2. FPME, 70. 3. FPME, 70. 
validate value judgments? Kant argued that only reason 
validates such judgments. Marx argued that while reason 
is a great aid~ a surer basis is found in human puxposes 
guided. by science. 
Marx's cosmopolitanism cannot necessarily be used. as 
an argument to prove a universalistic, Kantian method.. 
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True enough, Marx addressed himself to all men. He intended. 
his theory to reach workingmen around the world. To be 
free of exploitation was not offered as a good for this or 
that group 1 but for all men,. But it is one thing to make 
a more or lese universalistic statement or value judgment; 
it is an entirely different thing to make its universality 
a condition of its validity. The latter Marx did not do. 
The difference between Kant and Marx at this point 
is put brilliantly by Sorel. He wrote: 
.,. .A Il est tree facile de reconnaitre dans le 
sooialisme contemporain deux conceptions ~thiques 
~~~~~~=s~eli;~~ ~;~i~e~t!t~~i~~~tl~a;~:i~re, 
inspir~e de traditions de la bourgeoisie lib~r­
ale, se rattache ~ la ~volution francaise; la 
eecond.e, ~velopp~e principalment dans l'influence 
de Marx, puise ses principles dans ltetude des 
conditions socialee produites par la grand in-
dustrie.l 
Kant belongs in the group characterized by the doctrine 
of nnatural right)n or the belief in an objective moral law. 
Marx, on the other handJ rejected all thought of a valid 
moral law independent of material circumstances. 
l. Art.(l~99), 13~. 
When Marx did discuss Kant, he referred to him dis-
paragingly as a spokesman for the German bourgeoisie of the 
eighteenth century. Kant's flgood will" and his moral postu-
lates were an expression of the historical period in the 
Germany of Kant 11 s time. Marx saw no other meaning in Kant 's 
formalism than a reflection of bourgeois liberalism, the 
proauct of a particular class and age. Marx wrote: 
The ei tuation in Germany at the end of the last 
oentury clearly reflected Kant's critique of 
practical reason. While the Frenoh bourgeoisie, 
through the greatest revolution known in history, 
came to power and conquered the European conti-
nent, and While the already freed English bourgeoi-
sie revolutionized industry and. subjugated India 
politically, and the rest of the world commer~ 
cially, the German bourgeoisie could only arrive 
at the 'good will.' Kant contented himself with 
the 1 good will,¥ without regard to consequences, 
and placed the fulfilment of this good will, the 
harmony between it and the necessities and im-
pulses of individuals, in another realm. Kantfs 
good will expressed perfectly the impotence, the 
depression, and the wretchedness of the German 
bourgeoisie.l 
Marx and Engels were no doubt thinking of Kant when they 
said derisively in the Manifesto~ 
The Socialist and Communist literature of France, 
a literature that originated under the pressure 
of a bourgeoisie in power, and that was the ex-
pression of the struggle against this power, was 
introduced into Germany at a time when the bourgeoi~ 
sie, in that ~ountry, had j~t begun its contest 
with feudal absolutism. 
German philosophers, would-be philosopheis, and 
men of letters eagerly seized on this literature, 
only forgetting that when these writings immigrated 
from France into Germany, French social conditions 
1. DID, 175. Translation by the author of this disser-
tation. 
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had not immigrated along with them. In contact 
with German social conditions, this French litera-
ture lost all its immediate practical significance, 
and assumed a purely literary aspect. Thus to 
the German philosophers of the lgth century, the 
demands of the first French Revolution were nothing 
more than the demands of npraatioal Reasonn in 
general, and the utterance of. the will of the 
revolutionary French-bourgeoisie signified in 
their eyes the laws of pure will, of will as it 
was bound to be, of true human will generally. 
The work of the German literati consisted solely 
in bringing the new French ideas into harmony 
with their ancient philosophical conscience, or 
rather, in annexing the French ideas without 
deserting their own philosophic point of view.l 
Marx frequently ridiculed all discussions of moral laws 
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and rights Which were based purely on reason, on a nliter-
aryn approach to the social problem, This is a chief theme 
of the Critique of the Gotha Program. To speak of natural 
rights, universally valid ideals, as in themselves valid 
or usefUl concepts was to becona a babbler. In his early 
article on Heinzen the property question was discussed. 
There Marx declared himself specifically against settling 
such questions by appeal to universal moral principle.2 
To Marx the issue of property was a purely historical, 
economic, and sociological question to be understood by a 
scientific analysis of the facts. In a similar discussion 
in the third volume of Capita1, Marx wrote: nto speak in 
such a case of natural justioe ••• is nonsense.n3 
For Marx the ideas of reason, taken abstractly and by 
themselves, were nothing. Ideas always have a social origin 
1. OM, 35. 3. CAP, III, 399. 
and a social function,l and it is always more illuminating 
to discover scientifically the social origin and function 
of ideas than to try to ascertain the possible social con-
sequence of this or that pure idea. 
Marx's value judgments were not based upon moral prin,... 
ciples rooted in reason, nor in any way even closely rese~ 
bling the Kantian approach. His judgments were not vali-
dated by reason. Joad argues that Marx's socialism was·not 
essentially ethical. He sees in Marx a. great weakness at 
just this point, citing his emphasis on means and scientific 
analysis, rather than ethical, valid, human ends. As a 
consequence, he says, Marxists work not for human better-
ment, but merely act nunder the sign of economic fatality.n2 
Selsam is perhaps the extremest representative of this 
view, arguing that even in the Manifest0 there are no 
ethical judgments at all.; 
A clear example of Marxts approach is the concept of 
surplus .... va.lue. Marx believed that the workingmen were 
exploited. He did not base this judgment on a.ny general 
ethical principle. It can be shown that.almost every ethi-
cal principle which could be used to justify the theory of 
surplus-value is emphatically rejected by Marx (such as•the 
principle of absolute equality). The judgment, rather, was 
based on an analysis of the mechanics of the capitalistic 
;. Selsam, Art.(l9~), 26. 
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system of production. The briefest and sharpest statement 
of the empirical basis for the doctrine of exploitation is 
found in Wage-labor and Capital,l although it is stated 
in ma.ny other places. Marx based his judgment on his analy-
sis whioh indicated that the worker put more into the pro-
duction system than he got back. This relationship is 
statistically determinable, and even the aotual percentage 
of exploitation can be determined. When Marx allied hi~ 
self with the workers on these grounds he implied no die-
tinct ethical theory, any more than did Robinhood when he 
gave to the poor. The only difference was that Marx added 
a sophisticated economic analysis to his emotional bias, 
as Robinhood did not. 
All this is not to deny that Marx did or would make 
ethical or other value judgments identical to those of 
persons holding a Kantian view. Kant and Marx were both 
against slavery. But the difference lies in what is taken 
as the validating ground of those judgments. Ka.nt :found 
this validating basis in reason, Marx in practical activity 
guided by empirical science. 
(2) Form vs. Content. 
For Kant, the only absolutely good thing in the world 
was a good will.2 Goodness was a formal quality, dependent 
upon the disposition of the :free will.3 When an individual 
consciously wills in accordance with rational moral laws, 
3. FPME, ll. 
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there is goodness. This goodness is entirely independent 
of all empirical oircumstances~l The truest ethical goal 
for the individual is a certain purity of will. This is 
Kant's ethical formalism. 
With Marx it was very different. The circumstances 
which condition the will and the consequences of its action 
are all impo~tant in the formation of ethical judgments. 
An ethical law or judgment which is formed completely inde-
pendent of all empirical content is not so much invalid, 
as utterly useless. For Kant nexperience ••• is, alas, the 
mother of illusion.n2 But for Marx, the content of experw 
ience is both the source of value principles and the only 
meaningful reference of those principles. 
The clearest evidence of Marx's opposition to Kant 
at this point lies in his direct refutation and rejection 
of ethical idealism. In the Critigue of the Gotha Program, 
wherein Marx makes a number of what might be called typi-
cally X:antian value judgment.s., the centr~l theme is the 
futility of programs and theories based on abstract ethical 
ideals. Lassa.lle's central error,. as chief author of the 
Gotha Program, was his insertion of such ethical ideals a.s 
economic justice and human rights in the workers' program 
and strategy. Marx wrote! 
I have dealt more at length with the 'undiminished 
proceeds of labour' on the one hand, and with 
'equal right' and 'equitable distribution' on the 
other, in order to show what a crime it is to 
2. CPR, B375• 
attempt, on the one hand, to force on our party 
again~ as dogmas, ideas which in a certain period 
had some meaning but have now become obsolete 
rubbishy phrases, while on the other, perverting 
the realistic outlook, which has cost so much 
effort to instill into the party, but which has 
now taken root in it, by means of ideological 
nonsense about 'rightt and other trash common 
among the democrats and French Socialists.l 
Lassalle had 'perverted• the thinking of the workers by 
including Kantian ideals in their published pronouncements.2 
The most telling statement in the criticism of Lassalle 
and his program~ revealing Marx's own ethical approach and 
his antithesis to Kant, is the following~ 
Right can never be higher than the economic 
structure of society and the cultural develop-
ment thereby determined.3 
The implications of this statement are clear. First, it 
follows that ordinarily ethical ideals, concepts of right, 
which are beyond the level of possible attainment in present 
society are not even thought of. But, second, when they 
are thought of, as in Kant, they are utterly useless, be-
cause they are simply not applicable. Empirically, they 
have nothing to do with pr·esent tasks and present possible 
achievements. 
A great deal of The German Ideo logy is an a.tt ack on 
ethical idealism. Writers who, as did Kant, attack the 
problems of society from the standpoint of ethical ideals 
alone are called by Marx n11tera.ry sooialistsa or atrue 
l. OGP I 10 .. 
2. No doubt Marx's personal grudges against Lassa.lle in-
fluenced these judgments. 
3. OGP I 10. 
socialists.nl The difficulty with such thinkers is that: 
they are concerned with the 'most reasonable' 
social order instead of with the needs of a 
particular olass and time. The real state of 
affairs escapes these •true socialists, t 
steeped as they are in their German ideology.2 
1!4 
This feature of Marx's thought comes out even more strongly 
in his correspondence. In a letter to Engels Maxx expressed 
regret that some of his associates required him to insert, 
in a statement which he wrote for the International Work-
ingmen's Association~ several phrases sueh as 'duty,' 
1right,t and 'truth, morality~ and justioe.t3 In a letter 
to Kugelmann Marx included a brief on BakUnin, criticizing 
a program he offered to a workerst congress as full of 
nempty babblings" sueh as n equality of olasses," and "abo-
lition of the right of inheritanoe. 114 
This opposition to Ka:ntia.n idealism was based on the 
assumption that nor.ms, ethical principles~ and ideals have 
no value or significance apart from the historical oontext 
of their authors, Ethical principles are, like all other 
concepts and theory, part of the problem solving equipment 
of man. UAll social life is essentially practioa.l, 11 said 
Marx,5 Normative principles rise from the social pra.otioe 
of men and aid social progress. Therefore, to be praoti~ 
oa.lly effective, a norm must be addressed to a speoifio, 
pra.otica.l problem, and must be adapted to the peculiar 
l. GI, 79. 
2. GI~ 79• 
3. COR~ 162. 
4. LDK, 102. 
5. 11Theses,n VIII. 
conditions of that problem, Thus, ethieal standards are 
like any other standards. A ratio of three to two between 
the length of the wing and the length of the fuselage of 
an airplane may or may not be an absolute. universal con-
dition of heavier than air flight. But that is beside the 
point. The question is. will such an airplane fly; and 
will airplanes bUilt on other ratios also fly? So with 
ethical ideals and standards: will they attain the prac-
tical purposes for which they are designed? That was Ma.rx1 s 
question, and it explains his approach to e~hios and norms 
of all kinds. 
Marx's attention to content, rather than form~listio 
theory1 is everyWhere evident. Capital itself is a great 
illustration of this. Marx's view of capitalism wa.s based 
not essentially on principles of justice, but upon a twenty-
five hundred page empirical analysis of the material con-
tent of capitalism as a functioning economic system. Marx's 
particular doctrines, many of which ran directly counter 
to his own long range ideals, were framed in the_light of 
the particular historical context in whioh he lived. The 
olass~struggle and the revolutionary strategy are examples. 
Neither of these was desirable in itself, but both were 
demanded, Marx thought. by the immediate historical situa-
tion. Marx· was not concerned, as he said, with "the most 
reasonable social order," but rather with "the needs of· a 
particular class and time.wl 
1., GI, 79• 
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~wo illustrations may serve to sharpen the distinction 
between Kant and Marx at this point. The first is their 
respective views on the problem of freedom. Kant wrote 
in the Critique of Pure Reason a great and noble expression 
of the ideal of freedom. Kant said! 
A constitution allowing the greatest possible 
human freedom in accordance with laws by which 
the freedom of each is made to be consistent 
with that of all others--I do not speak of the 
greatest happiness, for this will follow of it-
self--is at any rate a necessary idea, which must 
be taken as fundamental not only in first pro-jecting a constitution but in all its laws. For 
at the start we are required to abstract from 
the actually existing hindrances, which, it may 
be, do not arise unavoidably out of human nature, 
but rather are due to a quite removable cause, 
the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of 
laws.l 
At first glance this passage seems clearly to be one of . 
the sources of Marx's view of freedom. Especially strik-
ing is Kant's desire for a constitution granting freedom, 
but freedom that is consistent with the freedom of all--
implying the same sort of limitations on individual free-
dom which Marx regarded as necessary. Marx's statement in 
the Manifesto to the effect that the free development of 
each is the condition of the free developmnt of all seems 
to be almost a direct quotation from Kanto But, while 
there is here clear evidence of influence, the view expressed 
by Kant is really quite different from Marx's. Kant seems 
to take a view which Marx certainly regarded as erroneous, 
1. Kant, CPR, B373. 
the view that freedom is basically a constitutional ques-
tion. Kant believed, apparently, that the means to general 
human freedom was a good constitution. Freedom was a politi-
cal question. But Marx's view~ as stated above, was very 
different from this. For Marx freedom is a question in-
volving the whole political, economic, social, and cultural 
context. Political considerations alone were largely formal 
matters, incidental to the main pxoblem, namely, the estab-
lishment of those material and social conditions which 
will make freedom possible. Once the material conditions 
of freedom are established, political or constitutional 
freedom would follow as a matter of course, Marx believed. 
A seoond illustration concerns the nature of the sooial 
problem itself. For Kant social injustice was ndue to a 
quite removable cause, the neglect of pure ideas in the 
making of laws.nl The social problem was a matter of bad 
laws, and it could be solved by writing good laws. But 
according to Marx laws were only part of the nsuperstructuren 
of society, a superstructure which is determined by the 
social process, and rarely by ideas, pure or impure. No 
amount of genius in authoring constitutions, Marx believed~ 
could solve the social problem. The social problem could 
be solved only by operating on the content of the social 
process, and not by changing the external forms of social 
life. 
l. Kant, CPR, B373• 
(3) Personalism vs .. Humanism. 
One of the chief arguments for the Kantian interpre-
tation of Marx is the urespect for personality" which was 
supposed to be common to both. That Kant made respeot for 
personality a fundamental ethioal principle and that Marx 
was concerned about human beings oannot be doubted. But 
this similarity~ apparently, tends to conceal the basio 
difference between Kant's personalism and Marx's humanis~­
as the latter is revealed to be on the historioal approach 
to ~x. The difference is suggested by the following 
statements, first by Kant, then by Marx. 
Morality, and humanity as capable of it, alone 
possesses dignity,l 
Thus the imperative: 
Aot so that in your own person as well as in 
the person of every other you are treating man-
kind also as an end, never merely as a means.2 
Marx: 
The real intellectual wealth of the individual 
depends entirely on the wealth of his real oon-
nections.3 
This sum of productive foroes ••• is the real basis 
of what the philosophers have oonoeived as uaub-
stanoeu and flessence of man.w4 
With this view of man Marx goes on to say! 
When, for example, he (Feuerbaoh or any idealist) 
sees instead of healthy men a crowd of scrofu-
lous, overworked and consumptive starvelings, he 
l .. FPME, 53• 
2. FPME, ~7. 3 •• GI, 27. 4 GI, 29. 
is compelled to take refuge in the 1 higher per-
ception• and in the ideal 'compensation of the 
species,' and thus to relapse into idealism at 
the very point where the communist materialist 
sees the necessity, and at the same time the 
condition, of a transformation both of industry 
and of the social struoture.l 
These quotations should serve to make olear the difference 
between Kant 1 s personalism and Marx's humanism. It is 
the difference between idealism and materialism. 
In the first plaoe, it is evident that while both Kant 
and Marx did actually place a high value on manJ they de-
fined man differently. Kant sees in the fact that man is 
a moral being his chief distinguishing feature and the ground 
of hie worth. Marx, on the other hand, stresses biological, 
sociological, developmental aspects in his view of man. 
Kant defines man chiefly by reference to the psyche, while 
Marx stressed materialistic categories. Marx's emphasis 
on man as a total, physical, functioning organism clearly 
led to a view of mants moral destiny and mission that was 
distinct from Kant's. Thus Kant made morality a psychic 
fact, a quality of the will, whereas for Marx morality was 
an economic, social, and material fact as well as psychic. 
A second important distinction concerns the way in 
whioh worth is attributed to man. For Kant worth is a 
more or less absolute quality, predicated of all men, be-
cause every man is capable of morality. The worth of ma.n. 
is rooted in a principle. But Marx ridiculed all statements 
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of the essence or universal attributes of man as metaphysi-
cal nonsense. The only valid statements about man, as with 
anything else, were empirical generalizations based on obser-
vations of individual, living men. Worth was not an attri-
bute of man simply by virtue of man's participation in uni-
versal reason. Rather, the Wintellectual wealth of the 
individualw depends on his Wreal oonneotions.n The worth 
of indi vidua.ls may and. will vary from man to ma.n. Some 
men are not worth as muoh, either to themselves or to others~ 
as some other men are worth. The dehumanized factory oper-
ative simply does not have the same dignity as the clergy-
man. That is why it is necessary for the communist, Marx 
said, to operate directly on the conditions of men, so 
that real worth would be more widely possible. among men. 
But the final, and most crucial, question is the ground 
for attributing worth to any man. Why was Marx conoerned 
about the worth of other men, and in increasing their worth 
to themselves and others? If some men were worthless, 
then why were they an object for concern? It is still true 
that Marx aoted as though he believed that the worth of 
the individual was a universal faot. Marx may never have 
. used the phrase, 11respeot for personality, 11 but he did say1 
"man is the supreme being for mankind." Why? Does he not, 
after all, oome baok to an absolute, postulated norm~in 
a thoroughly Xantian spirit? 
On the historical interpretation the answer is no. 
This may be argued by recalling the context of Marx's words 
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that 11man is the highest being for mankind." It should be 
remembered that this phrase was preceded by the words: 11The 
oritioism of religion ends with the doctrine that •••• nl 
These words are the olue to Marx's theoretical basis for 
his doctrine of the primacy of human beings, 
The explanation is this. First~ what was Marx's "criti-
cism of religion?" In essence it was that religion is not 
man•s response to God, but instead is man's. creation. 
Religion was oreated by men, for human purposes. The object 
of religion, God~ was a human creation, an idea of the 
human mind. Moreover~ what was true of religion was true 
of all other expressions of man's consciousness as well as 
all social and historical institutions. This yields the 
oonolusion that every social faot oan be traoed ultimately 
to human purposes, executed by individuals in interaction 
with the material and social environment.2 Social life 
is practical. Every social aot is an attempt to solve a 
praotioa.l problem, although many times the solution falls 
short of its purpose~ and at other times the solution is 
a spurious one (as religion and the state) • But even though 
in the maze of ideas~ traditions~ and institutions the 
original purpose is lost~ and man becomes the slave of his 
creature, it is still true that all social facts are func-
tions of human purposes. Without human purposes and needs, 
l, Marx, Art.(lg44)Dl, 614-615. 
2. Marx1s statement that "all natural ~remises ••• (are) the 
creatures of men" may be recalled ~GI, 70). 
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every sooial·and historical faot would lose its reason for 
existence, and therefore its value. In short~ flman is the 
measure. 11 Only human purposes can oon:fer value., and there-
fore only human beings are worthwhile. Value is real only 
by virtue of human purposes simply because the fulfilment 
of their purposes is all men wanto This is not only obvious• 
Marx believed., but tautological. Thus to say that lfma,n is 
the highest being for mankind11 is simply to _paraphrase a 
faot. In this sophisticated way Marx built the theoretical 
basis for what is, after all, instinctively felt by nearly 
everyone~ namely, that human beings possess worth, and all 
human beings should be treated deoently. 
5. Oonolusion. 
After reviewing the two opposed oases, it seems evident 
that both are strong. Both are well founded on the evidence 
found in Marx1 s own thought. This suggests that the oonfliot 
really resides in Marx, and is not simply a quarrel among 
post-Marxian intellectuals. The fact is that Marxts thought 
really goes in two (or more} directions. There is Marx the 
moralist, the revolutionary, the friend of man; and there 
is Marx the aloof, oold1 soientifio observer of history.l 
Throughout this dissertation the naturalistic inter-
pretation has been favored. The reason for this lies in 
1. Mehring distinguishes Marx the "fightern and Marx 
the ~thinker.n The former, he believes, always 
took precedence (KM, xxi). 
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the nature of the evidence. Most of the proof for the 
Xantian interpretation is drawn from Marx's propaganda 
pieces (the Manifesto, chiefly) and from incidental state-
ments and judgments in other works. On the other hand, 
the evidence for the historical interpretation is based 
on passages where Marx entered upon explicit discussions 
of theory, method, the basis of judgments, and so on. 
Marx's correspondence, also, wherein he wrote not for the 
public, and Where he was more likely to reveal his inner 
thoughts, seems to favor the naturalistic interpretation. 
Furthermore, it would seem that where there is doubt, it 
is safer to accept a man's own judgment about what he 
thought, than someone else's judgment. Marx did not think 
of himself as Kantian. He did think of himself as un-
Xantian, and as historical, sociological, and scientific 
in his thought. 
This is not to deny the evidence of Xantian influence 
in Marx. The evidence is too strong to deny. The general 
conclusion indicated is that Marx's essential theory was 
historical and sociological, but also that there is a very 
strong Kantian tendency. These two phases at certain points 
issued in conflicts Which Marx never really resolved. 
1. Introduction. 
CHAPTER V 
DISVALUE 
19~ 
The idea of disvalue may be taken in several different 
senses. Disvalue may be thought of as the absence of good, 
as in Aquinas. 1 Or, it may be thought of as anything which 
is opposed to or obstructs the good, that is, instrumental 
evil. Finally 1 disvalue may be thought of as a quality of 
positive facts 1 a quality which is esteemed to be bad, pain-
ful, or ugly. In general, the same metaphysical problems 
which present themselves in analyzing the concept of value, 
appear in treating the problem of disvalue. 
For the purposes of this chapter 1 a simple generic 
definition of disvalue may be given. Disvalue is any state 
of affairs which is esteemed to be inherently disliked or 
offensive. Synonyms of disvalue are bad or evil. The 
problem here is simply to discover what Marx considered to 
be bad1 and why. 
Various theories of evil have appeared in the history 
of thought. Socrates found in error the souroe of evil. 
Many thinkers (especially Spinoza) have held that there is 
no objective evil. The universe is neutral to good and 
evil, and our estimates of evil are purely subjective. Plato 
l. ISA, 26g. 
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found evil's source in giving oneself up to bodily pleasures 
exclusively (Phaedo; g3), and, in general, allowing the ani-
mal part of the soul to rule the rational part. Leibniz 
distinguished natural and moral evil, and accounted for 
natural evil as punishment for moral evil. 
This latter point, from Leibniz, suggests a further 
distinction. Moral evil is disvalue which is consequent 
upon individual h'I.U.D.a.Xl choices. Natural evil is an evil in 
nature (earthquakes and tornadoes) for which no human can 
be accounted responsible. 
Marx1 s thought was concerned entirely with what is 
called moral evil. There is no attempt to account metaphys-
ically for evil. Marx was concerned with nature only in 
the interest of finding ways to control it, and subvert it 
to human purposes. He did not attempt to explain why there 
were tornadoes--either from a philosophical or meteorologi-
cal standpoint. His interest was confined to areas wherein 
effective human action was possible. 
There is considerably more material in Marx about dis-
value than about value. Marx was a critic, a .revolutionary, 
a seeker of change. As such he was deeply interested in 
changing the v~rld from its present evil state of affairs, 
but was not so clear about what the world should. become. 
At any rate, there is a richness of material in Marx deal-
ing with evil--not theory of evil--but descriptions of evil. 
These descriptions reflect Marx's humanism. 
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2. Fetishism. 
i. The Concept of Fetishism. 
In the thought of Karl Marx, the most prolific source of 
evil is fetishism. This concept is defined in a chapter 
titled, flThe Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereot.nl 
The concept is an analogy drawn from primitive religion. In 
general, fetishism is the act of attributing powers to things, 
powers which in reality they do not possess. Thus when the 
primitive rubs a doll to relieve his illness, he is making 
a fetish of the doll. The doll really has no power to cure 
illness. When a value is attributed to a thing when it 
really has no value, or when value is attributed in an irra-
tional way, there is fetishism in the realm of values.2 
In the definition of fetishism there are two essentials. 
First, the object which is made a fetish is always a human 
creation. In the case of the primitive it is the doll. In 
the case of the modern, it is the capitalistic system, In 
the second place, the object is regarded as though it were 
independent of human activity, having a reality and powers of 
its own, and engaging in action according to a realm of law 
beyond human control. 
The fundamental form of fetishism in Marx's thought was 
the fetishism of commodities and commodity produotion4 But 
the concept has universal application~ There are many fetish~ 
Some of these will be cited below. 
2. See Marx, CAP, I, 90-96. 
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ii. Religion and Fetishism. 
A further necessary step in expounding Marx1s concept of 
fetishism is an examination of his view of religion, and the 
relation of that view to the general problem of value. Marx•s 
view of religion has already been touched on. But a fuller 
statement is now in order. 
Fetishism is a result of the inability to distinguish 
reality from unreality. In fetishism, unreality is mistaken 
for reality. This, Marx believed, was the very error whioh 
marks all religious thought and action. Fetishism is the 
nreligiousn way of thinking; and all religion is fetishism. 
The passage cited above wherein Marx gave the first 
principle in his view of religion may be repeated! 
To find an analogy (to the fetishism of commodities), 
we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions 
of the religious world. In that world the produc-
tions of the human brain appear as independent 
beings endowed with life, and entering into rela-
tion both with one another and the human race.l 
Thus, for example, from human life and activity has emerged 
the conception of God. Men attribute to God reality and 
great powers. God is thought to have created the world and 
to be in control of it. But, Marx thought, God is merely a 
creation of men, an idea in the human brain.2 God has no 
reality and no power, except as an idea. 
This conception is the first principle of Marx's philos~ 
ophy of religion, if it may be called that. To think in a 
l. Marx, CAP, I, e;. 
2. Marx: DMan makes religion, religion does not make man» 
[Art.(lg44)Dl, 607]e 
religious manner is to attribute reality to unreality, to 
hypostatize the creations of the hu.ma.n brain and human activ--
ity in general. Thinking religiously is thinking erroneously~ 
and this is the source of a multitude of evils, 
The source of this Marxist view is clearly indicated 
in Gregaine 1s account of Feuerbaoh's conception of religion. 
Aux yeux de Feuerbach, la religion constitue une 
complication erronnee~ inutile, fallacieuse et 
profon~ment muisibleo•o•LTerreux findamentale 
de la religion est de oroire qu'un etre tel que 
Dieu, c 1est-a-dire en etre personnel et purement 
spirituel, pourrait ~tre reellement distinct de 
l~homme, posseder une existence ! lui.l -
Religion is a.n. evil, first 1 because it violates the 
principles of the discovery of value noted in the first 
chapter, and second, it violates the principles of the reali-
zation of value noted in the second chapter. The principle 
of consciousness, especially, is violated, Religion is 
false consciousness. 
Why, then, does religion arise and flourish? The Marx-
ist answer to this question is well known. Religion arose 
as a nreflex of the real world,n2 which served to explain 
nature and society to men who could not understand nature 
and sooiety.3 Religion is the refuge of ignorance, to use 
Spinozats well worn phrase. 
Religion is especially satisfying to those who are 
subjected to extxeme, meaningless suffering which is hard 
l. SPD, 153. 
2. CAP, I, 91. 
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to bear and harder to understand. ~Religious misery is an 
expression of real misery and. a protest against real misery."l 
Thus religion is a reflection, but a true reflection~of 
misery. "This state and this society produce religion, a 
perverted world consciousness, because they are a perverted 
world."2 
The desire for consolation serves to perpetuate reli-
gion. This desire occupies a prominent place in Marx1 s 
analysis. In Marx's article on Hegel are found the famous 
words! 
Religion is the general theory of this world, its 
encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular 
:form, its spiritual Point dthonneur, its enthusi-
asm, its moral sanction, its solemn :fulfilment, 
its general solace and justifioationo It is the 
fantastic real~zation of the human being, because 
man possesses no aotuality., •• Religion is the 
moan of the oppressed creature, the spirit of ~ 
heartless world, and the spirit of spiritless 
conditions. It is the opium of the people.3 
Here is the second basic point in Marx's view of religion. 
Religious ideas arise as efforts to explain or give intel-
··leotua.l satisfaction, and to console or give emotional satis-
faction. 
But then, another question arises. Why, even in a 
scientific age, does religion flourish? Onoe the illusory 
character of religion is made known, the intellectual and 
emotional satisfaction which it offers should be nullified. 
Still, religioh persists. Why? 
Once established, Marx held, religion can be manipu-
lated to salve the consciences and enhance the purposes of 
the ruling class. Religion becomes .a device, more or leas 
consciously used, to keep the exploited in subjection. 
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That religious faith is adopted which is best suited to the 
special purposes of the ruling class. Christianity, espe-
cially in its Protestant form, Marx believed, is most suited 
to the purposes of the ruling class in capitalism.l 
The conception of religion as an instrument of oppres-
sion is found most clearly stated in the Manifesto. The 
worker has lea~ned, says Marx, that n1aw, morality, reli-
gion are ••• so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk 
in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.n2 And again: 
nThe parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord.n3 
Religion comes to the aid of the ruling class in its 
mission of exploitation by cultivating among the masses an 
attitude of acquiescent acceptance and by providing a. "front" 
for the dissemination of ruling class ideas. Institutional 
religion, in sum, is an instrument of social control--an 
instrument which the upper class is able to wield to its 
own ad.va.nt age. 
What led Marx to adopt a view so derogatory of reli-
gion? The answer is not to be found in any merely theoret-
ical dissatisfaction with religion. Rather, it is to be 
l. CAP, I, 91, 303 footnote. 
2. OM, 20. 
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found in Marx's intense conviotion of the hypocrisy of 
institutional religion. He looked at religion as a socio-
logical fact and found it bad. It was with this preposses-
sion that Marx came to build his case against religion. 
Frequently Marx's sardonic comments on hypocrisy are 
found in footnotes~ In one Marx gave an account of several 
factory owners who were accused of working boys~ twelve to 
fifteen years old~ for thirty hours without a break, in 
violation of the factory laws. Of them and their trial 
he wrote<: 
The accused gentlemen affirm in lieu of taking 
an oath--as quakers they were too scrupulously 
religious to take a.n oath--.that they had~ in their 
great compassion for the unhappy children~ allowed 
them four hours for sleep~ but the obstinate child-
ren absolutely would not go to bed •••• Dryden antici~ 
pated these gentry: 
'Fox fUll fraught in seeming sancti ty1 
That feared a.n oa~h, but like the devil would lie, 
That look1 d like Lent, and had the holy leer, 
And durst not sinl before he said his prayer lt1 
Concerning observation of the Sabbath~ Marx wrote: 
In England even now occasionally in rural dis-
tricts a labourer is condemned to imprisonment 
for desecrating the Sabbath~ by working in his 
front garden. The same labourer is punished 
:for breach of contract if he remains away from 
his metal~ paper~ or glass works on the Sunday, 
even if it be from a religious whim. The ortho-
dox Parliament will hear nothing of Sabbath-
breaking if it occurs in the process of expand-
ing capital. 2 
Marx was turned from Christianity and all religion in 
large part by his disgust with the churchmen of England. 
2. CAP~ I, 291 fn. 
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These were the factory owners and operators, the professional 
., 
classes, and others, who participated in social injustice 
and the wholesale destruction of human beings. These were 
persons whose morality was generally selfish, sensuous, and 
gross. These were the nrespectable people.n These, in 
Marx's words, would nshow their Christianity by the humilityl 
with which they bear the over-work, the privations, and the 
hunger of others.nl 
Marx was at his best as a critic of institutional reli-
gion when he revealed its failure to meet its own announced 
standards. In this role Marx was at his best stylistically, 
is hardest to refute, and made his greatest contribution 
to the cause of truth and religion. 
What then would Marx do with religion? The answer is 
simple. He would eliminate it. Of course, religion cannot 
be simply abolished.. Just as with every other historical 
phenomenon, religion has its historical conditions, and 
cannot be eliminated until the historical conditions are 
eliminated. Nevertheless! 
Abolition of religion as the illusory happiness 
of the people is an advance in the people's real 
happiness. The advancement which gives up illu-
sions about the real situation is an advancement 
toward giving up the situation itself which re~ 
quires illusions. Criticism of religion is there-
fore in essence criticism of the vale of sorrows 
whose holy appearance is religion.2 
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The solution to the problem lies in a full and perfect 
explication of the world as it really is. The answer to 
religion, on Marx's principles, is education, investigation1 
and action. Marx would replace religion with science, 
false consciousness with true consciousness. 
A great deal may be said in criticism of Marx's view 
of religion. But before reviewing some of the more cogent 
criticisms, the position may be reviewed. There are five 
points. First, religion is the attitude of unreality, of 
fetishism. It is the attitude which regards creations of 
the human mind as real beings, independent of men, and pos-
sessed of causal power. Second, religion is a nreflexn of 
the world which was inspired by a desire for explanation 
of the unknown. Third, as a matter of fact, religion is 
an instrument of social control and oppression. Fourth, 
hypocrisy pervades institutional religion. Fifth, religion 
should and will be displaced as man advances. 
The first, and most obvious, answer to this position 
is its studied disregard of the pure, wholesome, and so-
cially desirable individuals and institutions which are 
by no means absent from_religious history. Marx could have 
maintained the substance of his theoretical case, and still 
have given credit where credit is due. It is especially 
unexplainable why Marx did not feel some sympathy and admira-
tion for religious reformerslj But even these, especially 
Luther, are treated disparagingly. 
Second3 Marx completely ignored the theoretical case 
for religion. Sheed makes a great deal of this.l Marx 
20~ 
can partially be excused on the grounds that he never set 
out to deal with religious doctrines as such. Nonetheless, 
Marx did say a good deal about religion. Further 1 he al-
ways treated religion as a purely sociological phenomenon. 
There is throughout, the tacit assumption that the theoreti-
cal case for religion is nonsense and not worthy even of 
consideration. This is satisfactory to those who come to 
his writings with an anti-religious bias. But it leaves 
unsatisfied the reader who says, ~Religion has been abused; 
still, is it not true?ft 
Finally, the criticism is made that Marxism itself is 
a religion, that Marx opposed the religions of his day 
chiefly because they were his competitors. Marx, it is 
said, was strongly influenced by the messianic conscious-
ness of his Jewish forebears. Many of his doctrines are 
viewed as religious in form (religious in the bad sense 
of the word). The doctrine of historical materialism, for 
instance, is viewed as a paraphrase of the doctrine of 
original sin. This whole criticism is given substance by 
the conduct of contemporary Marxists whose reverence for 
the scriptures (OAP), faith in the coming of the kingdom 
(communist society), dogmatism, and zeal associate them 
with certain features common in so~ phases of institutional 
l. OAM, l39-l4o. 
religion. Menczerl and others take this general view of 
Marxism. 
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This whole oritioism is in fact misleading and incor-
rect. It appears to be designed more to discredit Marx thm 
to illumine his real teachings. If it can be shown that 
Marxism itself is guilty of all those charges lodged by 
Marx against religion, then obviously the Marxist criticism 
of religion is weakened. But this is a dangerous and fool-
ish way to oppose the Marxist attack. To admit that Marxism 
is nreligiousn is both to give undue credit to Marx and 
implicitly to discredit all religiono 
Marx denied the existence of God; he adopted a scien-
tific, anti-supernatural method; he made man, rather than 
God, the center of the universe} he disdained metaphysical 
affirmations of all kinds. The only feature in Marx's writ-
ings whioh associates him in any way with the religious 
consciousness Was his moral enthusiasm. But interpretations 
of Marx which detect the form of theological doctrines are 
based on a loose type of analogy which couJ.d be applied to 
almost any writer who ever dealt with human affairs. There 
is nothing of religion in Marx's theory. 
This section on Marx's view of religion has been in-
cluded in order to explicate the Marxist doctrine of fetish-
ism. Religion, like fetishism, is the error of mistaking 
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the unreai for the real. In rel~gion man makes himself 
the slave of his own creation .. 1 In religion~ man attributes 
independent reality and power to the products of his own 
thinking. In the realm of values~ fetishism and the nreli-
gioue errorn ocour when value is attributed to something 
which really has no value, or does not have it in the sense 
supposed .. 
iii. TYPes of Fetishism. 
(1) The Fetishism of Commodity Production4 
The principal type of fetishism for Marx, as was indi-
cated above~ is the fetishism of commodities and commodity 
production. Under the capitalistic system the manufactured 
article oomes to have a significance which goes far beyond 
its nature as a simple product of human labor, created for 
the purpose of satisfying a simple human want. The commodity 
comes to be treated as an end in itself~ as the ultimate 
economic fact. Producing co:romodi ties, rather than satisfy-
ing human needs, becomes the controlling purpose of the 
eoonomio system. 
1. Marx wrote: tiThe more the worker expresses himself, and 
masters the foreign, external world, which he creates 
over against himself, the poorer he is himself, his 
inner world, and the lese it belongs to him. Such is 
the case with religion. The more man gives to God, the 
less he keeps for himself. The worker places his life 
in the object, but it belongs no longer to him, but to 
the object. The greater, therefore, this activity, the 
more does the worker lose. Whatever is the product of 
his labor is not his. The greater the product, the less 
he is himself. The expression of the worker in his 
product has this significance, not only that his labor 
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The following passage~ drawn from the section on 9 The 
Fetishism of Commodities,u is a clear and simple expression 
of MarxTs concept. 
A commodity appears, at first .sight~ a very trivial 
thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows 
that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding 
in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. 
So far as it is a value in use, there is nothing 
mysterious about it, whether we consider it from 
the point of view that by its properties it is 
capable of satisfying human wants, or from the 
point that those properties are the product of 
human labour.. It is as clear as noon-day, that 
man, by his industry, changes the forms of the 
materials furnished by nature, in such a way as to 
make them useful to him.~ •• But, so soon as it 
steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into 
something tra.nscendent •••• Whence, then, arises 
the enigmatical character of the product of labour, 
so soon as it assumes the form of commodities? 
Clearly from this form itself •••• A commodity is 
therefore a mysterious thiny, simply because in it 
the social character of men s labour appears to 
them as an objective character stamped upon the pro-
duct of that labour.,. •• It is a definite social rela-
tion between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the 
fantastic form of a relation between things. In 
order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have 
recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the re-
ligious world •••• This I call the Fetishism which 
attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon 
as they are produced as oommodities.l 
Commodities are human creations. A man makes a· table. 
But when the table is placed on the market for sale, it is 
a commodity., As such, its activity is determined not by 
the table's practical value to human beings) but by the 
fluctuations of the market, the law of supply and demand, 
exists as object to him, as external, alienated, foreign 
to him, and becomes an independent power over against 
him but also that life, which he has invested in the obj~ct, has become foreign and hostile to himu (ekM, g3-g~). 
1. CAP' I I g)._g:;. 
and a variety of other economic conditions which are re-
garded as objective laws and facts of a realm to which men 
can only conform. If the market requires it, the table may 
be kept in a warehouse and never used. Or, it may be put 
to some foreign purpose (e.g. firewood). This is the fe-
tishism of cor~dities. · 
This fetishism is expressed in an epigram well known 
among socialists--"food is produced to be sold, rather tha.n 
eaten.," A consequence was nthe incredible adulteration of 
bread, especially in Londononl Production of goods for 
their intrinsic use-value becomes incidental to the capital-
ist. Wrote Marx: 
The product appropriated by the capitalist is a 
use-value, as yarn, for example, or boots. But, 
although boots are, in one sense, the basis of 
all social progress, and our capitalist is a de-
cided 'progressist, 1 yet he does not manufacture 
boots for their own sake. Use-value is by no 
means, the thing 'guton aime pour lui-m~m~ 1 in 
the production of commodities. use-values are 
only produced by capitalists, because, and in so 
far as, they are the material substratum, the 
depositaries of exchange-value.2 
The capitalist does not produce a commodity on 
its own account, he does not care for its use-
value, nor does he consume it personally. The 
product in which the capitalist is really inter-
ested is not the tangible product itself, but 
the excess of the value of the product over the 
value of the capital assimilated by it.3 
Capital and its self-eXpansion appear as the 
starting and closing point, as the motive and 
l. Marx, CAP, I 1 273. 
2. CAP, I I 207. 
3. CAP, III, 53-5~. 
aim of production •••• Production is mere1y produc-
tion for capita1, and not vice versa, the means 
of production mere means for an ever expanding 
system of the 1ife process for the benefit of the 
society of produaers.l 
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Goods are produced for profit, not use. The end is not 
va1ue, but exchange-va1ue and surplus-va1ue. Marx expresses 
himse1f somewhat ~ore graphica1ly in this passage! 
So fa.r a.s he (the capita1ist) is personified 
capital, it is not values in use and the enjoy~ 
ment of them., but exchange-value and its augmenta-
tion, that spur him into action. Fana.tical1y 
bent on making value expand itself, he ruthlessly 
forces the human race to produce for production1 s 
sa.ke.2 
The sole determinant o£ production is the possibility 
of making a profit. If the capitalist can make no profit 
in a given business, he leaves the business. If a profit 
can be made, though at the expense of the laborer and the 
consuming public, the capita1ist stays in business and 
makes his profit. When the capitalist discovers that the 
requirements of the market conflict with rational social 
purposes and ends, he has no choice but to be obedient to 
the market fetish. Otherwise, he would commit suicide as 
a capitalist. 
This latter point, that the capitalist has no real 
choice, suggests an interesting critical point with respect 
to interpretation of Marx. In his attacks on capitalism 
and the capitalist, Marx never intended to hold the indi-
vidual capitalist an object of special blame. Marx thought 
1. Marx, CAP, III, 293. 2.. CAP I I' 649 • 
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that the individual capitalist was caught in the web of 
the system just as much as was the individual worker. Marx 
made this clear in the Preface to hie Oapital.l 
Men have created the capitalist system. But the crea-
ture is no longer the tool of man, an instrument of his own 
purposes. The system has become a monster to which unques-
tioning obedience must be paid. The result is that nworld 
trade turns almost entirely round the needs, not of indi-
vidual consumption, but of production.n2 Further--nthe 
secret of bourgeois production ••• (is) its subjection to the 
domination of exchange value.n3 
The fetishism of the capi taliet io system. is most strik-
ingly revealed in the use of machinery. Machinery, plainly, 
makes available to men a way of producing goods which will 
both yield more and better goode, and will ;tighten the bur-
den of labor. On these two grounds, the use of machinery 
can be justified--and only on these grounds. 
However, Marx, chiefly in papital, insisted that in 
machine production neither of these purposes had been ful-
filled. Machinery tended to lengthen the working day and 
intensify the strain of labor. Furthermore, the real stand-
ard of living among the masses did not appear to have been 
raised by the use of machinery.. The net effect of machinery 
was only to increase the profits and standard of living 
1 .. CAP 1 I, 15. 2. Marx, POP, 37. 
among the capitalists, and to increase the misery of the 
workerw This judgment appears to have been largely true 
.when Marx wrote 1 but does not appear to be true today, as 
a matter of economic fact. But here is what Marx wrote: 
John Stuart Mill says in his Principles of Politi-
cal Economy~ 'It is questionable if all the mechani-
cal inventions yet made have lightened the day's 
toil of any human being.' That is, however, by 
no means the aim of the capitalistic application 
of machinery. Like every other increase in the 
productiveness of labour, machinery is intended to 
cheapen commodities, and,.by shortening.that por-
tion of the workingday, in which the labourer 
works for himself, to lengthen the other portion 
that he gives, without an equivalent, to the 
capitalist. I~. short, it is a means for producing 
surplus-value. 
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The length of the working day had been extended beyond 
all reason by the application of machinery.2 This happened 
because the only way to use machinery neoonomicallyn was to 
use it many hours a day. The life of a given machine is 
about the same whether it is worked few or many hours each 
day.3 Therefore, the most economical way to use a machine 
is to keep it going as many of the twenty four hours a day 
as possible. 
' The machines were kept going, and the laborer kept at 
them, for as long each day as was physically possible. Evan 
lunch hours were eliminated as much as possible in order to 
keep the machines going and save the expense of stopping and 
3. CAP, I, ~~l. 
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starting them. All manner of abuse of human beings followed 
as a consequence~ The parent of one child factory worker 
told a committee of Parliament! 
That boy of mine .... when he was 7 years old I used 
to carry him on my back to and fro through the 
snow, and he used to have 16 hours a day ..... I have 
often knelt down to feed him as he stood by the 
machine, for he could not leave it or stop.l 
A.ooo:rd.ing to Marx's account, not only did machinery tend 
to lengthen the hours of labor, but it intensified the strain 
of factory work,2 By requiring closer attention from the 
worker, by forcing the worker to overexert himself in keep-
ing pace with the automatic machine, and by making of work 
a dull round of mechanical and meaningless motions, the 
worker's energy was taxed far more than in hand labor. 
As for machine produced abundance, Marx believed that 
the mass of laborers had little more material comfort than 
before maohine production. Examination of the actual liv-
ing conditions of workers revealed that their misery was 
not relieved by greater efficiency of production.,3 
l. Marx, CAP, I, 272. 2. CAP, I, 447-457• 3. Marx wrot~ even before Capital was written! nEverywhere 
the great mass of the working class sinks deeper into 
misery; at least in relation to the ruling class it 
descends the social ladder. Even now in every land this 
truth is to be seen, proving for every prejudiced mind 
and denied only by him ••• that no perfection of machinery, 
no application of science to production, no improvement 
in the means of industry, no new colonies, no emigration, 
no opening up of new markets, no free trade, not all of 
these things together has removed the misery of the 
laboring class ..... Starvation is elevated to the ra.nk of 
social adaptation in the capital of Britainn (IdAA, 24-25). 
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The only rational 1 human purposes for using machinery, 
then, were not fulfilled. Yet machinery came to be used 
in more and more shops and factories. Why this anachronism? 
This could happen, Marx believed, only because the system 
of commodity production and machine industry had become an 
end in itself, a fetish, which functioned out of relation 
to human needs and purposes. 
It is not the task of this dissertation to consider the 
economic soundmess of these judgments. For the purposes 
of this writing it is incidental whether Marx was as a matter 
of fact right in saying that the system had taken command 
of man, that it does not serve the needs of man, and that it 
is completely at odds with any rational view of man and 
society. Rather, ·the problem is to discover what sort of 
principles this judgment implies, and What sort of value 
theory lies behind such judgments. 
It seems evident that Marxts criticism of commodity 
production implies, first of all, that any social system 
can be jUS.tified only to the extent that it satisfies rational 
human purposes. If the system functions in an impersonal 
way, and meets the needs of an impersonal realm rather than 
the realm of men, then it is evil~ Secondly, the system 
must be rationally controlled by men. It must be subject 
to conscious human purposes. Man, in other words, must be 
free within the system he has created. Any system which 
compels the obedience of man is bad, even though it might 
provide well for his physical needs. Even comfortable 
slavery is bad. .. 
(2) The Fetishism of Money. 
Another fetish is money. For Marx, money is in fact 
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a device which is instrumentally useful in the economic sys-
tem. Money is not a completely valueless symbol~ the source 
of all evil, as some social reformers have argued. Marx 
never claimed that money should or could be done away with. 
Money has a very specific and real nuse-value.ul 
Ma.rxt s money theory is somewhat complex, a.nd it is 
presented in detail in Capital~ the earlier Critigue of 
Political Economy~ and elsewhere. The economic intricacies 
of the theory need not be treated here. What is under con-
sideration is merely the way in which money is made into a 
fetish, an end in itself. 
In 1S44 Marx wrote! 
Gold humbles all other human deities, and trans-
forms man into a commodity. Money is the general, 
constitutive wealth of all things. It has robbed 
the whole· world, the world of man, and nature, 
of its value. Money is to man the alienated 
essence of his labor and his being; it rules him, 
and he serves in return.2 
That is, money is a problem because it is not seen in the 
light of what it truly is, a man-made economic instrument, 
but is thought to be something entirely different, apart 
from man, and possessing mysterious powers of its own .. 3 
1. Marx, CAP{ I, 95. 
2. Art .. (lg4J+JD2, b03. 3. Marx, OPE, 31. 
215 
The simplest form of the fetishism of money is, of 
course, hoarding. The miser is the brunt of some of Marx1 s 
sharpest jibes. 
The acquisition of wealth in its universal form (money) thus requires abstinence from wealth in 
its material reality. Thus the stimulating im-
pulse for hoarding is greed •••• The hoarder des-
pises the worldly, temporary, and transitory en-joyments in his hunt after the eternal t~easure, 
which neither moth nor rust can eat, which is 
perfectly celestial and earthly at the same time.,l 
Our hoarder appears as a martyr of exchange value, 
a holy ascetic crowning the metal pillar •••• In 
his imaginary unlimited passion for enjoyment he 
denies himself all enjoyment. Because he wishes 
to satisfy all social wants, he barely satisfies 
his elementary natural wants.2 
Modern society ••• greets gold as its Holy Grail, 
as the glittering incarnation of the very principle 
of its own life •• ~,The hoarder, therefore, makes 
a sacrifice of the lusts of the flesh to his gold 
fetish •••• Hard work, saving, and avarice, are 
therefore, his three cardinal virtues, and to sell 
much and buy little the sum of his political 
economy.; 
The hoarder, the worshiper of the money fetish~ finds the 
fulfilment of his desires in abstract wealth. He desires 
real wealth, but is satisfied with the mere symbol of 
wealth. He forsakes the enjoyment of real ~ode in the 
interest of accumulating money. 
Marx argued that love of money, as an end in itself, 
had never been so general as in capitalism.~ The urge to 
accumulate money is the capitalist's nsole motive.n5 The 
5. CAP, I, 170. 
circulation of money becomes an order to which men are sub-
ject.. When a "monetary crisis" occurs, men are powerless 
even to feed themselves.l This is the fetishism of money. 
(3) The Fetishism of the State. 
Ostensibly, the state is a nation of people function-
ing as a whole, caring for those needs which are best oared 
for by action of the group as a whole. As such, much can 
be said in defense of the state as a useful social instru-
ment. But the state, Marx believed, h~s become something 
far different from the mere fulfilment of a reasonable and 
necessary social function. The state has become a fetishe 
It is thought of as one thing--it really is another _thing. 
To the popular a.tti tude, and to most of ·the special 
theories of the state (Hobbes, Rousseau, and Regel, for 
example), Marx answers with the charge of fetishism. The 
state is not really what the citizen takes it to be. 
The state is an na,bstraction,n2 which is Ddivorced 
from the real interests of individual and community.n3 
It is "an illusory communal life., "lot The state is not a 
nation of people at all, but is a government, constituted 
by a few of the people in the interest of a few of the 
people., 
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The state runs true, according to Marx, to the general 
pattern of the fetish. First of all~ it is of human origin., 
3. Marx, GI, 23 .. 
4 .. Marx, GI, 23. 
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The state is a product of human historyo The modern state 
can easily be traced to definite historical origins, par-
ticularly with respect to the early developing needs of 
the capitalistic system. This part of the theory received 
its most detailed exposition in the writings of Engels. 
But the state has co~e to be regarded as something 
more than human. Indeed, it actually has become an imper-
sonal being, existing apart from the people, with interests 
and needs of its own which are sometimes in conflict with 
the interests of the people.1 fiThe State has become a 
separate entity, beside and outside civil society.u2 The 
state is a man made monster to which men themselves have 
become subservient. The less democratic the state, the 
greater is the likelihood that the interests of the citizenry 
and the interests of the state will not only be different, 
but in conflict. 
The State (is) an abstract whole, which exists 
only in and through its separation from real 
life, which is unthinkable without the organized 
antagonism between the general idea and the indi-
vidual existence of men.3 
Viewed as it really is, said Marx, the state is nothing 
more than the organized. political power of the dominant 
economic class. He said: nThe State is the form in which 
the individuals of a ruling class assert their common inter-
ests.n~ As for the modern state, whioh exists under the 
1. Marx, CGP 1 lT. 
2. Marx, GI, 59· 
3. Marx, Art.(lS44)3, 131. 
~. Marx, GI, 6o. 
conditions of bourgeois capitalism., he said: 11The executive 
of the modern state is but a committee for managing the 
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.'Hl Finally, "Politi-
cal power, properly so called, is merely the organised power 
of one class for oppressing anotherGfl2 The truth is: WThe 
workingmen have no country~n3 The interests of the workers 
as a group cross national boundaries. The real enemy of 
the workers is not this or that foreign state., but the very 
state which rules over him-4 
The only way for the worker to realize. his own inter-
ests is to recognize the state as a fetish and to abolish 
it and all purely political power.5 Until this is done., 
the broad masses of men will be in slavery to their state-
fetish~ 
Many criticisms of Marx's general theory of the state 
have been made. Some of these may be mentioned. Two are 
especially cogent. Bober., Parkes~ and others lay great 
stress on the fact that Marx~s account of the origin and 
nature of the state is oversimplified, if not incorrect in 
entirety. To say that the state is merely the instxument 
of one class for exploiting another is to make too narrow 
a judgment on the state. The state has many other functions. 
Moreover., it is not true that the dominant economic class 
l. Marx., OM., ll. 4. Marx., OGP., 13. 
2. Marx., OM, 31. 5. Marx, GI, 78; CM., 31. 
3. Marx., CM., 28. 
always rules~ Bober says. Military and religious groups 
sometimes dominate.l 
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A second, still more serious, criticism is that Marx 
would, at best~ replace partial tyranny with total tyranny. 
If some of men 1 s activities are now subservient to the 
state, under communism manta whole life would be at the mercy 
of the state. 2 This criticism is stressed by Ohamberl1n3 
and Parkes,4 and almost all critics accept it to a oertain 
degree. Parkes, in his remarkably clear, objective, and 
critical work on Marx, uses this criticism with devastating 
effect. Many of the critics sooff at Marxts belief, a be-
lief developed further by Lenin, that under communism the 
state would wither away.5 Recent Russian history provides 
a good deal of evidence to support this criticism. 
Most criticisms'· however, do not touch Marxt s funda-
mental proposition about the state, namely, that the state 
is a fetish~ created by man, but separated from the real 
interests of most men and the master of most men.. Few would 
deny Marx's contention that the existence of the state is 
justified only so long as it is identical with the common 
interests of the people. Few would argue with Marx's view 
1. Bober, IOH~ 342-345. 
2. Marx denied this~ of course. On the question of government 
sponsored education~ for example, he wrote that nthe state 
has need, on the contrary, of a very stern education by 
the peoplen (OGP, 21). 
3 •• Art.(l939), 6S. 4 MAA, ~assim. 5. See Elliott, Art.(l935), 216. 
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that the state should not be an end in itself. The only 
question is whether Marx was right in charging that the state 
under capitalism is inevitably a fetish and a slave-driving 
monster. There is also the question of the merit of Marxts 
altern~tive. 
3. Dehumanization. 
Viewed from the standpoint of its practical consequences, 
fetishism issues· in the dehumanization of man. 
The possessing class and the proletarian class are 
alienated from each other. But the former class 
finds in this alienation complete satisfaction, 
recognizes this alienation as its own power, and 
finds in it the appearance of a human existence. 
But the latter class feels itself denied by the 
alienation 1 stripped of its power 1 and sees only 
the reality of an inhuman existence.l 
Marx objected to the capitalistic system not merely because 
it failed to satisfy men 1 not from any merely utilitarian 
standpoint 1 but he objected to it because it made men in-
human.. It made them less than men. Through the fetishism 
of commodity production men have been made into animals--
worse than that, they have become mere things. 
i. Men as Things. 
The most interesting and convincing of all Marx's writ-
ings are those passages whioh describe the plight of human 
beings who were victimized by capitalism. Because these 
passages presuppose very little theory 1 they can be read 
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and appreciated without raising the question of the correct-
ness of Marx's theory as a whole. Whether Marxts general 
analysis is correct or not, hie chapter on nThe Working Daynl 
is a olassio in the literature of social reform. 
The essential charge made by Marx, the essential moral 
charge, against capitalism is that it reduces man to a thing. 
Capitalism bestializes. The position of man under capital-
ism was anticipated by Hobbes. He wrote! 
The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other 
thin@S, his Price; that is to say, so much as would 
be given for the use of his Power; and therefore 
is not absolute; but a thing dependent on the need 
and judgment of another. 2 
Marx believed that this view had become the practically 
accepted standard under capitalism, though not consciously 
accepted. In tha train of this practical standard has come 
all manner of evil. 
Man has become a mere thing, because under capitalism 
men are only commodities to be bought and sold. The state 
of affairs anticipated by Hobbes has come to pass. Marx 
summarizes this charge succinctly in the Manifesto. He 
says, ~the bourgeoisie ••• has resolved personal worth into 
exchange value.n3 The value of a man is equivalent to his 
price on the market. This is one of the most constantly 
reouxring themes in the Marxist literature. The following 
I 
are some respresentative passages. First, from the great 
Manifesto: 
The bourgeoisie.~.has left no other bond between 
man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 
'cash payment. 1 l 
The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its 
sentimental veil, and has reduced the family to 
a mere money relation.2 
Laborers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are 
a commodity, like every other article of commerce.3 
The work of the proletarians has lost all individual 
character, and, consequently, all charm for the 
workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine ..... 
All are instruments of labour, more or less expen-
sive to use, according to their age and sex.~ 
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Marx writes in a similar vein in his famous work, the Poverty 
of Philosophy: 
Finally, there came a. time when everything that 
men had considered as inalienable became an object 
of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. 
This is the time when the very things which till 
then had been communicated, but never exchanged; 
given, but never sold; acquired, but never bought--
virtue, love~ conviction, knowledge, conscience, 
etc.--when everything, in short, passed into co~ 
merce, It is the time of general corruption, of 
universal venality, or, to speak in terms of politi-
cal economy, the time when everything, moral or 
physical, having become a marketable value, is 
brought to the maxket to be assessed at its truest 
value.5 
The same theme is heard in Capita~. The worker is nothing 
more than a commodity. He can exist ·only by placing himself 
on the market to be disposed of by the highest bidder. He 
1.. OM, 11. 
2 .. OM, ll. 
5• POP, 30. 
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is a mere instrument of production. For the capitalist men 
are nothing more than a means to profits. 
Whether Marx was right or wrong in this indictment of 
capitalism is not here in question. What is to the point is 
the theoretical position implied by the rejection of the 
exchange-value standard. MaxxTs rej~otion of the standard 
indicates that he regarded any non-human standard of value 
as evil. 
ii. Men as Brutes. 
Once men are regarded as mere things, they are soon brutal-
ized. They are subjected to abuse, their natural powers are 
destroyed, and they are left without the least sense of 
personal decency or dignity. The system leaves the worker 
in a state of nmoral degradation.~.intellectual desolation.ul 
Marx cited many oases of hardship and physical abuse inflic-
ted even on women and children, in his chapter on the work-
ing day. Where the neconomiclt operation of the factory 
required it, the worker had to suffer. Capitalism accomp-
lishes nthe transformation of the laborers into laboring 
cattle. n2 
The interests of humans as humans were utterly dis-
dained. 
In many factories machinery is started up w!thout 
warning the laborers. Since there is always some-
thing to look after, even when the machinery is at 
a standstill, there are always many hands and 
fingers busy on it, and accidents happen con-1 tinually from the omission of a mere signal. 
When injured workers brought suit against factory owners, 
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the owners formed an association to wage their legal defense. 
In the ensuing trials, said Marx, tithe issue was to prove 
that killing is no murder when done for a profit. u2 
Children worked sixteen to eighteen hours a day, work-
men submitted to unhealthful and hazardous occupations with-
out any safeguaxds or protection, trainmen working twenty-
five to thirty hours without a break, children compelled 
to rise at two or three in the morning to work until after 
nightfall, twenty to thirty men or women in a room too small 
to accommodate ten workmen--these were the conditions under 
which men worked in the England that Marx knew. Pain, agony, 
suffering, humiliation1 and death became the lot of the 
laborer. Marx quotes literally scores of government reports, 
newspaper articles, and books to support this description 
of the conditione of the working masses. The following, 
copied by Marx from a daily newspaper, is typical. 
Mr. Broughton Charlton, county magistrate, declared 
as chairman of a meeting held at the Assembly Rooms, 
Nottingham, on the 14-th of January~ lg6o, 11 that 
there was an amount of privation and suffering among 
that portion of the population connected with the 
lace trade$ unknown in othe~ parts of the kingdom, 
indeed, in the civilized world •••• Children of nine 
or ten years are dragged from their squalid beds at 
two, three, or four ofc1ock in the morning and 
l. Marx, CAP, III, 107. 2. Marx, CAP, III, 107. 
compelled to work for a bare subsistence until ten, 
eleven, or twelve at night~ their limbs wearing 
away~ their frames dwindling, their faces whiten-
ing~ and their humanity absolutely sinking into a 
stone-like torpor, utterly horrible to contemplate •••• 
We are not surprised that Mr. Mallett, or any other 
manufacturer~ should stand forward and protest 
against discussion ... ~The system~ as the Rev. Monta.gu 
Valpy describes it, is one of unmitigated slavery, 
socially, physically, morally, and spiritually •••• 
What can be thought of a town which holds a public 
meeting to petition that the period of labour for 
men shall be diminished to eighteen hours a day? •••• 
We declaim against the Virginian and Carolina cotton-
planters. Is their black-market, their lash, and 
their barter of human flesh more detestable than 
this slow sacrifice of humanity which takes place 
in order that veils and collars may be fabricated 
for the benefit of capitalists?tl 
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Marxts comments on such quotations as these follow a common 
pattern. For example~ 
Hence it is self-evident that the labourer is 
nothing else~ his whole life through, than labour-
power, that .therefore all his disposab~e time is . 
by nature and law labour-time, to be devoted to the 
self-expansion of capital. Time for education, 
for intellectual development, for the fulfilling 
of social functions and for social intercourse~ for 
the free-play of his bodily and mental activity, 
even the rest time of Sunday (and that in a country 
of Sa.bbatarians I)--moonshine! But in its blind 
unrestrainable passion, its were-wolf hunger for 
surplus-labour, capital oversteps not only the 
moral, but even the merely physical maximum bounds 
of the working day.. It usurps the time for growth, 
development, and healthy maintenance of the body. 
It steals the time required for the consumption of 
air and sunlight •••• Capital cares nothing for the 
length of life of labour-power. ·All that concerns 
it is simply and solely the maximum of labo~ 
power, that can be rendered fluent in a working 
day. It attains this end by shortening the extent 
of the labourer1 s life, as a greedy farmer snatches 
increased produce from the soil by robbing it of 
its fertility.2 
2. CAP, I, 291-292. 
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Marx goes to great lengths, quoting report after report, 
citing case after case of abuse of workers. The large number 
of oases cited was not necessary merely to establish his 
theoretical contentions.. But they do serve to create a 
cumulative psychological effect. They do appeal to the 
reader's sense of decency and do create an emotional dis-
gust with the capitalistic system--as it existed in the nine-
teenth century, at any rate. 
In Marx's declamations against the brutality of capi~·· 
talism, his essential humanism is revealed. Marx opposed 
a system which thrived only at the expense of Udie Ver-
kr~pplung des individuellen Arbeiters.ul He favored the 
establishment of a society in which human beings were the 
measure of worth. 
iii. Man as a Slave. 
Capitalism dehumanizes man, in the third place~ by mak-
ing of him a slave. The only freedom possessed by the worker 
2 is the freedom to sell himself\ But he is not even free 
to set his own price. The Market determines that. 
The general problem of freedom was treated in detail 
above. For the present 1 it is necessary only to sketch the 
essentials of Marx's charge against capitalism, that in it 
the worker is enslaved. 
l. Marx, KAP, I, 3g3. 
2. Marx, OM, 15. 
Capitalism enslaves in essentially three ways. First, 
under capitalism no one is free, not even the capita.list.l 
Everyone is determined by the flux of the system itself, 
over which no one has direct control. Periodically, for 
instance, there is a depression. Everyone suffers. The 
capitalist loses his money. Men are thrown out of work. 
The worker tramps the streets and his family goes hungry. 
The tremendous productive capacity in plant facilities and 
workmen's skills lies dormant. No one is able to do any-
thing about it. Men must simply wait and hope. In this 
way men are enslaved by nthe system,n as well as in other 
ways. 
The system creates slavery, in the second place, in 
the sense that the workers must do the bidding of the capi-
talist. This control of the capitalist employer over the 
workers is a despotism~2 The worker has no choice but to 
sell himself to the capitalist and to ·do what he is told--
if he wishes to survive. The worker is free only in the sense 
that he is freely available to the capitalisto3 Once in 
the factory, the worker must do as he is told, even if the 
work he is called upon to do will mean physical deteriora-
tion and possibly even sudden and prematuxe death. The 
laborer must sell his only possession, his nliving self,n~ 
to the capitalist who owns money and commodities. flThis 
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relation,n says Marx, 11has no natural basis.nl It amounts, 
in effect, only to the "servitude of labor.n2 
In the third place, the worker is enslaved intellectually 
and spiritually. He is taught as much, and only as muoh, 
as will serve the interests of the capitalist class. The 
culture, the books and arts, made available to the masses 
are censored by the bourgeoisie. The literature which the 
worker reads, if he can read, is distributed under the aus-
pices of the capitalist class. Newspapers are business 
enterprises, and, as such, are owned and controlled by 
capitalists. The s~hools are controlled, through member-
ship on boards of trustees, by the capitalist class. Most 
of the public education carried on in Engla~ in Marx1 s 
time, was carried on under the direct auspices of factory 
owners, for the children who worked in the factories, in 
accord with the legally enacted demands of Parliament. 
In short, nthe ruling ideas of each age have ever been the 
ideas of its ruling class.n3 This is profoundly true in 
capitalistic society, Marx believed. 
iVo Truncated Meno 
Men are dehumanized, finally, because under the capital-
istic system the development of their natural capacities is 
suppressed and the natural arena for the fulfilment of men, 
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society~ is corrupted into a scene of conflict. This evil 
is accomplished through the physical poverty of the worker~ 
the division of labor, competition, and the egoistic ideal 
of oapi t.alist society .. 
The natural fulfilment of man is hindered, first, by 
physioa.l poverty_ The wage that is paid to the worker is 
so small that he can provide for himself only the barest 
minimum of necessities. Marx examined the conditions of 
life among the workers and found that they lived in a.bjeot 
poverty. The worker's life was limited to eating, sleep-
ing, and working.l The worker, therefore, was without the 
means for his personal development. He had little or no 
leisure time. He had nq money to buy a piano, or other 
instrument of oulture~ had he had time to use it. He could 
not travel. Education was shut off from him. In a word, 
he was compelled to dwell in ignorance a.nd squalor beoause 
the bare, physical means to a better life were completely 
unavailable to him. 
A seoond obstacle to the development of fully rounded 
human beings, Marx believed, w~s the division of labor or 
1. Marx wrote! nit (capitalist ~roduction) comes to the 
result that man (the laborer) freely acts only in his 
more animal functions, eating, drinking, procreating--
higher only in habitation, dress, etc., and in his 
human functions only as an animal. The animal be-
comes human and the human becomes like the a.nima.l 11 
(~kM, g6). . 
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specialization.l Work, which should be a means not only 
to the production of goods, but also shoUld be intrinsically 
meaningful and satisfying1 beoa.me to the worker a. dull and 
tedious bore. This wa.~ partly due to the economic phenome-
non known as division of labor. There is little doubt that 
division of labor increases general productivity and effi-
ciency. It makes more material goods available. Yet Marx 
opposed it as generally practiced under capitalism.2 
Marx's complaint is simple. With division of labor, 
especially in factories~ each man tends more and more to 
be given one single, simple task to perform. This absurdly 
simple task then becomes the limit of his activity. He 
learns nothing else, enjoys nothing else, and eventually 
becomes incapable of anything else. The factory becomes 
ua productive mechanism whose parts are human beings,u3 
and the result is nthe development in a man of one single 
faculty at the expense of all other faculties.u4 
Division of labor separates town people from country 
people. It separates those who function as intelligent 
beings (the managerial class) from those who function as 
physical beings (the workers). It stunts human development. 
l. Marx: UThe division of labor reduoes the worker to a 
degrading function; to this degrading function corre~ 
sponds a depraved soulu (POP, 112). See also CAP, I, 
372, 3S4, 397-39S, 462. 
2. Marx, CAP, I, 36g-4o4. 
3. Marx, CAP, I, 371. 
4-. 'Marx, OAP, I, 3g9. 
One of the much heralded virtues of the capitalistic 
system is competition. From competition is supposed to issue 
efficiency and productivity. Without paying great atten-
tion to these supposed fruits, Marx dismisses competition 
as a false ideal. Under the capitalistic system! 
Independent oommodity-produoers ••• aoknowledge no 
other authority but that of competition, of the 
coercion exerted by the pressure of their mutual 
interests; just as in the animal kingdom, the 
bellum omnium oontra omnes more or less preserves 
the conditions of existence of every speoies.l 
The economic world under capitalism is a war of all against 
all. That is the condition perpetuated and sanctioned by 
the ideal of competition. Marx felt that from a society 
based upon such an ideal there was little chanoe for the 
realization of any rational, harmonious social order. Marx 
said! ncompetition makes individuals, not only the bour-
geois1 but still more the workers, mutually hostile.n2 
The principle of competition, which alienates man from 
man,is an evil. It violates the ideal of community. Marx 
believed that only in a society based on co-operation, 
rather than oompaltion and mutual hostility, could the 
values whioh are now enjoyed by a privileged few become 
general among all members of society. 
Finally, Marx believed, human life is stunted by the 
egoism of the capitalistic ideal. The individualism 
l. Marx, OAP, I, 391. 
2. Marx, GI, 5S footnote •. 
of laissez faire capitalism Marx deplored, both because it 
is a false principle of social justice and because it is 
hypocritically advocated. It is false, in the first instance, 
because it is the principle of pure selfishness, greed, and 
personal aggrandizement. A social philosophy based on t~e 
principle that each is to pursue his own selfish interests 
as best he can is palpable nonsense from any rational or 
moral point of view--or so Marx believed. 
Moreover, the view is hypocritically advanced~ Even if 
the view had some merit, even if nprivate vices are public 
benefits~ 11 that is not the reason why the principle is advo-
cated. The real reasonJ Marx thought, was that this principle 
served the special interests of the privileged class who 
have, as a matter of fact, gotten ahead as individuals at 
the expense of others. The capitalist finds in 11individua.l-
ism11 a rationalization for his own avarice. 
With his egoistic ideal the capitalist continues to 
enjoy his special privileges without any pain of conscience, 
and the worker continues to take his systematic nhiding. ttl 
The workers, and the capitalists, all are deprived of the 
enjoyments of developed individuals in a human community, 
and the worker especially, continues to endure the stunting 
of his capacities. Capitalism breeds a race of half-men. 
l. Marx, OAP, I, 196. 
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4. Unreason. 
It seems evident that many of Karl Marx's criticisms 
grew from a conviction of the essential irrationality of 
the social order he opposed. Certainly he did bring reason 
to bear. He did believe in theory. It seems correct to 
describe as irrationalism one type of disvalue which is 
discussed in Marx's writings. 
The fulfilment of rational> conscious human purposes 
was revealed to be an essential principle of value in the 
second chapter~ above. The foregoing exposition, in the 
present chapter, indicates Marxts belief that capitalism 
obstructs the fulfilment of human purposes, that capitalism 
is an irrational system. And because it is irrational, it 
is evil.. In capitalism~ 11complete anarchy reigns. nl Instead 
of 11 conscious control 11 by men of their society, there is 
only confusion~ frustration, obscurantism, and, in a word, 
irra.tiona.li ty. 
Marxts view of science bears on this point. Marx was 
a naturalist, in the sense that he believed science should 
be applied to all levels and types of human problems, in-
cluding social problems. The theme is constantly heard in 
Marx's writings that society should be consciously directed 
in accord with rational principles, Marx believed that the 
social order must bear the criticism of reason and science~ 
l .. Marx, CAP, III, 1027. 
But nothing is more common in the history of social 
reform than resistance to social criticism. This resistance, 
Marx believed, must be opposed and destroyed, by force if 
necessary. For Marx, the economic life of society should 
be carried on nby freely associated men, and ••• oonsciously 
regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan.n1 
In contrast to this ideal, capitalist society in Marx•s day 
presented a picture of anarchy and slavery in the common 
life of men. 
5. Conclusion. 
In this chapter there was no attempt to give Marx1 s 
systematic theory of evil, for he had none. Nor did Marx 
give a clear, theoretical definition of evil. He avoided it. 
It is apparent, however, from a review of the facts 
treated by Marx as evil, what ·was his general view ·of the 
matter. Marx's thought on evil germinated primarily, it 
would seem, from his view of science and from his view of 
man. Failu~e to apply science (fetishism and irrational-
ism) as he conceived it, and violations of human beings 
(dehumanization) constituted disvalue or evil. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation-
It was the problem of this dissertation to discover 
what sort of principles, if any, lay behind the value judg-
ments and ethical attitudes of Karl MarxJ and the relation 
of those principles to his total theory. It was the aim 
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of this study to discover whether Marx had any explicit 
general value theory at all, and, if not, what value theory 
was implied by his general view. 
This problem was complicated by conflicting strains 
in the thought of Marx. Difficulty was created by the 
necessity of gathering data from many writings, written for 
widely varying purposes. Diverse and conflicting interpre-
tations created further complications. These difficulties 
were not intrinsically insurmountable, however~ nor even 
especially unusual. 
An attempt was made, therefore~ to construct Marx's 
theory in such a way that his implicit value theory would 
come to light. The attempt was successful to some degree, 
for certain value principles did emerge. 
2. The Three Marxist Moods. 
It is apparent that Marx wrote in three moods. These 
moods were revealed in the first chapter~ which dealt with 
method. Marx was at times a humanist; at other times a 
scientist; and at still other times a dialectician. These 
three approaches to life and thought are not necessarily 
inaonsistento A coherent saientifia 8 dialectical humanism 
is possible. But the three moods can very easily lead to 
incongruities~ and did in the thought of Karl Marx. 
3. The Humanistic Mood. 
Marx1 s attitude toward man oould almost be described 
as one of devotion. The primacy of human welfare was both 
a methodological principle and a principle of action. It 
was supported by emotional convictions. Marx took a stand--
in favor of human well being. 
1la.rx1 s method was pragmatic. He assumed that the aim 
of science and thought was to solve practical problems, human 
problems. His humanism assumed that the frame of reference 
for the essential problems of life was man himself--his 
activities, his needs, his aims and puxposes. This prag-
matic inclination was so strong in Marx that response to 
human purposes became at times virtually the sign of reality. 
On this could be built a very strong case for interpreting 
Marx as an idealist. The humanistic standpoint provided a 
methodological criterion--the needs and aims of men. The 
humanistic mood issued in a basic value principle--the 
intrinsic worth of human beings and the infinit~ possibili-
ties for the good in human life. Human achievement in this 
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life became the great goal of Marx, and the ideal which pex-
vaded his writings~ 
The humanistic mood also issued in a basic principle 
of disvalue~that is bad which dehumanizes man- Whenever 
man becomes a thing, a slaveJ a bxute, ox a lonely, friend-
less creature, there is evil. 
Marx's humanism was intensively emotional. Even his 
scientific writings are charged with the feeling of a man 
afire. Conditions of life which destxoyed men and frustrated 
theix aspirations he detested. Obstructionists who willingly 
retarded the fulfilment of man's destiny he scorned and 
despised. In the cause for human betterment Marx had a 
single mind, to fight, fight, fight. This emphasis bears 
within it Kant 1 s principle of the worth of personality--and 
thus the Kantian interpretation of Marx. 
Marx conceived of man as an active, conscious being 
earnestly struggling for freedom and self-fulfilment. In 
his humanistic mood Marx joined that struggle. 
4. The Scientific Mood. 
But Marx was also, in his mind, a scientist, a histori-
cal materialist, and at times the humanistic mood fades 
into the background before the hard logic of facts. 
As a scientist Marx sought the real explanations of 
things--explanations which would have scientific certainty, 
and which would aid direct action. The enterprise of grasp-
ing true knowledge is not easy,. ltAll science would be super-
fluous~ if the appearance, the form 1 and the nature of things 
were wholly identical.n1 But they are not. And so~ science 
has to muster all of its powers of criticism, discovery, 
and analysis in order to provide man with the implements of 
better living which knowledge can provide~ 
As a scientist of man, Marx produced his activistio 
view of man. As a scientist of society, Marx produoed his 
historical materialism. As a scientist of natur.e Marx 
developed his dialectical materialism. A treasury of past 
science and philosophy, ethics~ religion, and metaphysics 
was cast away as refuse in the wake of these scientific 
procedures.., 
Science is a human tool.. As such it must be useful in 
achieving human ends~ It is useful 1 not when it attempts 
to establish the ends of life, but when it lays bare the 
facts. In his purely scientific mood, therefore, Marx was 
neutral to questions of value, seemingly indifferent to the 
pain and struggle of history, bent only upon revealing what 
is, what was, and what made it that way. 
As a scientist Marx fixed his attention upon material 
things, the material causal factors in history and present 
day society. Twenty-five hundred pages of description and 
l. Marx, OAP, III~ 951 • 
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analysis 1 in Capital, were required to substantiate Marx's 
opposition to capitalism. Mere dissatisfaction with the 
system was not enough. Marx interpreted man, society, and 
history as material phenomena, aiming always at descriptions 
of the facts. The value problem was reduced> in Marx's 
science 1 to a problem simply of describing how man achieves 
value, how his activity and consciousness expand his realm 
of estimations and enjoyments, and how his interaction with 
matter and society effects his purposes and aspirations. 
In all this there is complete neutrality to questions of 
objective values 1 norms, and ideals. The good is viewed 
as determined by human purposes and material facts, so that 
science can aid in value achievement, though only by reveal-
ing facts. A theory of disvalue is implied-~evil is fetishism 
and unreason> or the failure to act in full consciousness 
of the facts as revealed by science. 
But there are moments of hesitation in the scientific 
posture. Science becomes philosophical--indeed, dialectical. 
Also, many highly conceptual categories creep into the scien-
tific discussions. The deliverances and principles of Marx's 
historical materialism seem to go far beyond simple, observ-
able, easily defined data. Marx's science comes to move 
in the realm of the very abstract, the highly theoretical, 
and the difficult to prove. 
Finally, the sharply scientific posture bends before 
its master~human purposes and endse Science is nothing 
but man's servant 1 a tool for attaining human purposes .. 
Historical materialism is finally revealed to be not a doc-
trine of determinism, but ·of freedom. Marxist theory in 
itself is neutral to the question of value; but man, to whom 
the theory belongs 1 is not. Science is man's device for 
consciously controlling the material and social environment 
which conditions his life. The immediate objects of science 
are facts, but its end is human freedom and fulfilment. 
5. The Dialectical Mood. 
In the dialectical mood Marx seems at times to forget 
that man exists. Dialectics has a double reference. It is 
a principle of method and an attribute of reality. As a. 
principle of method1 dialectics is the study of developing 
wholes, of processes. Its chief features are completeness 
and coherence. It issues in inclusiveness as a criterion 
of reality and value. When captivated by the dialectical 
mood Marx tends to emphasize society as a whole, generic, 
group man, the social class~ at the expense of the individual. 
The humanietio mood fades in favor of contemplating broad 
historical achievements. Value becomes identified with the 
progress of the dialectic •. 
As an attribute of reality, dialectics is recognition 
of the irresistible, unconscious sweep of nature and history. 
The essential movement of the world is like a mighty flood 
that cannot be held in checkv Before this powerful onrush 
the individual is as nothing. He is its plaything. Nature 
and history are like a wild beast~ever exhibiting a sort of 
unconscious pride that can never be completely defeated. 
6. The Hope. 
But man also has pride. And even though the conquest 
of nature and history seems a practical impossibility, he 
will not admit defeat. If nature and history cannot be 
overcomeJ they can be imitated. Man too can develop. Ulti-
mately perhaps, nature and history may even be conquered; 
they may be brought under the sway of man. The possibilities 
of associated menJ exercising to the utmost their common 
power and intelligence, are impossible to estimate. The 
realm of necessity will always remain, but the realm of 
freedom is within reach of man. 
7. Summary Conclusions. 
The argument of this dissertation is now completed. 
Its essence may be expressed in the following propositions. 
1. In Marx's method are three more or less consistent 
strains: the humanistic, the scientific or historical, and 
the dialectical, each of which yields a distinct attitude 
toward the problem of value. 
2. As a humanistJ Marx considered all thought, science, 
and action as properly subordinate to human purposes and 
general human well being. 
;. As a humanist, Marx deplored the conditions of human 
life under capitalism, and condemned all conditions which 
tended to enslave, brutalize, or alienate men. 
4. As a. humanist, Marx is often interpreted as Kantia.n, 
which interpretation muoh of Marx's writings seem to bear 
out. 
5. As a historical materialist, as a. scientist of soci-
ety, Marx stressed description; ends and values are of no 
direct concern to science, although they may be enhanced 
through scientific knowledge. 
6. As a. historical materialist, Marx viewed man as a 
natural phenomenon, changing and developing according to 
the scope of his activity, developing consciousness, purposes, 
ends, and norms in response to the material and sooial en-
vironment which conditions him. 
7. Marx's historical materialism is highly theoretical, 
often abstract, difficult to test, often oversimplified, 
and often distinctly philosophical. 
g. As a dialectician, Marx stressed developing wholes, 
such as history and society, but also as a dialectician 
he described the formula for individual achievement, namely, 
the objectification or fulfilment of the individual through 
interaction with the material and social environment. 
9. The ohief forms of evil in Ma.rxts thought are fetish-
ism, dehumanization, and irrationality. 
10. Marx foresaw an era in which men could freely develop 
all their capacities, achieve goals now undreamed of, master 
their historical, social, and material environment, and, 
for the first time, make "humanw history. 
11. X:a.rl Marxt's philosophy of value is implicitly human-
istic and naturalistic, is dominated by somewhat inconsistent 
prinoiples, and assumes that the problem of value is a task 
for action, rather than a theoretical problem for thought. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
In the foregoing text, each s.ource was identified by 
an author's name and an abbreviation. The abbreviations 
used were more or less arbitrary~ and are to be found in 
this bibliography entered on the first line of each item~ 
following the authorts name~ 
This bibliography is divided into two parts_ The 
first contains titles of MarxTs own writings, and collec-
tions of his writings. The second contains titles of various 
secondary sources used in the preparation of this disserta-
tion. 
Titles are listed alphabetically by authors, except 
where there is more than one title by a single author. In 
such cases, the titles are listed chronologically for that 
author. This rule is followed throughout, except in the 
first section of Part I, immediately following, wherein 
titles are listed in descending order of importance. 
I. The Writings of Karl Marx 
i. Collections, Selections, and Bibliography. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels.--MEGA 
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, historisoh-kritisohe Gesamt-
ausgabe. Werke, Schriften 1 Briefe (ed. D. Rjazonov). 
Moscow: D. Rjazonov, 1927-1935. 
Drabn, Ernst.~MBIB 
Marx-Bibliographie: Ein Lebensbild Karl Marx1 in biograph-
isch-bibliographischen Daten. 
Oharlottenburg: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft f~ Politik 
und Gesoh&chte M.B.H., 1920. 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels.--COR 
Karl Marx and Friedrich En els~ Correa ondence 1S~6-1S 
tr. Torr • 
New York: International Publishers, 1934. 
Marx, Karl.-=BaK 
Briefe an Kugelmann, aus dam Jahren von 1g62 bis lg7~. 
Berlin: Vereinigung Internationaler Ver1ags-Austalten, 
G.m. b .. hq 1927. 
-------------LDK 
Letters to Dr. Kugelmann. 
New York: International Publishers, 193~. 
----~-------and Friedrich Engels.--LA 
Literature and Art: Selections from Their Writin s. 
New York: International Publishers, 19 7. 
Marx, Karl.--HOM 
A Handbook of Marxism ( ed. E. Burns). 
New York: International Publishers, 1935. 
-----------EM 
The Essentials of Marx: The Communist Manifesto Ka~l 
Marx and ~riedrich Engels ed. Algernon Lee • 
New York: Vanguard Press, 1926 .. 
-----------SE 
Selected Essays (tr. H.J. Btenning). 
London: Parsons, 1926. 
Stenning, H .. J.-4tr.) .--BE 
Selected Essays. 
London: Parsons, 1926. 
ii. The Writings of Marx by Individual Titles. 
Marx, Karl.--DeN 
Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphil-
osophie-
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abteilung I, Band 1, 3-144 .. 
1844 
Marx, Karl.--Art.(l844)Dl 
uzur Kritik der hegelsohen Reohtsphilosophie.u 
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abt. I, Bd. 1, Halbband 1, 607-621. 
----------Art.(1844)l 
»A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right.n 
Stenning, SE, 11-39. 
----------Art.(l844)D2 
nzur Judenfraga. tl 
Marx and Engels , MEGA, Abt • I, Bd. ,l, Halb band 1, 57 6-606,. 
----------Art.(l8~)2 
non the Jewish Quastion.n 
Stenning, SE, 4o-97. 
----------Art.(l844)D3 
nxritisohe Randglossen zu dam Artikel: 'Der X~nig von 
Preuszen und die Sozialreform•.u 
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abt .. I, Bd. 3, 5-23• 
----------Art.(l844)3 
non the King of Prussia and Social Reform,.» 
Stenning, SE, 98~133. 
----------Art.(l844)D4 
»Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritisierende Moral; 
Beitrag zur deutsohen Kulturgesohiohta. Gagen Karl 
Heinzen.n 
Marx and Engels, MEGA; Abt. I, Bd. 6, 298-327• 
----------Art.(l844)4 
DMoralising Criticism and Critical Morality: A Polemic 
Against Karl Heinzen.» 
Stenning, SE, 13~170 .. 
----------and Friedrich Engels.--BF 
Die heilige Familia oder Kritik der kritisohen Kritik 
gegen Bruno Bauer und Konsorten. 
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abt9 I, Bd. 3, 175-391• 
Marx, Xa.ri.-~6kM 
Okonomisch~philosophisohe Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844. 
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abt. I, Bd. 3, 29-172. 
------------The sen 
DMarx tber Feuerbaoh.n 
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abt. I, Bd. 5~ 533H535. 
Marx~ Karl.--nThesean 
llTheses on Feuerbach .. n 
Marx and Engels, GI~ 195-199 .. 
lg46 
----------and Friedrich Engels.--DID 
Die deutsche Ideologie. 
Marx and Engels, A~GA, Abt. I, Bd. 5, 3-52S. 
-------------------------~---GI The German Ideology (ed. R. Pascal). 
New York! International Publishers, 1939. 
246 
Marx Karl.--MdP Mis~re de la Philosophie: R~ponse ~ la Philoaophie de la 
Mis~re de M. Proudhon. 
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abt. I, Bd. 6, ll9Q22g. 
----------POP 
The Poverty of Philosophy. 
New York: International Publishers, no date. 
----------FT 
1lAddress on the Question of Free Trade.n 
Marx, POP, 194-2og. 
----------and Friedrich Engels.-~MkP 
Manifest der kommunistisohen Partei. 
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abt. I, Bd. 6, 525-557• 
------------------------------OM Manifesto of the Communist Party (ed. F. Engels). 
New York: International Publishers, 1932. 
Marx, Karl.--LuK 
Lohnarbeit und Ka~ital. 
Marx and Engels, MEGA, Abt. I, Bd. 6, 473-499· 
-- _____ ..:_ ___ ---------·· ·-
-- --- -~-- -~---~--------:-------
.Marx, Karl.--WLC 
Wage-Labour and Capital. 
New York: International Publishers, 1933. 
--------....... Aus 
"Austritt aus dem Bund Kommunisten .. 11 
----------ACL 
DAddress to the Communist League .. n 
Burns, HOM, 60~71. 
---------EQ 
The Eastern guestion. 
Londont Swan Sonnenschein & Cov, Ltd., lg97. 
---------BdLN ,.. 
De:r lgte Brumaire des Louis Napoleon. 
Hamburg: Meissner, 1g69. 
----------.... BLN The Eighteenth B:rumai:re of Louis Bonaparte (ed. E.P. Dutt). 
New York: International Publishers, no date. 
--------..... IND 
India. 
Burns, HOM, 179-194. 
--~-------SLL 
The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston (ed. E.M. Aveling). 
London! Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1899· 
Marx, Karl.--ICR 
Dintroduction to the Critique of Political Eoonomy.n 
Marx¥ OPE, 265-312. 
----------KdPO 
Zur Kritik der politischen akonomie (hrsg. von Kautsky). 
Stuttgart: J.H~M. Dietz, 1919. 
----------OPE 
A Contribution to the Or'itique of Political Economy (tr. N.I.·Stone). · 
Chicago: Kerr & Oo., l90~o 
--------~~HV Herr Vogt"' 
Leipzig: L. Franz & Co. 1 1927. 
-----------a~d Friedrich Engels.--OWUS 
The Civil War in the United States (ed. Einmale). 
New York: International Publishers, 1937. 
Marx, Xarl.~-IdAA 
Die In~ uraladresse der Internationelen Arbeiter-
assooiation hrsg. von Xautsky • 
Stuttgart: J.H.W. Dietz, 1922. 
----------... -VPP Value, Price, and profit. (ed. E.M. Aveling) .. 
New York~ International Publishers, 1935. 
Marx, X:arl.-.;...:up 
Das X:apitalt Xritik de~ politisohen 8kononde (hrsg. Engels). 
3 B!Ud.e" 
·Moscow: Marx-Engels Institut> (Bd. I, 1S67; II, 1SS5; 
III, lg94)l933-l934. 
------------CAP 
Oa italt A Criti ue of Political Eoono 
E, Aveling; ed. Engels • 3 vole. 
Chicago: Charles H. Xerr & Co,, 1932. 
------------BXiF 
( tr. Moore and 
Der Btixgerkrieg in Frankreioh: Adresse des Generalrathe 
der Internationelen Arbeiter Association in Europa und 
den Vereinigten Staaten. 
Leipzig: Verlag dar Expedition des Volksta.at, lS?l. 
-----------........ OWF The Civil War in France. 
New York: International Publishers, l94o. 
--.;...----------X:GP 
Xritik des Gathaer Pro~amms • 
. Berlin: Neuer Weg, 19 6. . 
~---~----~-CGP 
Critique of the Gotha Programme. 
New York: International Publishers, 1933. 
~-
II. Secondary Sources 
Adoratsky, V.V~--DM 
Dialectical Materialism. 
New York! International Publishers, 1936. 
Aiken, H.D.--Art.(l945) 
WDefinitions of Value and the Moral Ideal." 
Jour. ef Phil., 42(1945), 337Q352. 
Aquinas, St. Thomas.-~ISA . 
Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas (ed.. A.o. Pegis). 
New York: The Modern Library, 194g. 
Aristotle .. --WKS 
The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed. Richard McKeon). 
New York: Random House, 1941. 
Bakewell, Charles M. (ed.).-~sAP 
Source Book in Ancient Philosophy., 
New York: Charles Scribnerfs Sons, 1907. 
Baldwin, James Mark (ed.).--DPP 
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology~ 3 vola. 
New York: The Macmillan Oo., 1901, 1902. 
Ba.rzun, Jaoques.--DMW 
Darwin. Marx. Wagner: Critique of a Heritage. 
Boston: Little, Brown, and Co~, 19~1. 
Bell, s.~Art.,(l907) 
WRicardo and Marx.n 
Jour, of Pol, Econ., 15(1907), 112-117. 
Berdyaev, N.-~rt.(l937) 
npersonne Humaine et Marxiame.n 
Mauriao, LOO, 17g,...202. 
Bernal, J.D.~FN 
The Freedom of Necessity. 
London~ Routledge and Kega.n Paul, 1911-9. 
Bober, M.M .. -~IOH 
Karl Ma.rxts Interpretation of Histor!. 
Cambridge~ Harvard Univ. Preas, 19 g. 
2nd edition. 
BBhm-Ba.werk, Eugen.-~AMS 
Zum Absohluss des marxschen Systems. 
Berlin: 1g96 .. 
250 
B!hm-Bawerk~ Eugen.--KMS 
Karl Marx and the Close of Eis System. 
Sweezy (ed.), BBRH, 3-llg. 
Bohn, A.F.--Art.(l948) 
ttEmergenoe of Values.n 
Jour. of Phil., lt5(194g), 4-11,....414. 
Boudin, Louis B.--TTS 
The Theoretical System of Karl Marx in the Light of 
Reoent Criticism. 
Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co.~ 1920., 
Bo~gle, C.--Art.(l93l) 
n~mile Durkheim.n 
Seligman, ESS, Vol. V, 291~292. 
r Boutroux, Emile (ed.).--Ms 
Morale Sooiale: Leoons Professees au Coll~ge Libre des 
Soienoes Sociales. . 
Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Ba.illiere~ 1g99. 
Brameld, T.B.H.--PAC 
A Philosophic Approach to Communism. 
Chicago! Chicago Univ. Press~ 1933. 
Brentano, Franz.--PeS 
Psychologie von empirisohen Standpunkt. 
Leipzig: Felix Meiner., (1g7~)1921i=1925. 
-------~----------VuSE. 
Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Dritte Auflage. 
Leipzig! Felix Meiner, {lg44)1934. 
--~-----------~~KRW The Origin of Knowledge of Right and Wrong (tr. Cecil 
Hague). 
London: Constable, 1902. 
Brightman~ E.B.--Art.(l942) 
tt.AXiology.,n 
Runes ted.), DP, 32-33. 
---------------Art.(l94S) 
nvalue.n 
Ferm (ed.,)~ EOR, gog-809. 
-----------------POR A Philosophy of Religion. 
New York! Prentice-Hall, Inc.~ 1946. 
251 
Browning, R. W .. --Art. ( 1949) . 
non Professor Lewis' Distinction between Knowledge and 
Valuation .. tt 
Ethics, 59 ( 1949) , 95-lll. 
BUkharin, N .. I.-~EM 
Historical Materialism .. 
New York: International Publishers~ 1925. 
Burns, Emile (ed.).~HOM 
A Handbook of Marxism. 
New York~ International Publishers, 1935. 
Burtt, E.A.--Art.,(l947) 
nvalue and Existence.n 
Jour. of Phil .. , 44(1947), 169-179 .. 
Chamberlin, W.H.-~Art.,(l939) 
nKarl Marx, the False prophet.n 
Amara Mere., 46(1939), 6o-6s. 
Chang, Sherman H,.M.,.--MTS 
The Marxian Theory of the State. 
Philadelphia: 1931. 
Cohen, Morriss.--Art.(l934) 
nwhy I am not a Communist.n 
Russell, Dewey, et al, SYM, 91~100. 
Cohen, Robert 8.,--..Art.(l950) 
noontemporary Marxism.n 
Rev. of Meta., 4(1950), 291-310. 
---------------Art.(l95l) 
11 Marxism and Scientific Philosophy." 
Rev, of Meta .. , 4(1951), 445-459· · 
Cole, G.D.,H.--Art.(l929) 
"Karl Heinrich ~x.n 
Enc, Brit., Vol. XIV~ 995-999, 
-----------~-WMM What Marx Really Meant. 
New York: Knopf, 1934. 
Combella.ch, D. R. B. --Art.~ ( 1949) 
nTwo Critics of Society.n 
Pacific Spectator, 3(19~)4, 440-445. 
252 
Cook, H.J.--Art.(l94o) 
ttPolitics, Sociology, and Values." 
Jour, of Social Phil., 6(1940), 35-46, 
Cork, J,--Art,(l949) 
UJohn Dewey) Karl Marx, and Democratic Bocialism,u 
Antioch Rev~, 9(1949), 435-452. 
Cramer, F,H,--Art.(l949) 
"Definitions of Freedom: Marx vs. Sohopenhauer,n 
Forum, 112(1949), 193-199. 
Croce, Benedetto,--MSEM 
253 
Materialismo Btorico ed Economia Marxistioa. 5 ed, riveduta. 
Bari: G. Laterza & figli, 1927. 
---~------------HME Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx (tr. C,M. Meredith). 
London: Allen, (1914)1931. 
Darwin, G,H,--Art.(lg75) 
"~heory of Exchange Value.u 
:FoJ:"tnightly, 23(1g75), 243=253. 
Davenport, H,J.--Rev.(l925) 
Rev, of Morrow, The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam 
Smith (1924)., 
Philos. Rev9, 34(1925), 599-609. 
Demos, R,--Art,(l944) 
ttBrief Meditation on Values,n 
Jour, of Phil,, 41(19~4), 32g-332. 
Dewey, John,--Art.(l934) 
uwhy I am not a Communist.n 
Russell, Dewey, et al, SYM, g6-90. 
--------------Art.(l944) 
nsome Questions About Value.u 
Jour, of Phil.~ 41(1944), 449-455. 
---------------Art,(l949) 
nThe Field of 'Value'." 
Lepley (ed.), VCI, 64-77• 
Douglas, P.H.-~Art.(l933) 
11Karl Marx the Pro:ehet. 11 
World Tomorrow, 16(1933), 225-227. 
Ducattillon, R.P.~-Art.(l937) 
"Doctrine Oommuniste et Doctrine Oatholique. n 
Mauriao, LCO, 5-151. 
Eastman, Max. --MAL' 
Marx and Lenin! The Science of Revolution .. 
New York: A. and c. Boni, l927o 
--------------MAS Marxism, Is it a Soience? 
New York! w.w. Norton & Co., Inc., 194o. 
Ehrenfels, C .. v.,--SdW 
System der Werttheorie. 
Leipzig: O.R. Reisland, 1g97. 
Elliott, W.Yw--Art.(l935) 
"Modern State: Karl Marx and Mr. Laski." 
Southern Rev., 1(1935)2, 209-220. 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed. 24 vols.-wEnc,Brit. 
New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1929 .. 
Engels, Friedrich.--HED 
Herrn Eugen Dilhring' s Umw!lzung der Wissenschaft.,. 
Leipzig: Genossensohaftsbuchdruckerei, 1g7g., 
---------------~AD Herr D~ing's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dtihring). 
Selections. 
Burns (ed.), HOM, 232-301. 
-------------------LUD Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassiechen deutsohen _ 
Philosophie. Zweite Auflage. 
Stuttgart! J.H.W. Dietz, 1g95. 
-----------------~LF Ludwig Feuerba.oh_. Selections. 
Burns (ed.), HOM, 214-228. 
------------------RCR 
Revolution and Counter-Revolution (ed. E .. M. Aveling, 
attributed to Marx)., 
London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., (1g51-1g52)1g96. 
-----------~-----OHM On Historical Materialism. 
New York! International Publis~rs, (lg92?), l94o. 
Engels, Friedrich.--sus 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (tr. Edw. Aveling). 
Selections from Engels> BED. 
New York: International Publishers, 1945. 
Ensor, RvO.K.--Art.(l933) 
nwnat Marxism is.n 
Spectator, 150(1933), 636w637. 
255 
Federn~ Karl.--TMC 
The Materialist Conception of History, A Critical Analysis. 
London! The MacMillan Co., Ltd., 1939. 
Ferm, Vergilius (ed.).--EOR 
An Encyclopedia of Re~on. 
New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945. 
Ferrater Mora, Jose.--DF 
Dicoionario de Filosofia. 2nd ed. 
M~xico City: Editorial Allante, 1941. 
-----------------Art.(l941) 1 
ttKarl Marx. n 
Ferrater MOra, DF, 34g-349. 
--------~-------Art.(l941) 2 
11 Marxjsmo.n 
Ferrater Mora, DF, 349-350. 
Feuer, L.S.--Art.(l942) 
flEthical Theories and Historical Materialism.» 
Science and Soc., 6(1942)3, 242-272. 
Fichte, Johann G.--VOM 
The Vocation of Man (tr. William Smith). 
La Salle: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1946. 
Flubacher, Joseph F.--EHE 
The Concept of Ethics in the History of Economics. 
~Iew York: Vantage Press, 1950. 
Frankena, W.K.--Art.(l9~) 
»Ewing's Case Against Naturalistic Theories of Value. n 
Philos, Rev.~ 57(194g), 4gl-492. 
Fuller, Edmund.--Art.(l948) 
»MOral Challenge of the Communist Manifesto.n 
Amer. Scholar, 17(19~)1, 11-17. 
. -- ---- ·- -·· - ------·----~-~-_ _.__-- ~ 
Garaud.y, R • ..........DEM 
Le Communisme et la Morale. 
Paris: 1ditions Socia.les, 19~5. 
Gray, Alexander.-ST 
The Socialist Tradition. Moses to Lenin. 
London: Longmans, Green~ and Co., 1946. 
Green, T.H,--PTE 
Prolegomena to Ethics. 5th ed. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906. 
;· Gregaine, Franz,--SPD 
Aux Sources de la Pens~e de Marx: Hegel& Feuerbach. 
Louvain: Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1947. 
Gurian, Waldemar.--Art.(l94g) 
»Communist Manifesto: Marxian Communist Doctrine." 
Commonweal~ ~g(l9~g), 516-519. 
Hallett, J.--Art.(l933) 
"Karl Marx: Fifty Years After." 
Fortnightly, 139(1933), 311-321. 
Harley, J.H.--Art.(l90l) 
"New Social Democracy and Marx." 
Contemporary Rev., go(l901), 723~733. 
Harris, A.L.~Art.(l94g) 
nsocial Philosophy of Karl Marx. 11 
Ethics, 5g(194g)3, Part 2, l-42. 
--------------Art.(l950) 
»Utopian Elements in Marx's Thought." 
Ethics, 60(1950), 79-99· 
Harrison, A.~Art.(l9l5) 
"Marx and Materialism: Reply to Hyndman and Ba.x. 11 
English Review, 19(1915), 216-224. 
Hartmann, Nico1ai.--ETK 
Ethik. 
Berlin: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1926. 
--------------~~ETH 
Ethics (tr. Coit). 3 vo1s. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., (1926)1932. 
256 
Hastings, James (ed.).--ERE 
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 12 vola. and index 
vo1. 
New York: Charles Scribner•s Sons, 190g-1927. 
Haubtma.n~ Pierre.--MP 
Marx et Proudhon~ 
Paris: Eoonomie et Humanisme 1 1947. 
Haynes, E.s.P.~t.(l923) 
"Enemies of Liberty.n 
Hibbert Jour., 21{1923)~ 54~551. 
Hegel~ G.W.F.~EpW 
Enoyolop!die der philosophisohen Wissensohaften (hrsg. von 
J. Hoffmeister). FUnfte a.uflage. 
Leipzig~ Felix Meiner~ 1949. 
Heimann~ Eduard.--Art~(l949) 
nMa.rxism: lg4g-19~g.n 
Jour, of Pol., 11(1949), 52~531. 
Hilferding~ Rudolf,--HMK 
B8hm-Bawerks Marx-Kritik, 
Wien: I. Brand, 1904i 
------------------~BB B~hm-Bawerkfs Criticism of Marx (tr. Eden and Cedar Paul). 
Sweezy (ed.)~ BBRH, 121-196. 
Hill, Thomas E.--CET 
Contemporary Ethical Theories. 
New York: The Macmillan Co,, 1950. 
Hobbes, Thomas.--LEV 
Leviathan (Everyman edition). 
New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Ino,, 1914. 
Hook, Sidney.--Art.(l93~)l 
"The Meaning of Ma.rx.n 
Russell, Dewey, et al, SYM, 47~g2. 
--------------Art.(l934)2 
"Communism without Dogmas.n 
Russell, Dewey, et a.l, 101-144. 
-------------~TUKM Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx. 
New York: The John Day Co., 1935. 
------------~Art,(1935) 
nviolenoe." 
Seligman (ed.), ESS, Vol .. XV, 264-267. 
--------------FBM From Hegel to Marx. 
New York~ Reynal & Hitohoook, 1936. 
Hook, Sidney~Art.(l940) 
11What is Living and What is Dead in Marxism? 11 
Southern Rev., 6(1940)2, 29~316., 
---------~---Art.(l9lJ.g) 
»The Communist Manifesto 100 Years After.n 
New York Times Magazine, February 1, 19lJ.g, 6~ 36, 3g. 
Hughes, H. Stuart.~AET 
An Essay for Our Times. 
New York: A.A. Knopf, 1950. 
Hunt, R.N. Carew.-~TPC 
The Theo;y and Practice of Communism. 
New York: The Macmillan Co .. , 1951. 
Jackson, T.A.~DIA 
Dialectics: The Logic of Marxism and its Critics. 
London: Lawrence & Wishart~ Ltd~, 1936. 
Jeze, Gaston.~Art.(l93g) 
11 Le Marxisme et lea Realities." 
Illustration, 200(193g), 224-225, 303, 394-395, 493~4. 
Joad, C.E~ M._...GTP 
Guide to Philosophy. 
New York: Random House, 1936. 
-------------Art.(l941) 
11Wheel Comes Full Circle. 11 
New Statesman and Nation_, 21(1941), 43l .... lJ.33, 455-456. 
Jones, L.--Art.(l933) 
11What did Marx Really Mean?» 
Christian Century. 504;1.933), 45&-.lJ.5S .. 
Kant, Imma.nuel ..... -Krv 
Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (hrsg. von R. Schmidt). 
Leipzig! Felix Meiner~ Cl7Sl)l930. 
---------------CPR 
Critique of Pure Reason (tr. Norman Kemp Smith)., 
New York: The Humanities press, (1929)1950. 
---------------GMS 
Grundiegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (hrsg. von Rudolf 
Otto). · 
Gotha: L. K~atz, 1930. 
Kant, Imma.nuel.---FPME 
The Fundamental Principles of the_ Metaphysics of Ethics 
(tr. Manthey-Zorn). 
New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 193g. 
'259 
Xautsky., Xarl~-EMCH 
Ethios and the Materialist Conoeption of History (tr .. John 
B. Askew) .. 
Chicago! Charles H .. Kerr & Co., 1909 .. 
Korsch., Karl.--Art.(l933) 
"Karl Marx,.fl 
Seligman (ed.), ESS, Vol- X, 172-175• 
Labriola, Antonio.--SP 
Socialism and Philosophy (tr~ Untermann). 
Chicago! Charles H. Kerr & Co., 19~~ 
Laird, John.~IOV 
The Idea of Value. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1929• 
Laski, Har·old, --COM 
Communism. 
New York: H. Holt & Co., 1927. 
Lee, Algernon (ed.).~EM 
The Essentials of Marx. 
New York: Vanguard., 1926. 
Lee, Otis,.-~EI 
Existence and Inquiry. 
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 19~9. 
Lenin, V.I.--WTD 
What is to be Done? 
New York: International Publishers, (1902)1929• 
Lepley., Ray.~vov 
Verifiability of Valua. 
New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1944 .. 
---~----~--and others.--VOI 
Value: A Cooperative Inquiry. 
New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 19~9. 
Lewis, C.I.--AKV 
An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. 
La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co., 19~6. 
··-----. -- ·-- ... --------·---~~= 
Lewis, J.D.-~Art.(l936) 
11 The Individual and the Group in Marxist Theory." 
International Jour. of Eth., 47(1936)~ 45-56. 
-----------(ed.}.~-Art.(l949) 
.flMarxism, Revolution, and Democracy: lS~ and 194g.n 
Jour, of Pol., 11(1949), 51~565. 
Lays, Wayne A.R.--ESP 
Ethics and Social Poliov. 
New York! Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1941. 
Little, C.J.--Art.(lg90) 
nKarl Marx, 1g1g-1gg3.n 
Ohautauguan, 10(1g9o), 694-69g. 
Loomis, R. S .. -Art. (1919) 
nDefense of Naturalism.n 
International Jour~ of Eth., 29(1919), lgg_201. 
Lovett, R.M.-~Rev.(l929) 
Review of Rtihle~ Karl Marx--His Life and Work (1929), and 
Marx, Capital. 
New Republic, 59(1929), 265-266. 
MacDonell, J,--Art.(1g75) 
"Karl Marx and German Socialism.n 
Fortnightly~ 23(1875), 3g2-391. 
260 
MacMurray, John, J.M. Murray, N.A. Holdaway, and G.D.H, Oo1~.--MAR 
Marxism. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1935. 
Mallett, Marcus B,--Art.(l942) 
llMa.rxism .. n 
Runes (ed.), DP, lSS~1g9. 
Mannheim, Karl.--Art.(l935) 
llErnst Troeltsch.n 
Seligman, ESS, Vol. XV, 106-107. 
Marshall, Alfred.--Art,(lg76) 
1lMill's Theory of Value." 
Fortnightly, 25(1876), 591-602. 
Mauriao, F. and others.--~CC 
Le Oommunisme et les Chretiens. 
Paris: Librairie Plan, 1937 .. 
Meinong~ A.--GaW 
Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie. 
Groz: Leuschner & Lubensky, 1923 
Mehring,- Franz.--KMD 
Karl Marx: Geschichte seines Lebens. Dritte Auflage. 
Leipzig: Leipziger jjuchdruckerei iAktiengesellsc:b.aft, 
19!0. 
-------------~XM Karl Marx: The Story of Hie Life. 
New York: Covici, Friede, Publishers, 1935 .. 
Mellor, Stanley A • .--Art.(l921) 
nso eia.lism. 1t 
Hastings ( ed.,), ERE1 · Vol. XI, 63~650. 
Menczer, B,--Art.(l947) 
ncentena.ry of the Communist Manifesto.n 
Contemporary, 172(1947), 35~359. 
Mills, Frederick c.--Art.(l949) 
URound Table in Commemoration of the Centenary of the 
Communist Manifesto! The Sociology and Economics of 
Class Conflict. Opening Remarks.n 
Amer, Econ. Rev., 39(1949), 13-15. 
Mitchell, E.T.--Art.(l945) 
nneweyts Theory of Valuation.u 
Ethics, 55(19~5), 2a7-297, 
Moore, G.E.--PE 
Principia Ethica. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, (1903)l94a, 
Mo~ris, William and E.B. Bax.--soc 
Socialism: Its Growth and Outcome, 
Lo.ndon! Swan Sonnenschein & Co,, 190g. 
Muelder, Walter G.--PCM 
A Personalistic Critique of Marxism~ 
Unpublished.,. 
Murray, John, a.nd others.--MAR 
Marxism. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1935. 
Parkes, Henry Bamford.~MAA 
Marxism: An Autopsy, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939. 
---------------Art.(l939) 
nsome Marxist Fallacies.n 
Southern Rev., 4(1939)3, 474-4ag, 
---.] 
-I 
Parsons, Talcott.--Art~(l949) 
usooial Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent 
Sociological Theory~n 
Amer. Eoon, Rev., 39(1949), 16-26. 
Perry, R.B.--GTV 
General Theory of Va1ue. 
New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926. 
Pettee, George S.--Art.(l940) 
nThe Failure of Marxism.n 
Jour, of Social Phil,, 6(194o), 101~136, 
Plato.--DIA 
The Dialogues of Plato (tr. Jowett). 2 vola. 
New York: Random House, 1937 .. 
Rader, Melvin M,--ES 
Ethics and Society1 An Appraisal of Social Ideals. 
New York: Henry Holt and Co,, 1950. 
Reekie, A.G.--Art,(l94g) 
ttEnd of Communism.,n 
Hibbert Jour.,, 46(194g), 26~262. 
Ricardo, David,--PPE 
Principles of Political Economy. 
New York: The Macmillan Co,, 1909. 
R~le, Otto.~-KMD 
Karl Marx: Leben und Werk, 
Dresden: Aralun Verlag, 192g, 
__ .,. ..... _,...~------XM 
Karl Marx! His Life and Work ( tr. E .. and c. Paul). 
New York: Viking Press, 1929. 
Runes, Dagobert D. (ed,).--DP 
The Dictionary of Philosophy, 
New York: The Philosophical Library, 1942. 
-----------------(ed.),--TCP 
Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought. 
New York! The Philosophical Library, 1943. 
Russell, Bertrand.--PRF 
Proposed Roads to Freedom, 
New York: Henry Holt and Co. , 1919. 
Russell, Bertrand, J. Dewey, and others.-...... sY.M 
The Meaning of Marx: A Sxwosium. 
New York~ Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.~ 1934. 
Russell, Bertrand.--Art,(l934) 
"Why I am not a Communist. n 
Russell, Dewey, et al, SYM, S3~S5. 
Santayana, G.--Art.(l949) 
"Some DeveloplWnts of Materialism. n 
Amer. Scholar, la(l949), 27l-2Sl. 
Schiller, F.c.s.--Art.(l922) 
"Value. 11 
Hastings (ed.), ERE, Vol. XII, 5g4-5a9. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A.--CSD 
Capitalism, Socialism. and Democr~c4• 2nd edition. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 19 1· 
~------------------Art.(l949) 
"Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics." 
Jour. of Pol. Econ., 57(1949)~ 199-212. 
Scott, John Waugh.--KMV 
Karl Marx on Value. 
London: I. & c. Black, Ltd., 1920. 
Seli~n, Edwin R.A. (ed.).--ESS 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 14 vole. 
·New York: The Macmillan Co,., 1930-1937. 
Sellars, R.W.--Art.(l944) 
"Can a Reformed Materialism do Justice to Values?" 
Ethics. 55(1944), 2S~5. 
Selsam, Howard.--SAE 
Socialism and Ethics. 
New York: International Publishers, 1943. 
---------------Art.(l94a) 
"Ethics of the Communist Manifesto." 
Science and Soc., 12(l94B)l, 22-32. 
Shead, Francis J,--CAM 
Communism and Man, 
New York: Shead and Ward, l93B. 
Sidgwick~ Henry and A.G. Widgery.--OHE 
Outlines of the History, of Ethics., 
London: The MacMillan Co.~ Ltd., 1949. 
Smith, Adam.,--WN 
The Wealth of Nations. 
New York: The MOdern Library, 1937. 
Smith, H .. --Art. (1939) . 
nMarx as a Pure Eoonomist.w 
Eeon. Hist., ~(1939), 245-25g· 
Smith, T_v.~-Art.(l93l) 
11Ethioe. 11 
Seligman (ed.), ESS, Vol. V, 602-607. 
________ _..... ... QE 
Constructive Ethics: With Contemporary Readings. 
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 194S. 
Somerville, J. MacPherson.--Art.(l942)1 
11Karl Marx,n 
Runes (ed.), DP, lgg. 
-----------------~-----Art.(l942)2 
11Dialeotical Materialism. 11 
Runes (ed.), DP, 79-SO. 
------------------------Art.(l943) 
11Dialeotioal Materialism. 11 
Runes (ed.), TOP, 469-509. 
Sorel~ G.-~Art.(lg99) 
nttEthique du Socialisme. 11 
Boutroux (ed.), MS, 133-161. 
------------DEC 
La DEi composition du Marxisme,. 
Paris: M. RiviElre~ 1908. · 
Spargo, John.--LAW 
Karl Marx! His Life and Work. 
New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1910. 
Speier, Hans.--Art.(l937) 
nMax Weber .. n 
Seligman (ed.), ESS, Vol. XV, 3S6-3g9. 
Spinka, M.--Art.(l94g) 
11Berdyaev's Critique of Oommunism.n . 
International Rev. of Missions, 37(l94g), 264-272. 
264 
Spinoza.-..ETHD 
Die Ethik (Neu ~bersetzt und mit einem einleitenden VorwGrt 
versehen von J. Stern). 
Leipzig: P. Recla.m~ lggg., 
--------ETH 
Ethics., 
Spinoza~ SEL, 94-ijQO,. 
--------SEL 
Spinoza Seleo~ions (ed. John Wild). 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons~ 1930. 
Standen, Anthony.--Art.(l949) 
UA Scientist Reads Das Kapital.n 
Commonweal, 4g(l949), 519-521. 
Stabbing,· L.S .. --Art. (1939) 
»Ethics and Materialism.» 
Ethics, 50(1939), 35~. 
Stewart~ D.A.--Art.(l949) 
nNaturalism and the Problem of Value." 
Queen's Quarterly, 56(1949)1, 15-29. 
Sulzbach, Walter.--Art.(l940) 
n•classt and Class Str~gle.n 
Jour. of Soc. Phil., 6rl940), 22-34. 
Sweezy, P.M. (ed.).--BBRH 
Karl Marx and the Close of His System bv Eugen von B8hm-
Bawerk and B8~Bawerk's Criticism of Marx by RUdolf 
Hilferding., 
New York: A.M. Kelley, 1949. 
Thalheimer~ August.--DIAM 
Einf~rung in den dialektischen Materialismus: die moderne 
Weltanschauun_g_,. 
Wiant Verlag f~r Literature und Politik, 192g., 
-----------------IDM 
Introduction to Dialectical Materialism: The Marxist 
World-view (tr .. Simpson and Waltner). 
New York: Covice, Friede, Inc., 1936. 
Tillich, Paul.--Art.(l94g) 
RHow Much Truth is there in Karl Marx?n 
Christian Century, 65(194g), 906-90g. 
-------------and others.--PE 
The Protestant Era. 
Chicago: Univ .. of Chicago Press, 194g~ 
Urban, W.M.--Art.(l902) 
nworth. 1f 
Baldwin (ed.), DPP, Vol. II, S22-S66. 
~---,:_-------VAL 
Valuation. 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1909. 
-----------~Art.(l9~3) 
lfAJtiology.,ll 
Runes (ad.), TCP~ 51-73. 
Va:aghan, Wayland F.--SP 
Social Psychology: The Science and the Art of Living 
Together .. 
New York: The Odyssey Press~ l94S. 
Venable, V .. --HNM 
Human Nature: The Marxian View. 
New York: A.A. Knopf~ 1946. 
Vivas, E.--Art.(l946} 
nAnimadvereions on Naturalistic Ethics.n 
Ethics, 56(1946), 157-177. 
Vorl!nder, Ka.rl.--XuM 
Kant und Marx: Ein Betra.g zur Philosophie des Sooialie-
mus. Zweite Aufga.be. 
T~bingin~ Mohr, (1911)1926 .. 
Waddington, C.H.-~Art.(l94l) 
nRelations between Science and Ethics. lt 
Nature, l4S(l94l), 270-2SO. 
•!.•·· 
Warren, R.E.~Art.(l942) 
1YPlace of Values in Social Theory.n 
Jour. of Soo. Phil., 7(1942), 223-239. 
Weisengrtn, Paul.--MSF 
Der Ma.rxismus und das Wesen der sozialen Fra.ge. 
Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1900. 
Windelband, Wilhelm.--GdP 
Gaschiohte der Philosophie. 
Freiburg: J,.O.B. Mohr, 1S92. 
-------------------HOP 
266 
A History of Philosophy (tr. James H. Tufte). 2nd edition. 
New York! The Macmillan Co., 1905. 
Wright, D.M.--Art.(l949) 
DThe Economics of a Classless Society.n 
Amer. Econ. Rev., 39(1949), 27-36. 
Ziegenfuss, W. and G. Jung.-wArt.(l950) 
nxarl Marx.n· . 
Ziegenfuss and Jung, PL, Vol. II, 12g-133. 
Ziegenfuss, W. and G. Jung.~PL 
Philosophen-Lexikon: Handw!rterbuoh der Phi1osophie naoh 
Personen. 2 vols. 
Berlin: W. ae Gruyter, 1950. 
ABSTRACT 
It is the problem of this dissertation to discover, 
describe, and evaluate Karl Marxts philosophy of value or 
worth (as distinct from his economies of value). Examina-
tion of his thought reveals that Marx had no explicit, sys-
tematic value theory. Attention therefore is turned to the 
task of constructing Marx's philosophy of value, on the 
basis of his various value judgments, value principles, and 
general theory. This task is complicated by textual and 
interpretative problems in the writings of Marx, as well as 
by widely held misinterpretations of Marx. But these prob-
lems are not insurmountable, nor even especially unusual. 
The first element in constructing Marx's value theory 
is a review of his method. Three approaches in Marx are 
revealed: the humanistioJ the historical or soientifio, 
and the dialectical. Eaoh is prominent in Marx, and each 
yields its characteristic approach to value. 
The humanistic approach yields the chief subjeot of 
value, man. Man's aotivity as a value creating and experi-
encing being constitutes the su~jeotive conditions of value. 
The objective conditions of value are those factors in man's 
world (matter and society) whioh condition the individual's 
life and value el.;periences. Marx's theory is expressed in 
the doctrine that value is a.ohieved through the free, con-
scious activity of men in pursuit of their own human purposes. 
Men realize their destiny as they are more active$ more 
conscious, and. more free. 
An important critical problem rises from Ma.rx''s human-
ism. Many have been led, by his emphasis on man, to believe 
that the Marxist ethics and value theory are essentially 
Xantian. It is concluded that the case for this view is 
strong. Marx's writings at times seem to involve idealism 
(both in ethics and in metaphysics). But the opposing, 
historical interpretation of Marx is also strong. This 
indicates a conflict in Marx•s own thought. 
Marx's scientific or historical approach is expressed 
in his special theories of man, matter and society. In 
these theories Marx stresses description, and a theoretical 
neutrality to the question of values. The task of science 
becomes one of revealing facts, rather than verifying ends. 
In Marx's value theory, viewed dialectically, man is 
the thesis or subject of value. The antithesis or man's 
objects are matter and society. Value is a synthesis of 
man's interaction with the material world and society. 
The dia.leotioal tendency of Marx's thought is illus-
trated also by his stress on activity and rational wholes. 
Stress on activity issues in emphasis on the primacy .of 
action, as against contemplation. Maxx sees in the fulfil-
ment of rational wholes, in the reconciliation of subj eot 
and object, of man and his environmental conditions, the 
realization of value. But this principle also leads to an 
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emphasis on the group as prior to the individual, and on 
history as prior to present society. 
Marx's theory of disvalue can be derived from his pro-
lific judgments on specific evils. The various types of 
dehumanization whioh he soared--brutalization, enslavement, 
alienation and other forms of human destruction--reflect 
his humanism. Marx's scientific attitude is reflected in 
his attacks on the evil of fetishism. Fetishism is in large 
measure a. failure of human knowledge, which true science 
can help to correct. This also suggests Marx's humanism, 
for fetishism, on Marx1 s view, implies the priority of a 
nonhuman realm. The evil of unreason, the failure to bring 
h'tlman knowledge and science to bear on all human problems, 
also reflects Marx•s scientific emphasis as well as his 
dialectical method. 
Typical of the critical problems suggested by Marx's 
thought are ethical materialism, means. norms, freedom, 
statism, and the role of the individual. With respect to 
the first of these, it may be said that Marx's materialism 
implies no ethical priority for material values. Seoond, 
Marx's theory of means is found to be re!A.tivistio, leading 
to social strategies which seem to compromise his own ethi-
cal standards. The problem of norms Marx also treated rel~ 
tivistioa.lly. Norms are validated not by reason, but by 
human purposes and human science. With respect to freedom, 
Ma.:rx affirms rational, conscious control of the material 
world and man's social matrix, as the path to liberty • 
- -- . 
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The danger of statism seems to be implied in Ma.rx1s 
social view, but his real purpose was the abolition of the 
state~ There is reason to believe that Marx looked favor-
ably on democratic ideals. His conscious goal was the free-
dom and enriohment of human individuals. 
Several salient weaknesses in Marx's thought may be 
noted. The three-fold method leads to incongruities. In 
spite of his concern for the individual, Marx's interest 
at times seems to be only in broad, historical achievement. 
The individual is sacrificed to the revolutionary cause. 
Again, human purposes and ends, and the unity of theory 
and practice are basic in Ma.rx1 s anthropology. But in his 
scientific theory Marx is indifferent to ends. 
While simplicity, exactness, and concreteness are posed 
as Marx's scientific ideals, his own science often leads to 
over-simplified, over-generalized, abstract, unprovable 
statements and theories. This is especially true in appli-
cations of historical materialism. 
For the purpose of elaborating a general theory of 
value, Marxts thought seems too narrow. It considers facts, 
but not enough facts. For exampleJ Marx's theory of man 
is sociological, which may be meritorious. But there is a 
tendency to regard sociological facts as the only facts. 
Other approaches (such as the religious, psychological, or 
biological) seem to be ignored or excluded. 
Finally, there is the question of faotual correctness. 
Marx's views are highly theoreticalJ and ~xtremely diffi-
cult to prove. Marx did aim to support his theories with 
elaborate factual evidence. But there is also a tendency 
to be satisfied with the application of a scientific for-
mula or general methodological proo~dure, and to neglect 
full factual proof, the type of proof Marx•s own theory 
demanded. Some of Marx's theories were notJ and perhaps 
could not be proven with factual certitude. 
The argument of this dissertation may be summarized 
in the following propositions: 
l. Marx's approach to value is (with uneven consistenoy) 
humanistic, historical or scientific, and dialectical. 
2. As a humanist, Marx stresses the free, conscious 
activity of men in pursuit of their own human purposes. 
;. As Q humanist, Marx deplored as evil all conditions 
which enslave, brutalize, or alienate men. 
4. Marx's humanism suggests a Xantian influence, but 
taken as a whole Marx's thought is opposed to the Xantian 
approach to ethics and values. 
5. As a historical materialist, Marx stresses descrip-
tion, is relativistic, and takes a sociological, rather than 
religious or ethical, view of man. 
6. As a dialectician, Marx found a value principle in 
developing wholes, and in the dialectical interplay between 
man and his social-material environment. 
7. The weaknesses in Marx's philosophy of value seem to 
derive chiefly from inconsistencies in special applications 
of the three-fold method, and from Marx's failure to develop 
from his humanism, historical materialism, and dialectics, 
a single» coherent method. 
g• Marx's theory is often more abstract, generalized, 
and conceptual than his own scientific principles would 
allow. 
9. Marx foresaw an era in which men could freely develop 
all their capacities, achieve goals now undreamed of, master 
their historical, social, and material environment, and, 
for the first time, make nhumanu history. 
10. For Karl Marx the problem of value is more a task for 
action, than a theoretical problem for thought. 
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family moved to Sioux City. There Mr. Cox completed his 
secondary education at East High School. 
275 
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